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E:.;{POSITION Oli' THE PROBLEM 
It is much easier to point out the faults and 
errors in the work of a great mind than to 
give a distinct 0nd full exposition 
. of its value. l 
No thinking man today questions the wide-spre.:1d influence 
which the publication of Irnmanuel hant' s Y~i tik del' Heinen -~.-----~ 
x~rnuR!.i had upon the philosophical world. Many great problems 
h,Jve arisen in philosophy and in (7Ven the day-to-day life of men 
as a result of the new realms of thought 1',8nt'8 writings un-
cuvered. !.iany of those problems arose out 01' the conclusions nod 
implications of his teaching. But many problems also arose in th 
interpretation cf Rant's writings, in trie precise purpose of some 
of his ideas, and in the very meaning of his words. 
" . 
Y.ant's thought is often of such profundity, so comprehensive 
in its ramifications, that its expression on pap~r has seemed to 
his reader a labyrinth of incomprehensible terminology and 
flagrant contradictions. But those who have read l<:t=lnt wi til an 
open mind and a willingness to see his vi-aw have denied that such 
lArthur 3<fflopenhauer, p,ritlcism.££. ~ I<~}ntia,n Ptli.l.0-fJ"£phZ, 
quoted in s. l<orner, ~ (Harmonds'Worth. 19f)5), p. 5. 
8 
1s truly the case. Nevertheless, the quality ot h1. thought 18 
not solely reapoulble tor ,be contusion so onen met in attemp' 
iDg to tollow his reasoning. Not intrequentlJ his .1"1 tinS shOlllS 
tbe detinite marka ot a hurried and s Qllewba t careleaa expre •• 1on 
Both tilese factors. the qual1ty ot his 1ihOlght and the manner 1n 
which it wa_ eXlB'essed, have resulted in the tremen40us arral of 
:fu:lntian CO DllIEunar1, so 41_rae and. otten c cn:tradicto17. 'fil1cn is 
ava1la ble today to the • tuden' ot Xan'. 
Not least 1mportant in tile 41ft! Olltl.s ot interpretatim 1 
the :ramons passage in 1be CE& tl@8 .9t. ll!t!. Bt!!9P entitled "The 
Schema 1;i am of the PuN Concept S ot the Underst aDding. tt At 1ih 18 
pOint in the l1Ii"9. iant haa proved the existence and Decessit 
Of !. prior' ooncept •• the oat.ser1es, 1ilieh are the const1tuent 
elements ot all cognitional experience and are 11mited for their 
valid use to the realm ot sense knOllledge. 2 Theae categorles 81" 
pure and I. PUSi (1n no wise empir1cal 1n or18in). Otherwise h 
• 
oould oo.r knowledge be necessary and ~n1v" sal,3 But the 1n1m1-
20r as Kant expressed 1 t, tt. • • th er",! san be no a pr10rl 
1 e, 11911 N.. Object. Sit. ])0111'6, expei,iiFFtt ImrAanuel 
t, 0 e • n'S. tres. orman em.p Smith, and 84. (London .• 1955 f p. '14.t&llcs 1n orlginal. In Kantts or1ginal 
ed1 t lan, B 166. All aubsequent reterencea to the text ot the 
ClA!lSlP wUl include the pagina.t1m or both 1st aDl Ind ed1t:k> 
'I anrespect1ve17. -- lt tbe text is toUDd In boUl editions. 
Tbe p.lg1natlon ot the SJD.1 th translat10n wlll be 1ncluied 1n po re 
theses. Thus a sample :reference to the Hf1tGeUG would be s1llP1y 
"4 l39-B 1'l8 (laL).tt The clted text wo a round on page 13' 
or the 01"181_1 German t1rst ed1 tion, on page 1'78 of the orlg1na 
German second edition, and an page 161. ot the sm.1th translatlon. 
3ct. B 2-4 (43-44). A 'la-a 104 (112). A 13'1-B 1'16 (180), 
and many simllar pas88gea. 
.3 
tlonal4 sense experience vlhlen tbese caagories make possl'ble 
to which they apply in consc1 QUa judgment is completely ampul-
cal.5 The oategories and sense intuition then, are th<rougbly 
heterogeneous. This, wlth a. brevi ty whlch makes almost a carie 
ture ot the ttDeductions". 113 the development ot Kant's tb.ouejlt 
tbe Cntlgue 1dlan he a~. up the probleDls.torwhlch sehematlsma 
the aChemais. are 1ihe answer.6 
In the ttTraDsoenden1al Aesthet1c" and in the IfAmlytle ot 
Concepts" Of the "Tran seendental Ana17tlc tt Kant baa shOlfn lJ'Ael 
there III1st be A Rlisi catesories to account tor our universal 
neceaaa1'7 knowledge, :!;i!~ we apply these categorles to cbject1v 
synthetlc!. PI,g:, Judgments ot exp!tr1ence, aId tbat such an 
application Is just1tle4.' 
Now, 1n the "AJullytio or Prine ipl • .-," Y.ant propose. to ab. 
us how these oateSll!' lea are used aDS. 8,lP118d, the mnner 
they hang together with the e18_nt.~ot sensibilit,._ He 
first by sb<»: in.g tbe sensible eonU tions under which the categ 
les can be employed, 1.e. scb.ematism ot the :pure UllI1erslllnding. 
'.ntuI,IS1l here and thl'Ql@lout this thesis 1s taken in the 
:Kiln\lan. senae at that. thrw~ wbich knowledge 1s 1.m.Dl3d1atel,. 1'8 
lated to objects. ct. A 19-*S 33 (65). Almost always In FAnt 
means sanse intuitIon. In the German, Anschauung: Intuition or 
singular representation. 
eA 19-B 33 (66). A 6l--B '75 (93). AlZ'7-B 1'76 {laO} t !l Ii • 
&rhe mere 1ntimate relationsbip Yil1ch schemat1am has to til 
metaphysical aM transcend en tal deducti ons w1l1 be d1:5 cusaed 1 
chs. II and III. 
? .. ..-:--See Aorner, P. '70. 
and secondly, in the "Principles of Pure Umera1andlng." be 
demonstrates the rules of' Judgment in which the oa'tegcrles are 
app11ed to experienoe. 8 
It 1s. of course, 'he first of these two which involves the 
precise problem of' this thesis. Since ·the "deductions" have lett 
the categories aId intu1tlonal e::xperlence so 18terogeneous, sche-
ma. tlsmmuat provlde some fttb. 11'4 thing, wbich 1s hcmogeneOQs an 
the one hand with·tba ,cate80r7, and on the other hand w1 th 
appearance. ft9 Th18 th Ire! thingi., 1n Slnml8ry tashlon tor the 
present, ftthe $ranIS,nden'll 89hP,ft10 a "transcendental deter-
minationat t1me."1l the "produot of imagimtion," a "universal 
procedure of' imagination 1n prov1ding an image for a concept t ... 12 
and tta rule or ayn1bea1s ot the 1magina t1 en. ,,13 Schematism i. th 
"procedure at the ullderstand1ng in tbaae schemata, ft14 and an ttart 
concealed 1n the depths of the human swl. ft 15 Bes1des, the 
schemta l1mit the eategones ~ sena~bUity and are t.be p.benomeDa 
8et• illil. and A 136-5 1'15 (179). 
9A 138--B17'1 (181). 
10Ib1d • Italics in original. 
114 138-139--B 1'17.178 (181). 
12A 149-B 179 (182). 
13A 141--B 180 (lSS). 
14,A. 140-B 119 (18S). 
15A 141--B 180 (185). 
" . 
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or scmsible ooncepts or objects in agreement with the categorles: 
All this. and tile cha.pter on scnematism as a whole. are con-
fusi,ng. even 'to one v4lo haa managed to inch his way through the 
involve4 passagee of the mtaphysical. am transcendental 
deductions. But when the brain-weary reader looks to tbe commen ... 
tatora for aome 11gb. t in his intellectual contusion, be meets onl 
a chaos 01' diver •• and otten contradictory interpretatlons. 
Norman Kemp Smith, probably the most w1de.17 read F.ng11sh 
mentator on the Or! tlgp.t 1n recent t1mes, forms the opinion that 
Kant's trea1ment or schsnat1sm is h1~ly flrt1f1c1al, an accretion 
which has been insplred principally by kant's 10V'e for the archl-
. tectonic at tradltlOD4l 10g1c. The problan of t1» heterogenel. 
ot categol"Y am lntult ion is no real problem at all. !bese two 
are related 11ke matter and form w1th correlatlve ,..t d1rrerent 
Datures.1 ' 
Mntts architecton1c has forced'~hlm to state the proplem in 
a m.Ost m1sleading manner. FQr scherratism. Smith maintains, is not 
BubsumptiCll but raUler creati ve synthesis rIb:) reby the content of 
knowledge 1s apprehended in terms of relations. Further, tmre is 
no need. ta! a "third th1ng, ft the dis cua.lon of wblCh is m.erely 'tb8 
error of comp,j·ring the relat10n of oategory to intu1tion to the 
16A146--B 186 (las). The above quotations lnc~ude all the 
essent1al det1n1t1 ODS and descriptions ot schematism that Kant 
ofters. 'l,'hey will be analyzied 1n detail in subsequttnt chapters. 
'. :a,'1Norroo.n Kemp arn1tb.. Ii con:unentar!:sto Kant', grltlgue.2tl!!£.t 
R!!J.on, 2nd 84. (New York, l§SO), p. r. 
relation of a claas concept to 1ts particulars. IS 
Nevet-thel.ss. Smith sdmi;s that Kant fa trea'tmltnt or schema-
tlsm haa the value or cllarltylng his doctrine on produc"1 ve 
1mglm tton, on the relat10n ~ image aId concept, and on the na-
ture 01' the elist motion between the categories and the pure fer me 
of understandlng.19 It is evident, thoush. according to 9m1th, 
that I<t.mt '. arohi teet (Ute has fer ced him to pretace tlu ••• Insight. 
wi th remarks which run entirel, cCAln'ter to the point he was tl'ying 
to Dike • .!!I.. the InseparabilIty ~ concepticn and 1ntultl0J1.IO 
Althcugh Smithts ain concern in his canments on schematlsm 1s 
pOInting out Kant's ... rars, the stand .m takes on the 1D.terpre'ta-
ti on or 8chematism's mean1ng seems to be a. mare S1bjectlve one • 
.9m1 th ends by interpreting the schemata. as ecpl valent to the 
categarlesl He claims '\;hey are nothing more than tba pure logical 
forms a s modi tled tlr ough the 1r re1a tl0 n t'o tImEt. 81 
lSll!!l_. pp. 334 aid 335. 
19~.t pp. 356-339. 
20Ib!4 •• p. 340. 
21 Ib1f., pp. 359-340. It is difficult to show with cert1tude 
that 3mi th 8 equlvalatlon or Kant's aohetMta Vi'1 th the categar les 
places him def1nitely on a subjectivistic InterpretatIon. am1th 
does not expand the im.plioatlons ot tb,is 1nterpreta'tlon. Perhaps 
1t Is truer to say that Smith was 80 concerned w1th polnt1ng QQ" 
what he saw to be the .-rore and dl:f't1cult1. 1n the chapter on 
schematiam that be never nally stoOd on a subjective lnterpreta-
t10n where the schalE woUld be a cond1 t10nlns process nor on an 
objeotlve OBe where the schema would be a churaoter1stl0 ot 
cons c1 Quane.s. 
'1 
ludp.en' aa to wbet;her theae and other crit101sms ot smith 
are Jus'1tie4, or to wbat extent. ,is being reserved till later. 
Similarly with the o1iher oommentators that will be d1scussed 1n 
this intrOduct !QQ.. For the (i) .lect1ve here 18 merely to point ou' 
the existing opinion on the value aM _anlDg or Kant's cbapWr 
sohematla. 
One or the m.ost au'\b.oritaUve eXElJJl)les ot an opposing 
oplniOD. on Kant 'a scl:uunat1am. is that ot H • .T. Paton. Be SptDd8 no 
leluf tban 1ihree chapt .. s of h1a two volUDle oommen~ary on the til's 
halt ot the or ".lSU an.allz1ng Kant' areas on1ng 1n the chapter Q11 
scbemat18m aDd demonstrating lta importaDce 1n the Kant:lan a,at .. 
M1n1aizing tar the mOilt part Kant's view ot the achemata as 
verlMl rules ~ 1ag1.nat2t>n,tt Patcn'a moat fundamautal vin 1a t 
the schemata are universal oharacteriatl ca of experi_co t belong-
ing prec1sely to the known obJeata. 82 Thus at the outset Pa:tan'a 
i8 a decidedl,. obJeotive view in th.~ interpretatlQll at schematiam. 
, 
Moreover. he maintains the. t the cb.apto:t on schematiam is a n esse 
tlal part ot theargumen t at the ar J,tlgu,t and ot much mare value 
than merelYPointlng out iant's error •• 23 
Adm1tt1ng the obsourity and artificiality at much of Xlmt's 
21a.J. Paton. IftS·f !lMP_110 11t~ 'tI,'ftP (New York, 1936). II. 17-8). spec a 1:~U8 lOr trans ceD4ental 
schemata ue the u.ni veraal charaoteri.tles ,whlCh, he hope. to sb. 
later. Il\1.8t belong to all objects aa o'bJeCj, J..!. ~ These uni .... 
versal charaeteristlc. belong to oDject., not aaSIien to sensa-
tion. bu' •• !£ibiD1A by the transcenden'&al sy:o:theaia of imgiIl4 .... 
tion :in one t •• "Ib14. 19 and 20. Italic8 in or1ginal. Far 
the deliberate oveJ:'l"{S'Olt'g ot the ttrule or 1maginatiOntt aspect of 
schemat1am, aee 1b14-. 18, 110te 2. 
231!U:i_, 20 an4 21. 
8 
treatmen$, Paton 1s tirmll convinced tbat nevertheless the chapt. 
1s by no _aDa euperfluoua. We nee" the argu_nt tar the iapoal-
tlon ot unl"er_l characterist10s an objects 1n a sJIltbe.ta cor-
respondiDg to the catesorles. ae cla1ma to retu.te the objec1;lons 
ot many oamu8l1tatar., 1D.C1.ud1.ug 'the JIB tter-torm difficultl pro-
posed by smith whlch wa. discussed abore. 84 
other oharac'teristlca ot Paton'. pO.lt~CD which ha.,. not le't 
been dl.oua.e" are 'the tollowlng. He 61., •• 1ih. reader car.:tlll 
analrsea of the text on scbematl.m and weighs in detaU the possi-
ble lnterpretat101.l8:. lie goe. to great pllna 1n tbia matter and, 
as wm be •• en later, makes oarehl distinctions in Kant's mean-
iag ot achen:atl_ 1Ihloh are not noticed by other eo.entator •• 
The •• di.tinotlou are the toundatioD ot· his favorable 1nterpreta-
tion ot aChematlsm.J5 
The t1r.t two cOI.IIentatar. just oDnsiderea. are probably the 
most pOinted example. 1n df.Donsvat1q the dive .itl or ~terp:r.-
" . 
1;at1011 of tbe 8Cb.e.t1am pissage. The other co __ tators 1;0 be 
considered, although or lesser importance, will also aid 1n 
84lliJe, 27 and 26. 
atisesides the passage. already reterred to, see Ibid., 66, 
note 2; also seotion 5 and 6 or OOe 341 lP.1Aet 75-78. For the en-11gblen1ng di811ncti0ll8 mentioned (wh cli1iI'l ea'ter the argument. 
ot this the.i. later) .88 especially section 10 ot ell. 32 and seo-
tion 1 ot ch. 33. Ib3,.4_, 39-41 and 42-44; also seotlon 2 ot oh.34. 
Ig&g., Ge.70. 
It there i. allJ light thrown on the d1ft1cult subject ot 
lantta .011e_t1.881 a. a re811t of thi. tbea1s, the author is aboye 
all other. indeb1ie4 to Patan tor the elucidating argument. ot h1a 
o Q1UI8ntar 1. aa should be evident from subsequent reterences. 
9 
h1ghlighting this diversitl_ 
Betore this path lead. "00 great a d 1stanoe from Paton, the 
opin1on ot S. Korner ought to b~ cons14ered. His interpretation. 
of schemati8Dl i8 not greatly 41tterent trom Paton t •• True, 
KOrner doe. not attempt the extElls1ve treatment that Paton does. 
In general he considered sohemata aa "re.terential rules" ooncern-
ing concepts which link them to perception. Non-reterentlal rule. 
concerDing concept. tell about the eont .. t ot 'the C(f1ceptSt but 
without relAtlC1l to objects. For example. "BeIng a dog implies 
being 8 aammal." 1.,8 non-reterentlal rule. On the other band.' 
8 reterentlal rule would make a concept appllca.ble to concrete 
experlence. Since the categories deal .. ltll reallt,. aa such.thelr 
referent1al rule. or sohemata must be auch as to eraable their 
appllcatl~t not to particular objects, but to the experience of 
objects as 8uch. Now tb.e tea ture whlch '8 common to every object 
ot experience lncluding the empiricai:, sel. t 18 belng in tlme. The 
schemata are thus the tanporal conditions under which the oate-
gories are applicable to exPerience. This interpretatlon .eems tG 
thls wrlter quIte similar to Paton's -universal characterlstios 
ot exper1ence," and thus Korner also stands tae an objective in-
terpretation at 8Cbematism.1e 
8GKbl'uer, pp. 70-75. "or a category, aooordingly,the schema, 
and consequently the reterential rules, determine the specific 
condl tions uder whiCh it is applicable to !mZ man 1 fold which has 
the 81nthetio unit,. of an,"~lng wbatever thar-is an object ot ex-
perience. Now the only feature which 18 common to every object or 
experienee. including the empirlcal selt, is Its being in time. 
10 
There are several ot the better known commenta. tors who take 
a very definite stand tor a subjective 1nterpretatlon ot schema-
t1sm. Most notable among them ls Edward Ca11"4. That his posltion 
would be a subjective one is not strange since hls whole :lnteJlpre-
tatlon ot :Kant is notably Hegel:lan 1n tone. For Calrd .cherrati_ 
ls flBre17 a m.aDllel" of expres~1ng a problem and the anner tor tb18 
problem. mkes lt nOD-exlstent. The relation ot perceptlons an4 
conceptlon ls audl that no mediatlng factor is really needed and 
Kant's 8.l"gp.m.ent nec88sarU7 leads to an al teratlon ot his premises. 
His scattoldlq talls away as unnecessary ODCe his struct\l:"e at 
knowledge 1s built. 17 ADllytlC and synthetic 'are but two aspects 
ot the same judgQJ:en t. SUbject and d) jact are i •• parable. In 
judgment we separate tor the sake ot reunion what was mver dis-
tlne". 'rhus, 8S far smith. the lBterogenietl ot category and 
intuit1 Q1 does not ex1st. Co:osequentlr. the problem of' hetero-
geneity does not exist. Ita answer. ~ schematlam.t was know~ betore 
the problem was proposed. as 
The schema Of a cateSOrJ, Ulerefore. determ.ines the temporal con-
d1t10ns under 1ttloll lt 1s applicable to objects ot experience in 
general. In :Kant's words, 'the scllematoa (ot the categorles) are 
therefore nothing but t~iral determina..!1 QlS a Wlf-f: 1n accord-
anoe w1 th rules' ••• n b •• p. 72. Kt.l."ner 1'i als or the 
opinion tbat 80hematiam a,a s1gnificant part of Kant's a7stem, 
stating 1bat :KAnt fa poslti on seen 1n sahem t i. "Claritles the 
function ot conceptual th inking. • • tt Ibid. t p. '14. 
2714_1"4 Gatrell %rut Crt ttsJ!tolb1i!2'i! .2t. 'mmtl!!l.1.ti Kant, 2nd edt (Gla sgOfi t lvOvr; I, 4. , • 3. 
a8Ib1c1• 405 and 406. ttReally. it suld be truer to say that 
JudgmenT'""'rl ~he dlfferentia.tion of conception and perception in 
order to their reun1on. •••••••••••••• Ii • • • • • • 
As a consequence, we are obliged to concei va the Judgment, nat .a 
11 
II.A. Prichard's 'trenchant criticisms of Kan't'a Qr1tiqU! alao 
contains a subjecti vlat1c interpretation of sohematialll, and th1. 
1ntel'pretation forcea P:rieb.ard to the opin1on that the chapter 1s 
baaed on contradiction aDd contua 1 on. A.l t hWgb. be has le U ob-
ject1oll1l11b sche-t1em than "lth the reat of the sectiOn cm.the 
"Pri nci ple ... " he con eei ve a wha t he cons 14 ar s to 'be .Kant t a charao 
tarlstics at the schema in general aa completely contrary to what 
tbe transoendental soh-.a ta ot tb.e oategorlea must 1nvolve. 
Tbe Characteristiea ot the schema 10 general are three: 
(1) 1t 1. a thQJ.ght of a rule by which we combine the manifold, ar 
a conception that 1a related to the subject. not to the character-
1st1oa ot the c;t)Ject; (a) althwfJl time is involved. the suee.sion 
is a subjecti ve construct1on, not In 'the c:b Jeot; (3) the sohema-
t1z1ng process directly brings the .nItol.d of peroeption UJ3der 
ita conception •. 29 
The transcendental schemata cannot ftllt111 these oharacterI.-
. . 
tica because (1) the sohemata ot the categor 188 must relate to 
objects known. (2) tIme must be in the object. am (3) It the pro-
ceS8 ot schematIzat10n acWfiY.tbl subsumas the manifold under the 
$ comb1nation ot what was preViously distinct. but a8 a separa-
tion, 1n order to a mare pertect un1. t of elements which W8re 
preVioualJ undiatingu lshed, and whlch, even in 'being distlnguished 
are never wholly separated." Ibil. Later 1t wl11 be seen that 
Ca1rd t 8 tae Ue ins·1gb. t 1s not iO 'be d1 ... garded. 
a'n.A.. PriChard. &mi'. Theorl!l£. KnqyledSe (OxtOX'd, 19(9). 
p. 246-2ti3. 
category, then i1; perform.s tJl. ver7 Imposslb11ity (joining 'the 
heterogeneous> wh1d! make it l»cesaary to postulate sehematism 
In the t1:rst place.50 
the third cOIUIlentaJ"3' we ehall cons:lder elch proposes a sub-
Ject1ve Interpretation ot schematlam is that ot Joseph Mar'cnal, 
3.J. JU. excelleD1 comm_ta17 on the t1rst .0:1,191. 1. tbe third. 
volue of his .. ell mc.n AI!. po,U .l!. PIPs:, ,. l!. M'taw,lgu" 
At the out.e' the reader m1ght be surprl,sed at a subjectivistic 
interpretatloD in Maredlal 'a vle .. at Kant. since it i8 eharacter-
1stic of Mar'chalts position to interpret Kant almost as a com-
plete rea11.t., But the poin:t here is n~ that Marectlal makes a 
subjectivls' out ot ].(ant, bu1; raUler that his interpretation of 
the meaning of Kant'. sohema'tlsm mQa lt primarily a subjective 
process and not essent1ally the product ot iDJl81m tlon nor an 
objective char.oterl.tic ot experience. 
Exploiting one ot .Kantts desorl~.t1ons of acherratism,. 
Mar.Chal deflnes the schema in general as "a tormal and pure con-
dition ot sensibility t!a cag of ti_). by which a calcept at 
UDder.taJJding 1s restricted (de'erm1ned) In 1ts objective usage, 
tbat is 1n its application appearances_,,31 ae supplements this 
definltion wi tb. s detailed psychological description ot the 
3OIb14. pp, 253-255. Note the sim.llarl ty ,of the 18 't'ter 
Object1151""111th tnat of Ca1rd's 1nterpretat1on Just 41scuss84 and 
411.0 with Smith·a objection on the false problEm of heterogene-
ity. Obviously this 18 an important issue that will bave to be 
resOlved In l1i1s-tb.e81s. 
31HEnviaage dans ses conditions essentialle., ~~1 iel~vent de 1£1 Deduct10n transcendentale, e schGme dolt se d.-rin r: 'Ulle 
schematiam proce.s. Be underscores h1s subjective vie. ot the 
schema by telllna U8 the. t 1t 18 a process at imgimtlve con-
structlon in ti_. that 1t haa no produced representation, tbat lt 
designates only the me'Chod acctr41ng ,to 111 1eh lmasll1itlon con-
structs 1mage •• tIlat 1 t 1s !. :prl <1'& w1th respect to the part1cular 
1mage.51 He emphasize. the pos1t1on of Kant·. prod.uctlT8 lag1_-
tlon 1n schematism, calling 111e schema the speoifioating form, the 
i.lDJIanent rule of 1.mag1natl". sJUtbesie.33 And although he tela 
us that the s~theel. 1nvolved 18 an ob Jectlve one, yet he is cer-
tain ,hat both the pure (transcendental) 0.:04 the empirical schema 
are 1nterme41a17 b."'.en the unity at consciousness, and, not the 
object known, but ihe ac~al aynthee18 at illllS1natian .. 34 
~ Although when speaking ot the sobena in general Marechal haa 
emphasized tbe subjective imag1native construction involved, h1s 
trea tlIent ot the a chema ta of pure reason or the transcendental 
:" / 
condition tormelle et pure de la sensibi11te ijn .9.!.ll.\: ClJ temp;) 
par laquelle un concept de l' entendemen test r stHlJ1t ~'t.rmrni 
dans SOll usage objectit, etest-\-dire dans son ap~~lcatlon aux 
ph'nom~nes~" Joseph Marlchal, 8.J., 14l..°i~t de IfS J!.l!. 
M'.,a1t1",. cahier I II: "La Critique de. an t;n Ii' _,:Ririe, 1944 J ,. 
38Ib!d., 178 and 180. 
33Xl!!~., 179-181. Martehal bases his description ot the ima· 
ginative proce.s on the synthesis ot apprehension am imagination 
in tranaeendenta1 apperception as seen In the first ed1tion of the 
"Transcendental Dedu.cti on. fI A 96-UO (131-138) and A 119-123 
(143 ... 146 ). 
54:uarecb.al, ,1014 •• 181-182. 
schemata takes a d,ltterent turn. These schenata are obtained by 
a process ot abstraotion. The synthesis whlch etfects the trans-
cendental schema <lepends upon the influence of past experience, 
the pure images ot space and time, and conditions assuring the 
nati va union b."'qn intellect and the form of internal sensth 
In thi. third .spect the trall8cendental schena is the dJ'Dtlmic ex .... 
pre.sion ot \he categories 1n pure imagination. Mar&Chal tells us 
the. t althwgh the first application ot· 1;hese pure schemata 18 pre-
corlSoloua (and th1s is oertainly consonant w1 th the subject! ve 
processes ot illilginatlon he desorlbed in detal1), they are con-
soiously applied to appearances in explic1t and objective judg-
ments. The relation or each category to a determinate aDd cbarac-
terietic insertion ot appearances in time eDibles the schemata ot 
~e oategories to be abstracted by the Ullderatar.dlng through a 
proc ... ot retlexion. 'thls reveals "general. signa" in experience 
and permits the application ot these ::cwttegor1es to appearanoe,,.35 
" . 
The las, ma1l'l cawaenta'ol" that will be considered here 18 
Roger Dayal. He is unique among the m.en whose positiOns have been 
examined In the .. he has wr1 tten a whole volume on schena' ism. 
His thesis 1s tlat schematlam is tbe key point ot all at Kant's 
351))i". 182-185. The reader 1 s at once aware of the change 
in position trom wba t Marecbal haa told \lS concern1ng schemata in 
general to what he tells us here concerning the schemata of tbe 
categories. Recalling PrJ. dlard'. objection a.bout a change in 
l\ant fS posi tlon on the same po1nt, thls supposes 1ncons1stenoy 'W11: 
prove to be signif1eant later 1n th1s paper. ct. 8.bove p. 11 aDd 
Prichard, PI'_ 252-2154. 
ph'llosoph1 and his work 18 an emauative study at the idea ~ 
schemat1sm as de"eloped 'throughout all or Kant's writingS, In-
cluding the .Qm1l PR!_. Oonsequently, he is .".n'mare con-
vinced of the ...... 1a.l value of schara t:Lam than 1s Fa ton. 'lhe 
unique po1llt of hl. posit ion 1s tba t be holds for nelther a sub-
jective 1nterpr ... t1on at sch .. at1sm as do men like Oa1r4, 
Prichard. al14 MarSChal, nor t~ a decidedl, d;) Ject lv. ataD4 aa do 
.. ' Paton au Korner. but sa)'s tlll t by schem tism :Kant intended both 
posi tions' 
After elucidating d18ou88ion8 ot the relat10ns ot understand-
ing, productive imagination, and reprcduet1ve 1.lIJ$S1natlon 1D. lant'. 
gri~'s.ul. Dayal adoptathe follow1ng h7Pothesia aa a 801ut10n to 
the great 41ttiCl11ti. concernIng the sohematis.m passage: concept 
a:Dd schema are t W'lder d1tterent aapects. the same law of knowle4se 
The concept 1s the dei.ma1ng ractor and the schema i8 the prodUci 
dewrm1ne4 cQrreapoDdlng to tbe conee~ or category- He »ropos8. 
~. ' 
to support his h)1)othea1a wlth text •• but this dee s not prove too 
conv1nclng. Neverthel«uuJ, the Inslgh t he fUm lshed, the distinc-
tions he proposes, and the synthesiS he a tterilpta to formula te are 
truly praisewatthf_ The only crIticism of his book as a whole tho. 
i8 valid will haT. to come fr em. it Jf.ftn mo" than ordinarily f'amll1~ 
with the wh016 ot l{antts philosophy and writIngs.56 
3~og.r naval, ~ MIl811111g1g.u, J! .! (Paris, 1951). Far 
Da val '.. rea scalna en t be impor til. nee or a ems t1_, se. .D!i., 
pp. 7-8; for the prec1se relationship ot understandlng, productive 
and reprcduct1ve 1rJIl\g1m tion, especially pp. 88, 89, 92, 93; fer 
1. 
Now that the reader haa ploughed through theae dJ'7 summaries 
or seconiary material. 57 he is pr ooably WOrld ering just mat specifi-
cally is the problem or this thesis. The di Vel' sity of' opinion on 
schf.nnatlsm that we have just reviewed, some praising, some con-
demning the chapter. a tew adopting an object1ve interpretation, 
others considering schemat1sm as a aub.1ec't;lve condi t1 on, turnishes 
the precl.e problem. of th1s thesi.. What is the correct interpre-
tation ot this obscure passage? Is it really superfluous at its 
place in tbe Cll)~9U!? It not. whose view of schenD.'tism 1s the 
correct one, it any? And what is the reason tor the diversity? 
lmat is a possible or probable war out ot th iainteluOiUal moras. 
a clear s~ry ot DaTal's essentIal. hypothesis on schemat15 see ~...' 95-96, espe ctally: nFour repondre ~ tOltes C,8 questions s priciser la nature du sohaa. avangons una hJPothise, que AOUS v rif1erOllS par d 'autrea textes: cone ept at sehlme son" \lIte aeule 8" mi. 101 de ltespritt mal, we sous deux aspeets d1tl'rentaj 1e 
concept est un ~ete mental determ1nant. 1e Bch~m.e est sa pro-
jectioo., o'e8t-a-411". 1e d§termin6 1"epondant hee d't .. m1nan .... 
Nels, De l'oub11ons pas, determinant at d6termine coIncident." 
For the relatlon ]):11'&1 _ke. between· the schema" aDd phenaaena alli 
a. clear SUll.IIIIlry on the caaparativG tunctions of intellect and 
1lra g1naticm ." illi., pp. 174-175. 
Since this thesis treats on11 sahena tism as found in the 
f1;rst Gr1tiiue. no attempt w111 be made to correla"e or criticize 
Daval.a am 7aes 01' aeheDll tism as he interprets it 111 the 1eal 
of the cr't~UJ J1t'~ Beatel alld 1n the rest of Kant's wrtlnga. 
The reader a retirF'i(1to reviews of Daval '8 book., especially 
that at Paton 1:0. P!!11olPphlcal QNAFHll;l. 1952 (2), p. 372. 
3'There are other oom.men_r1es on Kant's sch8lll tiam which 
might be cited. but because 1hey are 01' lesser 1mpc.rtance and do 
not say an1tb,1ng tba t haa not been sa 14 in one way or another by 
the authors that bave been treated here, they will be simply re-
ferred to in the bibliography appended '0 this t1».18. 
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Certainly. wher$ so many of the best :t\tintian experts dis-
agree, we oarmot hope far certitude. Yet it 113 the precise pomt 
ot this thesis to offer an hypothesis that will at once afford aa 
clear an explanatIon of !<ant's obscure chapter as can be hoped 
:tor. add llghtto the place and significance of sehematism in the 
Kantian system. of knowledge, and. 1;0 a certain degree, reconcile 
the apparent d1vergencies among the standard oommantators. 
C1ear11. 1t th1s hypothesis is proven to 'be true, an important 
gain w111 be attained 1n the understant1ng of Kant.s critical 
system. 
The ke1 idea of th1s hypothesis i8 tbit Kant meant two d1f-
ferent th1ngs 111 the chapter on sehematism, the subje ot1V8 and 
preo011acloua conditioning process whereby the schema 1s prodUced 
and the categories are synthesiZed with the manifold ot sense. 
and, secondly, the objectIve schemata of consc1c:usness, universal. 
~ . 
characteristics of' r6411t7 which are t!le product of the imagina-
tlve process wh1Ch cond1tioned than. Because of the obscure 
term1noloey Kant employed, the ambiguous way be eta ted the problem. 
for Which schemat1sm was Ule anner. aDd because of a confusiD.g 
expOsition ot the elements involved 1» achamatism., m.ost at: tp.e 
cQJU1lentatcrs d14 not perceive this dualitJ. or _en this solution 
was seen, it was perceived only vaguely38 and consequellil1 it wa_ 
3SSee fer example wbere Prichard rejects in a note (1'. 2M) 
the !)osslble objecti Ql of an interpretat10n at scheJm tlam. tm t is 
18 
not exploited. Only Daval clearly recognized the 1m.p11cati ona 01' 
this solut ion. 39 
The method at proviDg th is thesis ... ill be three-told. lirst. 
since it is an hypothesis, it is proven valid when. and only when. 
it is shown that this theory and only it, explains the facts. In 
this case the rAxli' are Eantts text, the obscure definitions and 
descriptions of schematlsm whlch he g1ves in the chapter on that 
subject., The hypothesis will explain these tacta by offering a 
clear exegesis and coherent explanatlon of the problema arising in 
the text an schematlem. It is hoped that this interpretation wiU 
proVide. or at least a1d in prOViding, a more intelligible ex-
planation 01' thls important subject than has been heretotore given 
Secondly, this hypothesis will be supported by texts from bot) 
the m3 taph,yslcal aD! the trans ceo. den tal deductions ot tbe oategor-
Any explana ti on 
01' schematism can only be valid 111 the: light of its consonance witt 
• 
• 
similar to the one ottered in this thesis. 
39the similar1ty between Davalta solution and the one that is 
proposed in this thesis i8 at once evident. It is to be noted. 
however, that the solution ot this writer was arrived independentll 
01', and snteri or to, discovering M. Daval t s hypothesis. Besides. 
there are notable ditferences in the two solutions as well as 
similarit1es. M. Daval spends Ii oomparatively small amount of tias 
on sche!l'latism ot the understanding as found in the first Crit1que 
since he is writing about schemat1sDl 1n all of Eant's writi~s ... 
very small porti on of his treatmEm t is spent on proving his hypo-
thesis. ~ost of his consideration 1s concerned with expounding thE 
consequences of this solution. ar, mare exactly, in explaining the 
notion or schematism in the whole Kantian philosophy. 
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this center of the critical system. 
Thirdly, this hypothesia will be conf1rmed by reference to th 
standard eanmentators, most ot whom we have reviewed briefly. 
Often, even when this thesia disagrees with the interpretati on or 
one or other canmentator, we shall find confirmation for a particu 
lar point. In some iIlStances, the very diversity amoo.g mny of th 
commentators wUl, because of the synthetic nature of the solut1on 
offered by this thesis. support that solution. Those commentators 
will be mOe t extensively used whose reputatlon for soholarship is 
mos t widely acknowledged, vii-, .Fa ton, Mar/chal, a.nd smIth. The s. 
methods of proof will not be employed successively, but simul-
taneously for each text aIalyzed, as instruments ready tor the sur-
geon t s hand. at efl en moment of a delica. te ope .. atlon. 
Because the terms lubjectlD and obje ctive wIll come up so 
frequently in the proof of this thesis. it will be convenient to 
inolose here a brief definition of both terms, to make cle~r the 
" 
subsequent arguments. By subjecti V! is meant all tha t is logicall 
prior to oonsciousness. In .Kant it involves the categories and th 
transcendental activities which oonstruct ~)n object of knavledge b 
synthesizIng the materIals of sensIbility with the determinations 
of the categorIes. By 9b.1eSi,ive Is meant consciousness ot the ob-
ject Just const1tuted. It involves intellectual awareness of an 
object terminatIng in e judgment ooncerning 1t. In the example. 
"Fire causes smoke, ft the objective side is the consoi ous positing 
ot such a JUdgment. On the subjective side. the object about 
p 
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which I make this judgment 1s canstructed ~ priori in its intelleo 
tual elements and in space and time, because tor Rant I know only 
wbat appears. Only the sensible content (e.g. flames and smoke) 
is empirical. In this constructi on, the categories, imag;im tion, 
and the materials of sensibility are combined to torm an object 
wit.ll ch'3racteristlcs such that onacious1y I Vw'111 make the above 
ju<lgm.ent. But both sub jecti ve and object1 va are one synthetiC cog 
nitlonal act. 
Atter much consideration, it seems best to divide the treat-
ment in the following maImer, the seoond chapter will treat the 
sUbJecti ve schematizing process by which t before all experience, 
the categQl'ies are cQ!lbined wtth the manifold of sensibility. The 
third chapter will explain tbose texts which concern the products 
of the Flchematlsm of the categories, i.e. the transcendental 
schemnta, which as universal ch,"lracterist.lca ot experience EU18ble 
the application of the categories to:ob.Jectlve experience ..in con ... 
. ' . 
scicus judg,ment. It is true that it \,111 not always be possible 
to abstract completely the schemat1sm from the schemata f the pro-
duction from the prodUct. But at least in point at emphaSis, and 
f'or Clarity, this arrangement is better. The fourth am last 
chapter will ahow how this interpretation of schemati am points up 
the consistency o,t l"ant's thw ght. Th1. will be accomplished in a 
su1'!l.Jllary of the arguments of the preceding chapters in the context 
of the "Deducti ons." Chapter IV will also make a few ccmparisons 
between Kant's schemat1sm and Thanistic thou€ht. 
, 
CHAPTER II 
mE SOLUTION, PART I: THE TRANSCENDENTAL 
AND PRECONSCIOUS SOHEMATISM 
OF THE CATBXlORIES 
'·Thls soh.matlsm of our UDl81!'8taDd 1mg ••• 
Is an art concealed 1n 'the depth8 
of the human soul." 
The opening .ordsor f~t's chapter on scnema't1am at once 
puts batere the reader Kant '8 view ot judg."Jl&n't as s'bl wd In the 
"AnalytIc of Principles." .Tudgaents are "au bsu.m.ptlons at an ob-
ject under a concept ••• ,,1 In the introductIon to thettPrin-
e1p1es" Kant explaIns thls more in deta 11. The understandlng 18 
the faculty whloh torme rtllea or concepts,S while subsuming under 
rules belongs 'to the ,1\ldgment.3 The, faculty or judgJ.1ltnt also d1s-
tinguishes whether Cl" not a partloulAr" ,object talls UDder 'a given 
concept. 
Kant also sta te8 111 the openIng paragraph otthe chapter at 
lA 137--B 176 (180). 
2A 132-- B l71 (177). That the "rule a" are concepts or cat .... 
f$orlea throughout the transcendental deduction. see e.g •. .A 106 
(135), A 110 (137), A. 126 (147). B 1,63 (172) and many oUler 
pla ces. 
3:Kant's word tor judgment is wteila!S£att. or the pcwer of 
Judging. ct. p,a'on. II, 21, n. 3. 
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schema't1sm that the representat10n ot the objeC't 4 must be homo-
geneous w1th the concept UDler which it talls. He goes Oll to give 
an example. "Thu.s the empirical concept or a plA!e is hom,ogeneou8 
w1th the pure geometrical oonClitpt at a Cll"ele. The roundness 
I III 
which 1s thQIght in the 1& tter can be 1ntu 1t" in the tormer. n 
'rhls first paragraph 1s a 80rt ot prelude to tho discussion ot 
schema 1;1.. Whether 1 t is an accu.rate 11'ld1oat10n .ot the me an 1 XIS 
of 8cnemat1sm Kant otter. remains to be ,Been. At the outset 
Kant·s reader is puzzJ.ed by the notion bare that jUdgment is d1s-
tinct :rran uadel"sta;od1ng. He at Ul has fresh in h1s mind the 
metaphfsical and transcendental deduct1ons. There Kant evidently 
thQIght that the preCise end of the uDders 1nnding and the act at 
i'orm1J:lg conoepts wa. fwD! in the pltl C1~ at a jUdgment. This 
apparent contradict1on w111 occupy our dis cuss10n shortly.o 
In the secantS parasraph ot the sahem tism. chapter l(ant poses 
the problem of heterogene1ty which wei '&poke ot brieflY' in .. 
Chapter I. The pure ooncept. ot the understa D41ng do not posaoss 
the hamegene1ty with emp1rioal 1ntuition which anp1r1cal concepts 
do 1n the example Just <poted. For siooe pur., the categories caa 
never possess fUlythlag empirical. No one, l'\ant ma1ntdinS, could 
find anything of causality, tor example, 1ntuited in senae or COll-
tained in mere appearances. !<ant'a meaning seems tbViOlS ellQ1gb.: 
'supposedly Kant means the actual ooject dS ·well as tile idea 
or representation ot th .... object-, tor he mkes such an oquivale.n.ce 
later 1n the paragraph ~ 137--H 176 (160)). Cf. Patou,II.26.n.l. 
OSee pp. ~ and 32. 
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the intel1 191bill t,. of causality 18 not to be found in the sensl-
ble characteristics ot :reality. Therefore how can there be the 
subsumption or intuition under pure concepts or the application 
ot the categories to appearances?6 
The que 81;1 em 1mm.edla tel,. a 1"1 sea: what i l3 Kant referr1 ng t 01 
Is this subsumpt10n ot appearance and appl1c ation oi' the eel tegory 
to be oonsidered an expllcit and consc1 oUs Judgment. fer examPle, 
in ph1losophlcal ju.dgment: tfOe.usallty is a <b.aracterlst1e of 
human experience. tt OJ;' in the empirical Ju.dgment: ·'])"1re causes 
smol'l.Eh"?7 Or, on the other hand, is this su'bsumpt1on to be con-
tddared the relation 01' category and intu1tion found 1n the very 
act of const1tut1J:lg the object of knowle4ge tn experience?8 The 
former wculd be an obJeotive and conscious judgment abtllt the al-
ready constituted object ot knowledge. The la tter would be the 
subjective and !. :ptl9J~ oon8t1tut1 Q1 of that ob Joet. Because of 
Kant fa own ate. tement of his problam r.u!'e, name 11, that at' the , 
" 
heteroganei ty of category and intu1tion, the obJect1 'Va and con-
scious jUdgment would seem almost certa1tU.y to be his meaning. 
6A 137-l36-B 176-177 (180). !<ant makes both the se dasor1p-
tion8 equivalent. 
'The reason tor Choosing first an example or an abstrac~ 
ph1losophical judgment and then also an empirical one will beoome 
ancient later in this chapter whan discussing the problems ot em .. 
p1rieal schem;atism and espeCif11ly in the di scua8ion o:f th1s matter 
in etl. III. 
S'Kant haa told U8 in the ltdeductions" that the cat.serles 
make experience possible and impose their laws UpOl1 appearances. 
See for example B 163 (172). 
But _;Vb. iant meant the subjecti .. e alternat1ve. or e.,en both the 
subject1 .... and the objective interpretations. This ambiguity is 
exactly the rundemental p.roblem. or the schemat1 •• chapter and 1s 
also the beginn1ng at 1t. solut1on. But betore sketch1ng this 
answer 1n detail we must bear Kantts own :er1g tacie solutlon to 
the p1'Oblem. 
He tells Us that 8. "transcendental' doctrine ot jUdgment ls 
necessary" to allSwer th1s vel Important problem. Th1s is not 
necessary t Kant tells us. 1n the other (presumably non-transcen-
dental) sc1ences. Far in these, their ccnlcepts are not so com-
pletell dist1nct trom the obJeots to whlch they are applied and 
thus no discussion ot the appl1cabl1it7 of the one to the other 1 
required.10 'fhis statement or Kant wl11 be the source of many 
difficulties whan a re. paragraphs later he begins an unexpected 
d1scussion ot schematlsm of emp1rical and mthEmat1cal coreepte. 
The answer, Kant teUs us at the beginn1ng ot the third pa~a .. 
graph, is "ObTiously • • • 80me third th1ng," whlch 18 homogeneous 
with both the categorl' and appearances cd m,lch consequent1)' 
iThe term traMcgdln~ 1s used here and thr Q1ghout the 
chapter on aehe!ootiam. and n.th 1s paper as well 1n ita most typl-
cal.ly Kant1an sense of the !. R£ im cond1 ti en or knowledge. "I 
entitle tranacenden'tal all knowledge Wbictl is occupied not so much 
with objects as with the mcx1e or our knowledge ot objeets1n sO 
tar as this mCX1e ot knowledge 18 to be possible !. priori. n B 25 
(69). Ct. Paton, I, 229, n. 3 and 230 as well as smithts excel-
lent history ot the term, pp_ 73-7&. 
104137-138.-B 176-177 (180-181). ~in, "those Whioh repre-
sent lt ln concreto" must be cCIlSidere4 the object it self /I both 
beoause ot the rea sou g1 yen abO'V'e 1n n. 4 and beoause the Kantlan 
~~ega_a!taal!18.a r!presentat1S!! anyway. ct. also below pp. 73-
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makes the applicat10n ~f the tormer to the latter possible. This 
,tthird thing" lant tells us by way at aUIlllll8.17 and title is a. 
"mediating representat1on" whidl. IlUst be both lntellectual and. 
sensible and is in tine, "the transcendental !chema, ,,11 
We bave already seen briefly in Ohapter I how sane ot the 
standard eouenta1tors object to }(antis a1atement of his p.roblem.12 
Smith tells US that 8e.henatism 1s nat IIlbsumpt10n but synthetic 
interpretation by whim conten t8 are apprehended 1n terms of tune-
i10ml relatIons. The category 1& not used as a predicate in a 
judgment but it articulates the whole jUdgment aa such. 31.m.l1ar17 
conceiVing the tranaeendental schema as a "t..1.ird thing't 1s treat-
ing tbe categories as if they were related to appearances in the 
sde mn.r in whioh a universal coucept 1s applied to 1 i8 pa.r-
t10ula 1".13 
'.to smith '3 tirst objeet1on the most po1"t100nt al'l8wer is that 
Kant does not say tba t scilema'tlsn 1s ·~$Ubsumptiol1. He says it is 
• 
a mediating procesa in Sllbsumpt10n (judgment), and that 1s a dif-
ferent tlling. Nowhere does Kant equi valate schematism to subsump-
tion of til part10ular uDiel" a universal. But it smith '5 first ob-
jection 1s ult1matel,- leveled at calling Ule ScilGma a "third 
-
UA lZS-B 177 (181). Italios 1n Ot'i g1nal. 
12Paton well renarka that to understand Kant we must allow 
him. to state his problem in his o. wa7- Kant 8. tea this probl-. 
sharply wlth no indicat10n 01' the proposed solution, one which. 1. 
general t we know trom the transoendental 4e4uo1;10. 'to be the doc-
trine accord11'l8 to which objects are com lmd in the manitold 1n 
time. II, 28. 
13880 pp. 5 and 6 ot this paper and Smith, pp. 334-335. 
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tblDg, It •• be probablJ fundamentally interuled, then the answer to 
1i1le fire' objectiCl1 i8 1b.e same aa that to the .econd. 
Smith's aecCCld Objection eJ;Pllc1tly concerns the use at a 
ftthird thing." And whe141er the relat1cn of category and 1.l'l:tult10D. 
adm1 ts at such an idea as a tttb. 11' d thing" can only be a.naw~n·ed 
later in this paper. wben the mean118 at 8cmmatlsm is more ruJ.l.y 
cla1'1f'! ed. It is a quest! Ql to be solved in this thesis as a 
whole. Thls much, though, can be said here 1'ar Sm.i tb.: 1'lrst, he 
haa touched the cent e1' of the whole p:.ooblem. concerning sehanat 18m, 
and secondly, Patonts anawera to sm.1th 'a db je etlan on this subject 
are by no means convincing.14 
At this point then in Kant's d1scu.saioll of sehemat1sm the 
precise problem. 11$ this: what did Kant DEan by the 'trjlnscendental 
sst1g? Is 1t a l'lBdlating faotar 1n the subjectlve and precon-
scious synthesis or cateso1"1 and appearance, the transcepdm tal 
constltutlcn ot the phencaenal objee~? Or is 1t an element 1n 
• 
consc1 Ql.8 experience, such a 8 when we ''Predic at e the categorles ot 
that experience? The answer wh1ch this 'thesis proposes 18 that 
14Paton cla1ms that sm1th's .etter-torm Interpretat10n ot 
category and intuition is false and consequently hia objection 18 
not valid. The categol!7 18 1ihe tom ~ thought. Dot at 1ntul 'tl0D, 
whQie torms are 8Ploce aId time. This:Js a bi t too facile and does 
not tUls ... r Sm1th '8 Objectlon. The oategorles are not the torllf_~ 
tQOlWt in the .Y In wh1ch torm determines DIltter. They areb. 
t91~ _~ ftPoli! 1n the sen.e they are tile ditterent ~~ •• ot can-
cep anza on and judgn'Jent. On the oUler hand. the e uctlons 
lead us to belle .... that the categorles do mve a relation !2. sena. 
intu1 tl91 or appearances in a ne nner analogousl,. the same as n¥l t'Ce It 
and torm. Nor does Smith's objectlon 1aply a t_paral succession 
between appearance and category. as Paton nPintains. See Paton, 
II, 27. 
27 
~ ty.nd_Ata~i IRMD4el1 botD' We saw that the hypothesi. ot 
this thea1. 1s 'based on a duall1il 1n Kant·s thoUl#lt. It 18 one 
wh1ch 1s evidenced througJlou tat leas t tbe wh ole "Transcendental 
Analyt1c,n a dua11ty whlch in _n7 1Dstanee. ea8111 begets con-
fus1on. This dUality 1s expressed in the d1sj\WCt1on jUst out-
lined in tile ambiguitJ of schem.atiam: the preconscious and 
transcendental coasti tutlon ot the obje ct. and the empirical and 
exp11clt cognit1ve experience. 
DUe 1;0 the nature ot Kant ts purpOSe 1n W1'1 t1ng 'the P11f 19"ue 
he was muoh CODCel'ned w1tll the tormer. But slace the transoenden-
tal processes are a condlt1on ten: all knowl edge and ot all ex-
periencej as !\ant tells us, he oannot avoid speaking abOlt the 
knowledge or expert_ce 1 tselt. Indeed, the oomplex organlzat1on 
ot transcendental. coDdltlona and aotiviti.s are postulated simply 
to explain aDd jUB'tlty the neceasU'Y aspects or conscloua tho\l8ht. 
The me tapb,Ja1cal aDd transcendental aeductions-e.peoia UJ the 
, .. 
forf18r ...... beg11l wl~h ttl. "given" 1n conscious experience an4 f'rca 
tbis argue to the transcendental Betivi ties wh1chalone can give a 
suff1cient .Xl}lanatlO21 ot this experi.me. Often Kant 881s thiDg$ 
about oae pole of 'th1s eO@Jllt1ve relationship whioh he means for 
~e 01l1er. This: 1s one of the principal sources ot cantua! on and 
misunderstandiDg both 1n the "Transcend_tal ADll7t1cn as a whol.e 
and 1n the chapter on schematlam in p1lrt1cular. 
This correlative duality and 1t .. 8 au 1 ting confUsion must be 
kept 1n min4 aa the restor the d).cure chapter on sohemtlam 18 
~--------------------------------~ 
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discussed. It 1s imperat1ve, therefore, before this is entered 
upon, that the ex1stence ot: suell a duality in:Kant fa thought be 
clearly justified, Only then will ita imp;>rt on the schemat18Dl 
chapter and the schemata correct interpretation stand out olearly. 
Because the subsequent arguments CIt this cnapter are neoes-
sarily long and sometimes complex, 1t is ne cessary that at thi. 
point we ha ve a. clear map ot where our raid is heading and over 
wbat sort at ter~a1n 1t 11e.. We bave seel1 Kant's sta tamant ot 
his own problem. hls R;1- flCl! .oluti on, the problem of this 
thea1 •• and last11, 'the pr oposed solution. Betore we take up 
Kant's tirst detln1tion of' the transcendental schema, we must 
first prove t1l1t the duality which 18 'the essence ot this the.is 
18 a slgn1tican t element ot Kant·8 thought. First then this 
duality will be explained and its existence jUBtit1ed. as a 
legltimte distinctlon ln philosophy in general and lnitll parti-
cular Kantian development. This laticn- Will be seen in three In ... 
" . 
stances: the "clue" ot the metaphysical deduction. the purpose 
and conclusions ot the transcenden tal deduction. and in the two-
fold tendencJ to subject1 " ism. and phenomenalism attr1 buted to 
Kant. Then, secondlY'. with this dua11ty clarified, the text ot 
tlle sc.b.emst1s14 chapter w1ll aga1n ocmpy our attention. from the 
f1ret definition ot the sohema throu@',hout the rema1ning texts as 
Kant Pl"esent8~ the.m. But in this chapter cnly those texts w111 be 
exploited which show the preeonsci QUS side ot the schena tism 
duality_ First to the duality then. 
~-------------------------------
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The distinction bebesn the precoDed. ous and the conscious is 
not peouliar to Bant.. Tho tradi ti onal schola etic philosophy bas 
its own preconscious and "t£9!oendent.,ln acti vi t:las in the Ulu-
minat10n of the agent intellect. the mediation or the pmntaSln. 
the aotivities at the internal senses, etc. The preconscious is 
often reterred to, not only in philosophy t but in poet1c inspira-
tion and other artIstic endeavors. In his Ql!atlve Intu.ltioo ~ 
~~. ;poeta the sCholtlstic philosopher Jacques Maritain nnk.es 
much of the "spiritual unconscious or preconscious." He maintains 
that these preconscious acti vitias are not purely unconscious but 
principally so, or the exaot point where tbe preconaeious emerges 
into the conscious. Poetic inspiration is born at this point. 
'rhere are two gr-eat domains of the precons oi cus, :Mar ita in affirms, 
the spiritual aad the blindly instincti ve or Freudian. This is 
not mysticisfn, whether natural or supernatural, but the tunction-
ing of everyday 1ntelligence as seen·JJl sCient1fIc discoveries am 
the 1nner activities 'beneath fl"ee decia1ons. l5 It is evident then 
that the d1stinction so. important in this thesia 1s valid also in 
realms outside of th.e Eantian or1 tiC'll system. 
The tirst important tactor in the IUmt1an development of this 
distinction 1s the "clu.e" of the metfIPhlsical deduction.16 Kant's 
15J'acq.ue! Y..aritain. ~a'lI~ Inm1,tlS2.Q 111 ~ and Pce1;rl. (New York, 1953) pp_ gl·9 • 
16Kant gives the name t~Metaphys1cal Deduction" only in the 
second edition, and then only by reference subsequent to this 
deducti w. "In the ta h lcal d!dU<ttlon the !omOri origin 01' 
to oategor1es been p ove t %'0 e i com: e· a ent ¥'I~~h the eenerar!OgiCal lunc ions ~t!u(~ t." ~ \} fi~8~. 
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purpose in this deduction 1$ to show that the torm.s ot Ju,4gnen't 0 
traditIonal logio ra"eUl 1n a h1dden ma:nDer the Olteegol'lea aa !. 
l1.£1ori sources or thea. JUdgm.ents, \ll1ih a one-io-one correspondene 
between the types ot Judgment and each category.l., Admltted1J 1Jl 
the oplnicm. ot even the aoat S1I1Pl tb.eUo commenta1tors the ooo-to-
ono cQrrespondence 1. moat artificial at.4 1n th1e point y"ant bas 
decldecUy fS.lled.18 But tb.la dOOR not d88t1"01 his pOint at 1'1114-
in; necesMrzr and !. ...... pr1r.clplea in cur cogn1tlve activit1 •• 
'flh.Ich accoux.'t tor tho necesaary torma of Judgment 1n gemral. 
J'urtnermare 11t aervea to shQl'l Kant'. m.lal on the relat10n of 
tranacendental act1v1t1 •• and the categories to consclwa intel-
lectual eXpert.noe. 
Atter an elAbo:re'. lntrodUotlon19 l.ani giv •• U8 the "clue" t 
f [ 
l'"In the .'apb,Jalcal Deduction the !. S:&SE'& origin ot the 
eate€?"Orlea 11.11 &atabllshe4 by thelr perteot a greemnt w1 tb. the un1 
verael log1.1 tUDCtlone (that b. t'Cl"r.us) of tb.O\li'ht. In the 
rrransoendent4l DGduetlon C!'lt 18 mown·1. their R~S'~&.f" aa !. 12£'5: cognitions of object. of Intu1t1on. More precaoy, the 
hictap 1$10al DeductlOl1 1s concerned w1th determIning the llL.t ot 
the cat.gorles, ard exp!Ii1n1De \heir ftl'~ 1n the nature'OT'"" 
url.derstanc.U.Ilg." Paton. lI.!40. Ite os n orig1:r.ral. . 
lBThe one-tv-one correspondence 1s #l.rtU1.clt:ll because the 
forms Of JUdgmen' &re artificial. .Rrton 1n tnaUn.g the mtaphr· 
physical deduction defends the correspondence between each torm. 
and os.sor,. lI, 203-297), 'but adm1ts lflter when speaklng of 'the 
s1enltlc(,;~nce of the transcendental scherzts that the table or 
Judgments has been undermiDe4 (II, 77-70). 
19,.. 66-79--8 91,..104 (lQ4-112). 
pi 
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the intlm te relation between form of.' judgment and category in the 
following words: "The ~ :u~erst am lath t,hrOl1Eih.l!!!. same O;eel"l-
tion§ by which in concepts, by means of analnI0 unitl. it pro-
-
duced the logical form of jud@1l6rlt. also introdUces a transcenden-
tal content into 1 ts representation, by nrH'tns of the ~lnthetie 
.YBitZ of the manifold 1n intuitIon in gen.eral. ff20 
The mean1ng 1s this. 'l'here are two functions to undors1:13nd-
1ng. The one 1s transcendental and synthetic, the oiber analytio 
and characterized by the propositions of general logic. :loth are 
functions of the s~:we unity of unders'tanding and are produced in 
the same operation. The synthetic unity 1s prior logically and 
psycholOgioally (but not temporally) because it is the cause at 
the analytic unity. The former is the a,-nthesis of the manifold 
of intuition through the 1ntroducti on of trsm.scenden tal conten't, 
namely the unity and nac8ssity or the category. In conscious 
aOA 79--B 105 (1l2). Italics not in origim 1. Paton f;1ves 
this excellent paraphrase of ttia 1tclue": tiThe same uXlderstandlng. 
and by preCisely the same acts, produces two results. Firstly in 
concepts, by means ot the analn~o unity, it brought Into being 
the l(}gical form ot a jUdgnsnt. Secondly, by means of the !l,,!!-
ta!i~s unit~ of the manifold of intu1t~on !B ~~eral, it intro-
duces a tratJ..3cendental content into its ideas. Renee we caD call 
these Idoas-·prasumably the ideas into which the transcendental 
contant has been introduced--pure concepts of the understandIng 
which apply A peiar! to ciJjects. This 1s a serVice which :B'ormal 
Logle cannot perform." II. 287. Italics in origInal. concerning 
the a.tamant of the final sentence, cf. this paper p. 34, n. 28. 
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judgment we analyze the cbject accordlng to the unities of 
ganer:11 logic. The discovered unities are synthetio ones.21 
We recall too t in the introduction to the "Analytic of Prin-
ciples n Kant detined jUdgment as the faculty o~ subsuming objects 
as distinguished from the understanding whc.ee function 1 t was to 
foral concepts. Here in the met3physlcal deduction an apparent 
contrad~.otlon arises in tll<'it -the p.al§:1:trtan£l.iM forms judg):uent 
itself. This is not really a contradiet1on. In the logically 
prior cOllsti tutioll ot the object the understanding forms the to-
tallt,Y vm.loh in conscious jUdgment hill a1 ther be broken apart 
(negatlon) or separated in crder tho. t the parts may be reunited 
{afflrraatlon). ~'Ihen speaking or c01leclous judgmnts. bebause the 
concepts are empirically abstraoted from the object at exr..er1ence, 
'we can in it sellse "subau.m.e!t an object w:.ier that concept. But al-
ready here it must be admitted that this OO!tcern i'or subsumpt10n 
will be found more a. result of' };;ant t eflove I'cr the arch it a,ctoniC 
" 
of traditional logic than anything 6188. 22 
In the sentence 1m.m.ediu'tely preceding the ab ove one elabora-
ting the !'clue tt Kant tells us Vt'hi.lt he mans by flPA1:t.lc tylJ. tl and 
s:artE+!at1c Witx although he d<..es not give than auch mnes until 
t.fle following sentence. ';'llhe same function which gives unity to 
2l.Note the sim.ilari ty with Cs ~:rd t S analysis of jUdf~nt in 
conjunction wi th sehematlsm. See this pa~r pp. lO ... ll and Cal rd. 
It :PI'. 405-406. 
22Cf. Smith, pp. 332-333. See end of chp. III also. 
~~. ----------------------------
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the various representatlons All i. Jy.dS!:!nS G-nalJtlc un1 t~ also 
gives unity to the lnere aynthes1s of' various representations l!. 
!Ii iP.tM&$&9.i ~ynth.t10 un! tyJ; and this unity in 1 ts most general 
expression, we entitle tbe pure concept or the Ullderstand1ng. n23 
The analytic un1ty 18 the procedure ot bring1ng different ideas at 
objects under a ooncept. 24 The S¥athet1o unity 1s, aa Paton at-
firms, the same doctrine elaborated in the transcendental deduc-
tion. Every object of knowledge has besides the particular in'" 
tell1g1b111tJ wh1ch w. recognize through empirical concepts an 
universa.l structure wh1ch is imposed by thQl~t. Paton well re-
marks that Kant merely asserts th1s here and intends 1 t as an 
hypothesis to be established in the transcendental deducti on. It 
must be provls1oSJally accepted here for .Kant to ahai the relation-
ship between the consc1ous farms of judgm.ent and the categorie8. a5 
It should be noted tbat limlyt·1c unity is not the same th1ng, 
indeed. has nothing wbatever to do w11h:t.he 11JD1ted class o.f jUdg-
ments classed as "analyt1c judgments." And s1m1larlJ there 1s 
only an analoG' between the spec1f1c synthet1c Judgmen.t and the 
synthet1c u1iy wh1ch is found at the bas1s at all acts of know-
ledge. 2e Bere again .. e have an example of Kant; ____ ~p~ use 
of terminology. i ':""""" 
::-",. ,.. v 
23a 79--B104 .... 105 (112). 
24PatOtl, I. 285. Concept 18 cons1dered here, of course, as 
an emp1rical concept and not the category. 
25Ibi' •• 285-286. 





Bant Dever says that tIle synthetic unity invol:ved behind O\l'r 
a nalytic consciousness ls preoonsci cua or nne onsc1 CUB. But impli-
cit in all F.ant' s arguments in this line of thwght 1$ the :neces-
sary conclusion that a t least such unity is not explioitly ad-
verted to. Otherwise why all the long "transcendental" analyses 
and arguments? It will be necessary to return t Q this quest! on 
again. 
From what we bave seen ot the "c.l1.\e" of the metaphysical de. 
ducti on it 1s clear that the duality bet.een the preconscious aDd 
consei ous!'1 1s a leg1 tiDa te and tundamen tal e 1Ea.edi in Kent t II 
system. as 
This fundamental duality is confirmed by tba general purposes 
a ud conclusions of the transoendental deductions. Rant expresses 
the purpose or the transcendental dedUctions in many places in tbe 
Cri,);lgU;1 and in several ways, but probably the most general is put 
in the torm: How can the subJeoti ve:Condit ions ot thought. (the 
" . 
2'1For Q good oonsidera.'tion ot the relation ot the metaphysi-
cal deduot1on to the transoendental deduction and to the trans-
cendental schemata, see d;h14-. 296. 
28.rhe duality seen. 1n the metaphysical deduct10n is Ule same 
as that expressed in the distinction between general. end transcen-
dental logic. 'Goneral logic treats at the pure forms of thou.ght 
w1thout aD,J oonsideration ot either the oontent or orig1n of know-
ledge. On the other hand. transcendental logiC deals precisely 
with the orig1n and rules at pure thwsbt of &n object and how we 
have it RltPD knowledge a t all. See A. 55-56-B 79-80 (90-96), 
A 13l ..... B70 (1'16), lllncl A 135--B 174 (1'18). Th1s distinction 18 
nothing else than the distinction between. the rules ot conSCiOUS judgment (general logic) and the rules for the consti tut10n of the 
object at A prl9.fl knowledge (transoendeutal logiC). 
~------------------------------------------~ 
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ea tegorlea) tta.ve obJective val.:1dltJ?29 The answer 18 the in'Yol;"e4 
reasonings ot the transcenden'tal deductions. It would be well be. 
yond the purpose and scope of this paper to ana17ze in detail the 
arguments ot the transcendental deduct10ns of both the first and 
second editions. The obJeot! Ye here is simply to show that the 
dua11 ty between preconscIous const ltnt ion of the Kant ian ob J80t 
and the conscious knowledge of that object is an essential aspect 
ot Kant '8 cri tical system. Therefore our procedure will be mer.ly 
to summarize the fundamental arguments ot both the first and aec~ 
edi ti on Tersi ona of the transcendental deductions. Some of Rant t 8 
particular analyses will tind their way later into this dIscussion 
when considerIng some or the other texts on schemati ... 
'1'lle transcendental deductions can be summarized as follows: 
1. I am conscious of an object of knowledge in Sloee.ding momenta 
of time. 
2. :3ubjecti vely there is required tor: SU.o1"l C onsei oueness of an 
ob jec't , 
a. that the percept10ns of the manitold be syn1hesized by some'" 
thing prIor (logically) to it in 'the knowing tunction. 
aOA 89--B 122 (123-124). Ct. Paton. I, 240: "Tbe Transoen-
dental Deductionl wn1eh i8 a Just1fication rather than a deduc-tion, shows how t 1s poss1 bla, and indeed necessary t tor eate- . 
geries 01', such an orig1n Lthe unders'teuJd1ng--from the metaph;ysical 
deducti ox!} to appl.l to objects 61 yen in Intuit! on. It 1s, in 
shart, concerned with their Obiect1ve va11d1tl. and so with their e~ifl and w1th thel~l" of heir 16ililmate use. rt Italics in 
or nal. 
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Th1s is synthesis ot apprehens10n in the I. ],1rior, form of: 
inner sense. 
b. This synthesis demands til reproduction of the prev1 ous repre 
sentat1ons. Such empirical reproduction could itself be 
effected only by something prior to it. 1.!!.- pure synthesis 
ot PI" oducti ve imag1m t 10n. 
c. A recognitIon of the preVious reproductions in the unity of 
one consciousness. 
~). now there is 1mplied a transc$nden tal syntllesis ot pure apper-
oeption 1n: 
a. The processes ot p1' educt1 ve 1uagtnat1 an just ment1omd. 
which can synthesize percept10ns not arb1 'trar117. but 1n 
necessary conneotlCl1. This synthesis 1s acoord1ng to the 
uni versal law or norm of transoen.dantal apperoept1on. 
b. The reoognit1on. or prev10us reproduc tl ons spoken or which 
., 
demands a unity of consclousneas.~. 
c. ~he const1tution or the in1t1al oonsciousness of an objeet .. 
Th1s 1s expanded 1n the tollow 1ng step_ 
4. The consciousness of anobjeet or knowledge imp11es and denends 
the conscious unity ot transcenderltal appercept1on. Reclpro-
os 11y , 0 onsci ousne ss could. not be w 1 til au t an d> je ct ot 
knowledge. In deta1l: 
a. In knowledge there mst be a synthesis of the :::snitold of 
experience with the undera~~nd1ng by the applIcat10n ot a 
unity to that Dlnltold. This unity is not that or the 
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oategory, or how could the category it self be synthesized 
experience? 
b. This un1 ty 1 s none other than the transcendental un1 ty at 
flpperce:ptlon. 
c. '1~here is an analytI0 unIty involved here (I am I). This in 
turn demands Ii synthetIc unity in the same ins tan t, that at 
the apperception witll. the r;lan1fold 01: experience. :E'or 
again, there could not be consoi GUanase; unless there was 
sOlne content to this unity. 
5. Three conolusions necessar1ly tollow from th 1s analysis 01' ap-
perception: 
a. The un1ty spoken ot constitutes a.n objective unity. For 
the combIning of the representatIons of a manIfold into one 
consciousness constitutes the relation ot these representa-
tions to an object. 
b. The logical forms ot judgment d~ .. not merely join concepts, 
but constitute a unIon in the object according to the 
di verse subjecti Vtl tnncti ons lib len are 'lbe categoriee. 
c. The synthesis of apperoept ion wi th the ;:uanifold th rough the 
diverse fUnotion of the categories lim1ts 1hese categories 
to the realm of that synthesis, i.e. tu sense elPerlence. 
Consequently the categories are valIdly used only in the 
area of that synthesized sense experi enee. 30 
30rrhe principal sources tor this summary outline, according 
to the diVisions ot that outline, are ss tollows: 
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'1'he duality so important to this thesis is evident in this 
summary, in the subJeot! ve deduction ot point two, tor example. 
and in apperception' 8 constitution ot the ob ject of knON led6e. 
]~ven in the repeated emphasis on smt+u1s as a tundamental '00 sis 
of tnought, we oan pereeive the difference between the logically 
prior constitution of the object, and consequent consciousness 
of that Objeet.31 
The third and last instance mich shruld be considered as 
pointing out this dual1ty in Kant' 8 thwstt t 1s the double teudenc 
1. A 98 (131). 
3. 
a. A 98-100 (131-132). 
b. .A 100-102 (13~133), A 11S (142-143). 
e. A 100-104 (135-134). 
B 160-152 (1M-
165 ). 
a. A 1.19-123 (143 ... 148). 
b. A 123-126 (146-147). A 11~-119 (141-143). 
c. A l04 .... UO (134-138). 
4. A 104-110 (154-138), B 131-136 (152-154). 
a. B 129-131 (151-152). .~ . 
b. B 131-135 (lti 2 ... 104 ) • " . 
c. B 136 (154-155). 
5. 
a. B136-140 {155-158}t .A 120-J.28 (147-14.9). 
b. B 140-142 (1.58-159,. 
c. B 143 (160) J B 146-149 (161-164). 
Ct. :~1th.. espeCially for the second editi an of the trans-
cendental deduction. PP. 284-291. 
31we are not aware of'sYnthesis as sueh in. our conscious ex-
perience. If' we accept Ra niT;;"" starting points (and it is beyond 
the scope 01' this thesi. to challenge ~em.) we will b!i va to dis-
cover this as the baaia 01' the un! ty we find in knowledge. J~ven 
outside the Kantian context we must admit that in much of OUr 
knowledge we s:~lUUl some of what is sub jective to the g1 yen at 
experience. 
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to bottl subjectivism and pwnamenalism which 3mlth attributes to 
MIlt. Pdton preter$ to call this dual pencilant in IJmt's thought 
"empirical_realism" and "tranacendental. 1deallsm." For 3m1th th,i 
is a blind tendency in which iant constantly vacilla.tei,h aub-
ject ivism is pred anlnate wlum all uppearances and empirical ob-
jects are mere modifications of wbjectlve sensibility. In this 
view the synthetiC aotivities are mere cognitive processes ot the 
individual mind. When the phenomenalist tendency is predomlm.te. 
appearances gain an existence independent ot the mind, the syn-
thetic activities tak.e place before cOI18ciousness can exist at fAl 
and are of a. aoUl1l8Dal cllara at er .32 
Paton objects to this interpretation and says that thas& two 
"tendencies" instead or being contradictory are mutually depend-
ent. "Transoendental idealism" (subjectivism) 1$ merely Kant's 
continued emphasis on the fact that human. knowledge is not of ob-
jects as they are in the.tnsal vea but a~ they apP,ear to the )l\unan 
" 
mind. ":&I.pirical realiemtt (phenomena11_) is merely the 1"&ot the' 
hl1lD4n bcwl'9dgo as the Joint union ot things and the human mind 
shows us that real substances and accidents truly interact and a 
d1rectly prea.nt to the human mtnd.53 
Whlc.b.ev~r "View 1s correct. the tendency serves to show that 
Kant was constantly ooncerned with both sides or our cognitional 
31Sm1th, pp. 83. 274. 270, 271. 
33paton. I. 582-583. 
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duality. Not because the double tendency express •• neatly and 
directly the dual aspect or cognition, but because in such ,~ tend ... 
ency Vie see clearly too t .Kant was constantly concerned both wi th 
the subjective constitutIon of the cotsnit1onal object and the 
hUMan knowing or that objeot. And if 3mi tIc t S content! ens are cor ... 
rect. he often confused the two. 
Although this duality is certainly a constant element in 
Yl.8nt's thou€')lt, 88 should be evident after 011 that v~as just dis-
cussed, we have not yet Been clearly that the 'fttranacendentalft 
side of the duality is preconae1CUtH The fact that all th.ese 
transcendental act1v1 ties congi'tion knowl;eO.ss and "malts! 6xoerisnct 
l'oss1l;>le'ftseems to prove conclusively that they are precon-
se1ous.34 
All thIs discussion has not been a digression. far removed 
from !l.'l discussion ot schemat18l'lh This dUellty must be clearly 
MThls will be settled fiM.lly ].a tel' in this chapter. EVen 
if this side ot the duality was not clearly preconscious, it would 
not mllterially affect the pOint of this the81~. Since, ho.\'Gver, 
tbese activities are to be tak.en aa preconscious ones, then it 
would seem that smith's v1ew instead ot Paton's concerning the 
double tendenoy is carrect. Moreover, Paton's view or "empirical 
realism'· 13 unconvincIng and when formula ted. seems to redu ce i t-
self either tv subjectivism or to the same contradiction attrib-
uted to Fant by smith. It seems there is no denying this contra-
dictory tendency in Kant, and indeed it was impossible to avoid 
ont!e l'~an t had determined that we do not know the ~ an a1 ch. 
Consequently. i8 Smithts vie .. of the transcendenti'Iactrvitles as 
noumannl also correct'? That is a question that it is 1m.possible 
to answer here since 1 t would invol 'Ye unravelling YlAn t t s obscure 
and controverted doctrine concarn1ng the noumenon and the "trans-
cend.ental object." It does not directly sfreet this thesis and 1s 
outside its ltmits. 
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understood and 1ts existence justl~led before taking up Kant's 
first definition ot the transcendental schenK't. FUrther, wa shall 
see that to a large extent sc~emat1sm is essentially only the 
transcendental act1 vitia. which are the product! VEt side of the 
duality outlined in the deductions. 
Kant's first real definition of the transcendental schema 
occurs in the fourth plrtlgraph of' his dla;lter. It is stated al-
most in the form of a syllogism. The maj cr is, "The concept of 
Understanding contains pure synthetic un1 ty of' the manifold in 
general. n This 1s a thought whi<il. 1s repeated throue.,hout the 
cri$lgul, especially in the transcendental deductlons. 36 The 
minor gives the nature of time: "Time. as the formal condition 0 
the manifold ot inner sense, and theref'Ol."e of the connect! on ot 
all representations. contains an!! Ui2£i m;:::.nifold in pure intui-
tion." This repeats what JCd:mt has said about time in the nAes-
thet1c.,,36 
The conclusion of this syllogism is stated and elaborated 
upon in the following words: 
Now a transcendental determination of time is so tar 
homogeneous with the (:ategorYl which constitutes 1 ta 
unit1. in that it is universe. and rests upon .an !. 
priori rule. But, on the other hand, 1t is so tar 
homogeneous with appearance, in that time 1s contained 
in every empirical representatlon of' the manifold. 
35Se8 for example, B 144-145 (160-161). 
36Espec 1ally A.34. ... -B 50-51 (77) a nd A 46-49 .... -B 66 (86). 
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Thus an app11cat1on of the ootesol"Y to appearances be-
canes possible by means ot the tranacenden tal determ1na-
t10n of tim.e, which, as the sChema of the concepts or 
understanding. mediates ~, aubsumpt10n of the appear-
ances under the catego17. 
rrhe 8l"€)1ment 1s not dift! cult to to11ow. UnderstaD11ng which 
tunct10ns through the categories 113 natively orientated to some 
sort or object or man1told 1n general. Time 113 the formal con-
di t10n of the man1fold and 113 at the same t 1me an !. Rri orl rule 
connecting all representations in Slccess1on. Thus it is logIcal 
that time should be the mediatlng factor between the category ot 
thooghtand the empirical manifold, since it is both !. P!"10f.~ and 
em.plr1cal. 
But the noteworthy thlng aboot tim.e as the media t1ng factor 
is tihat It is a "transce:ndantal glt!lm1~tIon p,t 1t"," or as 
Paton translates the German word le'tbe8tl~lYlS more 1Iterall,-. 
"transoendental time-determinatIon." 38 Now hare Kant seems to be 
explIcitly talking abalt the transc.fd~tal !..c}:l.l.,39 and n,ot 
transcendental lcb.mMt1Eb the preeoIlSoi QUa p;roductlve process ot 
the tormer. But in tbe present chapter of tll 18 paper the precon-
scious schematism process is to be prlnarl1y cons 1dered. Shalld 
not then the consideratIon of the transcenden tal t1me ... determina-
3'lA, l:S8-139--B 1'17-1'18 (181}..8 tor the whole fourth 
paragraph. 
36PatOl'l. II. 29. 
39trhe transcendental sehem or t1m~~el.p1i~tlon from its 
objective side will be discussed in ei. I i. 
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tion be relegated to the next chapter? Decidedly not. It was 
ment10ned ear11er that 1t would be dl:f'tleult to abstract the pre-
coosci oua schematlsm from 1 ts product. the consclous schema. What 
Kant tells about the latter 14111 teach us much about the farmer 
and 11ce vellA~ Moreover. as atlall be seen. l(ant often contuses 
the two considerat1ons. Thus we m.ust consider some texts in both 
chapters, but each from Its l'espe cti va point of view, 
Thus the transcendental determination of time is explicitly 
the transcendenta.l scile:na. The bent1mD1BY of the compound m.eans 
t:l, determ,iMtlon but can also mean the determ1n1y or the aotual 
determination a t this moment and not !JI!t rely 1 ts completion. Some 
d1cti maries give the first meaning of bestll!!!!U!S as a tt:f'lxing. 
fIxatIon," 1ihen only a ttdeterm1nation." A Geman dictionary pub-
11shed 1n 1611,40 Just twenty-tour Jears attar the publication or 
:tant·s seoond edition glves the f'1rat det1nlti on of besti!@'!WS aa 
"d1, handlgs au. bel~i •• h" or "the action ot the determination 
or determin1ng." Consequently. there :~.s muoh to be found .concern-
ing the schematlam process in the implicatIons ot the def1n1tion 
ot the schema. Sehematiam then can be sald to be a process whlch 
determines41 t1me (or aots upon time) In Sloh a way that the 
40J'ohann C. Adelung. WorterbucA m. gochS!u-;sgp.e,p KuMar". 
3 vola. (W1an t 1811). 
41Cf. these words about scbemat1sm wh1ch I<ants gives us else 
where 1n the W:lkaUS!: F1rst, "the categories require in addition 
to the pure concept ot: uDierstanl1ng, determine. t1 an ot their ap-
pllcation to sensib111ty 1n general \the schemata )." A 245 (263) • 
.Kant also tells ue t.hat the "acto of' understand1ng are. without 
the sche'i11lta ot sensibllity, Bll1eterP!imd." ;\. 664-B 692 (546). 
Itallcs in original. 
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application ot the category to appea:tance. 1s !!lid. possible" 42 
This is an initial definition whiCh w1ll be r1.lled out in the 
course of subsequent analyses. 
Paton interprets this time-determinuti on not as a character-
istic of t1m.e ltself, but as characte-r1stlcs of objects as tspor 
and aa combined in one tlme. This leads him to his typical "uni. 
versal charaoteristics" interpretation or the schemata.43 Al-
though Patents interpretatIon contains no positl .. discrepancy 
canpared with the interpretation to be evolv»d _ret hia pat1tioa 
excludes the su.bject1 ve condit 10ning slde of the duality trOll 
being found in Kantta tex1;.44 Yet from 'What bas been seen above a d 
from what :Kant tells us abrut the transcenden tal schema in sub.e-
quent pa:ragraphs it sa8me all but absolutely certain that ~u;t!D. 
thili d!t.t,n1~to1'\ coptYIU!t1J.l fl.tllIn!. }l2;tefl ,1S!ft s:L !W!. 4ual.tt. a pro-
cess of determin1ng 1n time and the determination ot time which 
results. In another p9.rt ot the schematlsm chapter ltant tIllks 
a bout the schemata as na. RJ."lor! de tar mine. ti one or t 1me in Ii coord-
42Eyen if iant had _ant only the p-oduet here, the determi. 
nation would lltve demanded a determining and something to do the 
determin1ng, and even a fo:tm or rule according to whicb the 4e· 
termlned was so effected. and we would stl11 be able to argue muc 
concerning the produotive process :rrca. a description ot its COIl-
plett on. . 
43paton. II. 29. 
"ct. below, pp. 07-68. 
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ance with rules,u45 which seems to support this subjective deter-
mining interpretation. I/or tliere must be something determin1ng 
(an agent in the act of determining) in accordance with the norms 
of these rules.46 
This interpretatIon i8 consistent with win t Kant tells Us 
about sehematiam in the mn (fifth) p!lragraph. Atter summa:rlz1 
the conclusions ot the transcendental deducti on, the lim! tatlon 
to sensibility mich t11e categories involve, Kant tells us that 
the categories must ncontain !. Pliox:& oertain formal conai tions 0 
sensibility, namelytthoae of 1nner sense. tt47 Kan .. equivalatea 
these conditions to the tr~llSeendental schema by telliDg us. 
nThese conditions of sensibility constitute the un1versal condl-
tion under which alone the category oan be appl1ed to any object. 
This fQt'mal and pure condition of ,enstbl11ty to whlch~ -the emPloy-
ment of the concept of underainnding is restri cted. we shall en-
title the SOS!mI ot the concept. Th~ 'procedure ot understanding 
45A 146--B 184 (185). 
461t is strange that wi th all til e emphasis Kant puts upon the 
definit10n ot the transcendental schema as a ti~-determinatioll 
throughout the whole achemat1sm clJapter Smith does not oonsider 
this even worthy ot mention. Marechal is mere concerned VJitil a 
lesa mentioned aspect (forma.l condi tion ot sensibility) and eveD. 
Deval, who makes schemat1sr!1 80 important, does not capitalize up 
this definition, as he m1gb.t .ell M .. in his interpretation. 
47Cf. it 181--13 224 (212) where Kant tells us tha.t the cate-
gory "contains the unity of th 1s scheml" and that it is substi-
tuted tor the ,category when apply1ng tile latter to appearances. 
The schema 1s the key to the category fa empluJment, "or rather set 
it alongside the category. as its restricting conditt on ••• il 
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in these schemata we shall entitle the sohemat1s. of pure under-
standing. ,,48 
Therefore to summarize Kant t a th rugb. there. schematlsm. 1s the 
procedure of the unders tanding whereby the entegorlas are senslb17 
condit10ned (thrOUgh the formal sensible condit10ns they conta.in) 
so as to I1n1it them to sense experience. What preCisely Is th1a 
formal cond1t1on of sensibi11ty which Kant equivalates to the 
transcendental schema. and m.ore 1mmedia te to the problem of th1s 
chap'ter. what 1. the "procedure of ~e UDderstanding n Wh1ch et-
feets 1t? Kant himself tells us that it 1s based on the transcen-
dental deduc'tlon. And he .baa also just told us tha' the schema at 
the category 1. a. tra.nscendental determlnatl00 of time. Indeed 
there 1s nothing strange 1n equ Ivalating -formal cond1tions of 
sensibility" to the "transcendental. determination at "time." F01" 
1n the "AestJaetic" Kant does almost this very th1ng.49 T1me 1s 
the form of inner sense. But inner ti.,se (t1me) includes .the de-
term1nations ot outer sense (space) and so is the !. prl,or1 condi-
tion of aU a.ppearanees.--micb is another way of saying "the for-
mal conditions ot sens1b111ty.~ 
The transcendental schema then 1s a transcendental determ1na-
tion of t1me which as the formal condit1on at sens1bility lim1ts 
the categories to sense experience. All of this is effected br 
4SA 139 ... 14o--B 178-1'19 (181-182). The limitation aspeot of' 
th1s paragraph hae 111s proper treatment in eh. III. Here we a.re 
only concerned with the "formal oondition of sensib111t,y.rt 
49A 34--B 50 .... 51 (77). 
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the activities outl1.ned in the transcendental deductionth For 
Kant implies throughout the fifth plragraph that all he is telling 
us, about the uforml conditions ot sensibilityff 1$ a repetition or 
extensi on of the transcendental deduction. 'What we sa:w earlier ot 
this deduction confirms this. That deduction can be summarized 
essentially as a synthesis of the manifold according to the rules 
of the categories in apperception. In many p.Ulces throughout both 
first and second ed1 tions we parcei ved how the minifold is de1!er-
mines and. aUJAlIUHU,zli through the categor1esin the, uni t;t 2.!. !,R.-
RercgtiQ!h and how a,s !. it6!y:lt the categories receive val1dit, 
only in the realm. ot: sense 1ntu1tion. i.a. are thereby limited. to 
this area of experience. 50 
/ Marechalts view of achamatism 1n general talls in completely 
wi ih this interpretation. We saw alr$ady how he baaes schaUB t18m 
upon the synthesis of apprehens10n of the fi :'st edt t1 on at the 
transcendental deduction. He tells U;s:tbe given ot external sense 
• 
is unified by the internal sensa at time. Unity in tile multiple 
50Typlcal instance. in the transcendental deduction which 
correspoDa w1th tbe sensible cond1tioning ot the categories and 
determinations ot t1me as aspects of scb.e:natism are the following: 
A 105 (135), the unity of rule determines the l1'8n1told; A lle-US 
(141-142), apperception funct10ns throuf#1, a sya'thesis of all the 
manifold; B 143 (160), tne manifold 1s determined. by the categor-
ies; B 150-151 (164-165), figurative synthesis at the sense mani-
fold conditions a. nr12£1 knowled,ge. The fo11C»iing two references 
are of primary signif1cance: B 160-161 (170-171), categories pre-
scribe laws whereby there is a determined uni t1 ot the mani:f'old in 
accordance witll the categories; and B 146-149 (163). without 
&lsnaib,s. 1njlll~*2A .or detarm1naii on in time knowledge is not valid 
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elements ot representation 1s possible through a princ1ple of' 
antecedent un1fioation. / Cri tical. reas ooing confirms. Marachel 
says, his psychological analysis in pOinting out the fact that the 
original synthesis is by no means simple, but supposes a union ot 
cOfllplicated associatIve processes whldl is construct1ve irmgina-
ti on. 
The unity ot consci ousness i.poses certain conditions upon 
the ob jecti VEt synthesis Just menti omd. F'rom the point ot view CIt 
the understanding these COM i t1 ons are the categories t the "ante-
cedent unificat1on" mentioned above. From the point of view at 
1mginat1on these are the pure transcend8l'ltal schellllta. which a8 
we saw in Chapter I, Illlong wi ill the empirical schemata. mediate 
between consciousness and the synthesis of imagination. or all 
the conditions far object! va knowledge, the schema 18 the solder-
1ng point. 51 
I The content of Ma.reellal's psycho1.0g1cal a l13.lys1s of s..chema-
" . 
tit:1tn a l'pears idan t! 00+ with the transcenden tal a ctt 1'1 ties outlined 
in the "deduct1 ons. rt " We cannot agree with the llhole ot Mareohal'. 
interpretation of schemstlsm,52 but his psychological analysis 
cOIl1.'1rms one vary im.portant ooncluslal which shruld have been 
obvious in the correlation pointed out above between scheaf.lt1sm 
51Ma~cha 1. III. 
52gspeclal17 1s there difficulty with his pr1marily subject-
ive view of the schema, at least as it is described in general. 
cr. pp. 12-14 of th1s paper, and 011. III. 
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and the transcendental deduction. It is simply: transeendenta. 
schema tii'i1 • ..2£ ,the ,m:0gedure 2£ 9!£. trans con 1en,tal ac. ti vi tie! .!!! 
l.imlti~ the CfliiUHEie.l ~hrousa jibe sonsibla conditions of time-
determinations, .u. notbJag m.,ore ~ the subjective constltuti!!} 
2£. ~ obJes,tt .u. ReeD J.a thi transcellden tal d~ducti on. 'fhe :\mpli-
cations of whut Kant tells us l.ibout the transcendental schema de-
mand this. 
, 
M~.l"ecb.al' s interpreta t1 on cont irma it. It is utter11 
consistent with what we saw in the wal aspect and tendency of 
Yantts syatOOl. And it will be conf1rDBd by the rest of the text 
on schama tism. 
The meanIng or t1U"1\eterm&na't101 is a 11ttle clearer now. 
:Paton is correct in remarking that 1t is not a characteristic at 
time. 53 It is :rather the determination C1l somthing in time. 
Tha t sOIoothing is the object known. The III tura of the transcen-
dental SChema or time determination taken objoctively, :from. the 
side of conse! ousnese. will be elabo.ia_d upon1n the :t'ol~ow 1ng 
ch{.~ptAr. OUl" picture of Schamf:ltisrn is necessarily here but halt 
complete. The important thing is that we perceive in the dlClptar 
on achematism the contusing dUality so characteristic of Kant: he 
tella us more about the preconscious constitution ot ~le Object 
\linen he explicitly treats ot its correlative oppOsite, the con-
sCi ous object., 
In the next section, in the sixth am the first llalf of the 
seven th paragraph, Kant 113 most successful in hiding his meaning 
53See above p. 44. 
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from his reader and rreeipltat1ns an endless maoa 1n interpreti 
schellBtisn. In the second paragraph which discusses the problem 
of heterogenelt,. Kant was quite emphatic in poInting out that 
there was a need ot discussing sUch a problem only In the 1nstance 
ot the categor1se. ftIn none ot the other sciences is ibls neces-
sary.ft04 How is 1t then that in. this sect! on under consideratlon 
YUint g1 vesus an explanatl an of schena tlsm of emplrical and ma'the-
mtlcal concepts? 
The openins statements of t.be sixth paragraph are simple 
enough and presumably concern the transcendental schena. It Is a 
product of the lmag1natlon55 a..nd 1s always dlst1ngu.lab.ed from the 
image. The reason tor the latter 1s tba t the synthesis ot the 
imaginat10n in producing the schema alms at no special intuition ... 
'the implIcation 1. tbat such would be an lmage·-but merely at 
uni ty In the determinsti an of SEmslbI11t,.. 'fhere 1s nothIng new 
here except far the tuncti.on ot 1magiDaU on In producing the sche 
" . 
(wh1ch was implied 1n what MS already been seen concerning the 
transcendental schema). But in the next sentence Kant goes on to 
descr1be the schemat18m of a m1ibematieal conoept. the thinking of 
the number tive or a hundred or larger numbers. ~ln. in the 
first halt of the seventh paragraph Kant desert bes the schema t1sm 
of the geometrical ooncept of 8. tr1ansle and 1. ts rEtlat1 an to an 
54A 13S--B 1" (180). 
65For the tunction at tmg1mtioD in schematism see belay 
pp_ 55 to 6". 
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lmage ot a iriangle. and the aohemai!sn ot the sensible cmcept 0 
a dog. 56 
Now schemai!sm. 01' anplrleal CODCepts57 seems to be outslde 
the 11m1te ot this thes1s .. hlob. is concerned onl.7 nUl the schema 
tism ot the caiegories. Mare'Ver. even it this ma:tter talls in 1ih 
realm ot this thests lt would seem bettalr to treat 1 t in the next 
chapter where we are oOJICerr.ted with the oojectlve scbemata ot con 
sCiousness. It would seem that schemat!sm or Gnpirieal concepts 
would be a conscious process or at laast evident upon reflection. 
Nevertheless, .Kant's insertion of ih1a trea1im.ent bere might in-
volve eome significant 1mpllca1ilC1ls tar transcendental sehematl. 
Consequently we must at least determ1ne the purpose of the treat-
ment of the empirical concept. The tact that Kant denied earller 
there was any problem. tn the applicability of emplrioal concepts 
to their. object. does not neoesaul11 preclude a treatment CIt 
schematism. ot such concepts. It is utterly lUl11kely that ~nt 
would flatly contrad1ot h1mself so explicitly within three para-
graphs. 
But here lt 1s precisely that a great problem. arises. Kant 
doe. seem apparently to contradict himself. He did say that there 
56A l40-14l-B 179-180 (182-100). 
57By 1IR,;19it :rRC'~1 without fUrther speCifications i. 
meant all matb.ema c an what Kant calls "seSibJ,! .col!ce~p... II 
In Scholast1 c terminology they would rOUSlly c arreapond wr u.n1- II 
versal ldeas, while the categories would correspond, again rough 
wi th the analogous concept. ot n:e tap!lyslcs. 
was no problem of heterogeneie'ty tor sclences other than transee 
dental. Scb.ematisU1 was postula ted to answer this problem. Whf 
then treat sChemat1sm 01' empir1cal concepts? ~~thermQret the 
de1'1nl tlons ot schema ta Kant gives in this passage involving em-
pirical schemat1mn are vague and extremely difficult to analyze. 
Ii is here more than elsewhere that the oommentators run r10t in 
contradiotory exeS881a.58 
It 1s evident that no com.plete or valid explanation ot trans 
cendentsl schematlam can be had unUl these. quest10ns are 
answered. The faot tbat tant lncluded e. trantaent ot schenat! •• 
01' empirical coneepta must bay. one at two possible significances. 
Either the cauldeation 0'[ empirical schematisrn throws 11ghton 
8chGmatiaa in Its general aspects aDd C CIlSequently on transeemen-
tel schematI_ as well, or emplri:cal schematlsm. was Insert ed bere 
as a point of contrast with transoendental scheDlit1sm, showing 
:nesstl VEtly what the schena t1sm of the .::ate€:;"Ories involves •• 
Now since Prlcnard found vary notable contra41ctions between 
"bat he thwght to be tant's treatmeD:t at schenat1sm in general 
and the transcendental sdlem&,59 since we saw similar inconsist-
encies in l-lar&oba1 t a treatment of the same two .subjects. 60 and 
-
5Srhe dlverse opin10A8 outll:oad ln Oh. I are mare otten than 
nat concerned with the definitions of schematlsm that Kant gives 
when descrlbina empirloal sohsl11'ltl ... 
59priCbard, pp. 252-254 and th1a thesis. pp_ 11-12. 
60see this paper. pp. 13-14. 
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since Paton t1nda that supposed considerations ot sCbematlsm in 
general "throw ••• little 11g11't on the nature 01' the tran.cencl.J:~ 
tal schemata. tt61 1t would seem that Kant's consideration or the. 
schematiam of empirical concept 8 i8 not direoted toard ampl~r,.­
ins our knowledge of sohematlam in SCleral, but rather it 1s a 
eons1deratlce ot what transcendental schem.at1sm 18 not. SUch an 
interpretation would l:Il ve 1tJ.e advantage of sk1rti128, the dlffiCul-
ties outllned above. ADd since sohe. i1 sn. or epi:rlcal cOl'lCepta 
and all that 1s involved In It. cODIJidera't1on would be negative 1n 
its relat10n to transcendental sohematlsm.no detailed analysis or 
justlf'lcation ot Kant'. treatnen't would be del8nded. But such an 
interpreta'tlon would leave oontradictary the tex't. involved Qf' at 
least would make qu1te a .1l1U tb.1nker and poor p1111osopber out or 
Kant himself. For expliolt cOlVJlderatlo:tls ot empir1eal scbemat1am 
are 80 interwoven with sta.t~nt. that must re81rd transoendental 
aOhemat1srn,68 'tha't a _s8tl 'fe 1nterpr~)ation at empiriOal 1!chema-
tl am doe s a complete inJustioe to the cons is'tenor which l\ant d1s-
plays elaewhere. The negat1ve 1nterpreta't1on at empirical set.ma-
t1sm cannot. therefore, aately stand. What then at the man1fold 
d1tf1cul't1es out11ll$d above when the statements concerning empiri-
cal schemtiam are regarded as val1d tor achema tlam of the cate-
gories? 
61Faton, II. 3&. 
62For example, the sentence stating that sohelllltlsm is a "con-
cealed art." A14l--B 180-181 (183). It w111 be diacussed below. 
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A way out 01' the marass seems t~ be the following. We will 
f1nd that &.int t ,. treatment of Empirical scheRB tlam is indeed In-
tended as a consideration of the general aspects of scneDlltism. 
It 1s so i.n a different oontext and trom a 'd1ttere nt point or vi. 
than it has been usually interpreted. But it 1s also Intended to 
show that there are 80me dlfferences between the two schemata. 
lbplrlc:al knowledge 1n general and emplrical sohe.ma tlsm in partl-
cular as seen In thls interpretation wl11 ciroumvent the diffi-
culties 01' the commenta~rs an tioned abO'1e and leave Kant basi-
caUy conslsten t. The carelessness 01' KfID. tts expression am not 
confUsion in h1s thougbt w111 be found to be the source of tbe 
d1:ftlculties in the interpretation of th1s pissage. 
Now, it w11l be seeil that empirical schem 't1 am falls deti-
nltelJ an the objeotlve and cognitional aide of the essential 
duality ot this thesis. Tberetore a de'ta.11ed analysis of Kant's 
detinltlons at empirical schenatiam Ii~~ the objections to·them 
will be rightl1 considered in Chap1ter III. Nevertheless, as was 
seen above, the general sIgnificance ot empIr1cal achenat1. must 
be here clar1tied 11' tranacendental schemati $11 fran Its constl tu-
tive side is to be seen in its rig,.t perspectiv.. This general 
consideration will involve two interdependent points: a brief 
analyst. ot the function or iBaglnation in schematl. In general 
and the preCise place ot enp1rioal knowledge (and empirlcal 
schena t1_) In 141e Kant1an system and in the tuIJdall'8ntal duality 
outlined 1n th is paper. 
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We ea_ alrciUt41 ttlat tbe aGems wa. a product of the 1reg1na .. 
t1oo.63 E;'-en it kat 41d not teU UtJ that throughout the schemat1 
chapter, we would bel1eve that SUch would bra the caee after tol-
lowing the arswaen'ta or the deduotions. espe('J.alll those ot the 
first edl tlon. 61 There 1. perl'ltlpa noth 1Dg 1n l.s.nt's expositions 
of the 1'11".' 9ZlS'911 that 18 80 ComDlOD.pla eean4 Jet 80 vague •• 
the tunc:tlon of transcendental 1m.glnatla:;. 1n producing the 
l'.antlan object of knowledae and thl sd'1emata as well. Paton tel 
us tbat t-ant gives us no clear anner to ttl 18 Pl'lblem. of in'rlg1na-
t1on. Whether transcendental uag1natlon exerta some Influence 
upon the tOJ!'lUot though, as some at leant'. later llfri.tillgs seem t 
Im.Ply. or whether 8""1"1 sYDtl'u,als of 1re slwJ tion followa a demand 
of thCUe';ht. aa l(ant'. words in the Q£&t~snUt repeatedly ossert, is 
a question which 1t 1s imposs1ble to settle here. Only this 1s 
certain: transcendental il;eglmt1on concerns s1D:thesls in time 
and 1$ an aspect at synthos1s 1n JUd~ t. 66 
This much is oerta1nly true alao--&n impression oonstantly 
lett by analyses ot the trari.8C8udental deduction sudl ns was out-
lined earlier in ttl 1s chapter-that tran seen de tal 1rlJl gina tion 
(and consequently OIIPu1eal or reproductive lus.gtmtion) 1s inter 
- • 
63aeg1nn1ng ot a1 xth p!l ragra pb ot text. See p. 50 ab Of •• 
MF01' exaaplet A 116-121 (141-144) but also B 151-152 (165). 







u;.ediary between the categories of understanding and the sense 
munifold. Amung uther things this was certainly the burden of 
synthesis of apprehension and the whole t:ci-fold synthesis in the 
l>irst edition deduction. 66 Rant expressed this much Lloro 
succlntly and clearly than he ever did in the 9ritlqu9 in a letter 
to Bec,L D few years after the publication of the critique',! second 
edit ion. If intuition provide~ .a manifold for knowledge and if' 
understanding binds and determines knov,1edga. then it 13 thG 
fUllction of imagination to structuralize or compose the former 
according to the determinations of the l,} tter. Hl"or knowledge ·tv; 
sorts of' representation.s ure demanded: (l) intuition by which an 
~)bject is given and (2) the concept by ;vhich it is thought. '1'0 
make t.hese two elements of' knowledge one knOtdedge, an nct is 
;3till required: to organize the manifold given in intUit ion, con 
formed to tile synthetic unity of consci ~)USness which the concept 
expresses. ,,67 If Lnugination 1s lnttirmediary • it 1s not q.ifficul t 
to see ?:hy its product, the schema. is also intermediary. 
I!llilgination (sp,eciflcal1y transcendental or pure imagin{ltion) a~ 
well <113 its produced schema vlill be SEHHl more and more as this 
Inper progresses to· be . the can'eral hl11!~e joining the two 
hotor()aneVus poles wl1ich involve the Ini tial problem. of' 
66A 98-102 (131-133). 
67Letter to 13ecl; ot January 2J, 1892, Kant's schriften, 
J?rusaian Acudemy of 3cience, (Berlin, 1902-I9'08r; xl', 305-!502, 
quoted and commented upon in naval, p. 90. 
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schematlan. It ls also the hlnge where eet the two sldes of the 
dUality wh1ch solves sehenat1sm·s dlfficult1es. 
Returning now to that dua11ty. where does emp1rical knowledge 
as d1 stlngulqhsed from transcenden tal knowledge fl t 1nto 1t. strue!" 
ture? l!m.p1rleal knowledge lnvolves the cons 01 QUall abstracted 
general concepts of common sense 1ntellectual knarledge. The ob-
ject ot th is knowledge 1 s som determilJfl te aspect at the prevlous-
11' cond1t1oned and constl1llted. PlWl9llnQ,D which 1s the product at 
all the transoendental acttvities molding the materials at sensi-
bility. Empirical knowledge is not l1ke transcendental knowledge 
wh.tch 1s philosophical and does not so moh 1nvolve abstract10n 
from the known object as refleetive insight into 1t. Transcenden-
tal knowledge is ot a h1gher level a nil more universal. penetra tlng 
Int 0 the ob je ct known; It does not advert to ~e _pirieal con1tem 
ot knowledge on thi\t direct enpiriesl level. Thus empirical know-
., 
ledge (whether It be ot "sensible" or qetbem!lticalconcepta) aDd 
the an.pirical schem tism it involves are dependent upon and subor-
dinate to not only the preconsc1 aue and transcendental constl tu-
t1011 of the known universal cbject, rut slao to the conscious 
philosophical or transcendental knowledge had when applying the 
categories in consc1ous JUdgments.&6 
68rhe dependence of the empirical part ot knowl$dge upon th. 
I. Rrl,ort is oert.alnl7 8 conaon aspect d: KBntta doctrine. Probab17 
its mos trenohant explanation is in the subjec'tive deduction Of 
the first edition transoendental deduction. A 115-119 (141-143). 
'I'he three elements ot knowledge, sense, lmg1Dl tion and intel1eo-
tion. are seen to havepa1"alJ.el functions on both the empirical an 
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A.ll 1his 1s a brief sW'JlDa17 at the oon:lual CDS of Chapter III 
the Objective s1de at the Kant:Ja.n duallty_ Yet 1ts conslderat1an 
1s demanded to' percel va the s1gnlt ica.nce of iant' s Insert 10n of 
emplrlcal 8cbematlsm where 1 t is taUlld. Kant can sUddenly descend 
to B%WD.ples ot e.mpirloal schemata. even when d is CUB sing trans cen-
dental schematlsm s1.mply because the act which constitute. and 
molds the known cbJeot. is the same act which enables b1m to know 
the categor1es 'lnvolved and schemltlzed In this object. and 18 tlB 
same act by wh 1& he can aba-.raot a certain plrt ot that obJeot 
emp1r1cally. This latter De cessl tates an intermediary empirical 
schema. The difficult1es ot interpretat10n ar1se preclsely, .e 
shall see, because the CIle transcendent a ct, with its dual as-
pecta ot tc:rmlDg the kXlOwn and l<nowlng it both ~ran8cendentallJ 
and Empirlcally, could not be claarly percei ved in 'the lIl1aleadlng 
express10n ot the scb.enat1sm chapter and ,d tbe det1D.ltiona alJd 
examples of 8I'lplr1cal schemata. in pert~.~lar. 
!. prlpn -a1des. In ea.ch case the empi r1cal functlon depen48 upon 
the correspondlng transcendent.l one. It shwld be noted that in 
the reason1ngs of the traDscenden tal deductions Kant begins' w1th 
emplrical knowledge, presclnda trom. 1ts material content to dls* 
cover the necessar3 and universal ln emplr1 cal e onaOlwSDiUJS, a~",,,, 
proceeda to the transcendental activities and the categories as -.wl 
only legltlftBte explanatlau ~ our lntell$ctual knowledge. But th. 
procedure in oo:natructlq the object lIIlat be Just the opposite (1n 
order ot oausal tuaCtloll, not of t.paral sucoe.81an): the cate· 
gorles Blust through 1mag1uat1on ayll'lle81ze raw experlence lnto the 
transcendental object (in which tbe oat8corlea, DCI'l sohemat1se4.1 
11e) and tram. this object at length 'the m.1nd can abstract and far.. ! i 
mulate the concepts ot empirical knowledge. Further cons1dera-
1;1011s 1n tn1.vein are ODe ot 'the _in objects ot Oh. III. 
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lan, 1II18t .Te bad fb1s transoendat un1t, ot knowleAge 1n 
mind when he treated alterm tely detinl tlona which eTiden'tly have 
onl7 to do w lth emp1rical concepts (tor example the rrequ.ent d18-
al8s10n ot the amS' Which emp1rical sehemata. DB. ke possible) Elnd 
consideratial8 ot tranacendental achematism. An instance at tbe 
lst_r 18 \be .. 11 known statemfllt or Kant that schematiS1l ot tbe 
Ulld er s taDd1l1g 1a a htdd en art. 
Eant DeTV use4tb.e term. "schemat1sm of the lmders tanding" 
unless he meant 8e1uunatisn ot :the IQrO understanding. i.e. trans-
cendental schematiD. The least tl1at can be sald ls that 1n it. 
context 1t must refer to acmematlsn 1n gemral.. bo1ib. transcenden-
tal and emp1rlcal.'fl1e sctence is one f:£ :Kant t. 1I10st quoted. 
ftThis schemat1sm ot our unders1Dm1ng in its app1ica1;ion to appeu 
ancesand their mere torm. is an art cone ealed in the depths ot 
the haen soult whoae real males ot actlvity DlWre i8 001'017 
11ke17 e'Yer to allow us to discover. ~d to lave open to our 
~.e.tl&9 
Th1s sen:tence seems ~ prove what wa. sta ted above abQ1t the 
69A 141--B 180-181 (lS3). Note that t11e sentenee tollC1l1ng 
br 1.Dgs baok the discusslon ot empirical concepts. It the cop.-
geal!i W. sentence 1s to be interpreted &s referring to tranaeen-
dental. ache.tUm primrU71 a. it seems necessary to do. we can easily perceive the d1tt1Cl ties fbis parasraph bias brougb,t to the 
lnterpretati on or sChema t1sm. This very en1gma ot !{ant fS text 
serves to empbasize the 1nterp1'e,t8. tion that the dual 1 ty of trans-
cendental cc:ndlt1oniug and Empirical knowing was ever betore 
Mnt'a mind. 
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schematlsm process be lng preconso1 aua. '0 Now schemat1 .. 1s 8een 
to be rreeonselous nOli only be_use 1 t 1 s equiValent to the 
transcendental determinat10n of the object as seen in the trans-
cendental deduction. but also because .tan t 8lq)11cltlr desorl'be. 
schematlsm as "conoealed in the depth. ot the soultt etc. This is 
further confirmed by someth1ng Kant said about the synthesis in-
volved in kno\lledge in the section on meiaph),slcal deduction, 
words so similar to the present ones as to make one belie,.. that 
Kan t had them exPlioltly in mind when he wrote the <ilapter on 
schematism. ftSJnthesls in general. as we shall. hereatter see, 1s 
the mere result or t.he PQter or 1magi:Dilt.1on. a blind but indis-
pensable function ot the soul, without wh1dl we shwld ha'Ve no 
knowledge whatsoever. but or whid! •• are scarcely e'fer con-
sc! ous. ft 71 
This quotati an, 1"o\Wd ~ a 11 l.$ .!Jt ~ q.lids t QL' tie ~ !eRhls & 
cal deducttoaj confirms that such 8yIittl.6Si8 ia px-econac1w..s. It 
" . 
also strengthens the conten1i1oIJ. of this the sis that the synthetic 
actl vitles spoken or 1ntranscendental sche matism are the same as 
those detailed in the transcendental deduction. But it especlal1 
shows that these acti"'! t16s are the same as must be implied in tb. 
metaphysl00.1 deduct! en where un1 ty 1s discOV' ered be tween our mude 
?Ocr. Paton, II, 73 and later in tiae present anapter. 
71 A 78--8 103 (112). 
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of judgment and the !. RD.sa::6 pr1ncd.pkta *leh ette,t them. 72 
In the last sect1 (Il or the leng1ibl seTen1ih paragraph Kant 
s11ps formally agaln into a discuss10n ot tl"(in$ean~en tal schema-
ti_u. '13 Here we are given a closely pa eked sen tono. whlch f as 
Paton remurl{ti. Fant 1s apt to present a t at eNolal point in an 
argt.un.mt. 74 This sent.me exp11citly gives the oharacteristics of 
tb.e transcendental schema aa diBtl~ul&t\.d trom o\her types of 
$cb.~ta.'~m1th breaks 1 t doe well tn his tra.nslation 1nto aev-
eral sentenc... Because it is 80 involved, It will be quoted here 
d1v1de4 and subcrdlmted accc:.rd1ng to the sensa. 
On the other hilld. the sell ... or a pure ooncept of under-
ataa41Dg can .Y. 'b8 brought 1nto 810' 11'll88 whatsoever. 
It 1s aimp1.7 the pure syntbeala, det .. mb:red br a rule of tha1 
un1 '7t lZl .e.or48110. with coDe.pta, 
to whioh the oat.gory g1ves expreaa1 al. 
It 1s a 1ranaoe4ental product of lrragii6'1oD. 
.... I i -It 
a product 1h lob ®ncerna tho determlmtlon or 1llJ'l8t' ae. It 
In geneX'dl aco crc11ng t" eolld1 tl ona of 1t. tOrtm. (i1.), 
1n respect at all representations, 
10 tar as ih88e reprfJsen.ti 0D4 are to be COfJ.D!)oted 
tn Rc!ii~ t;n: 1::~:' wi1". of appenIJ'1 Qt. 7.5 
71er. Paton, It 263 where he teUs Us that 1hls plssage "ls a 
aWIlCf.u:y statement of doctrines vAllch Will bo elaborated in the 
TraDacendental De4uctlClh" PGtoa baa •• 'this ~at._nt upon, smoag 
other things. Kant' a sta .ment ln the passage quoted, "as •• slBU 
hereafter •••• " Cou14 not thea. werda of l~ant JUst aa ,.ell rtis II ..1in§. ft {lRift .91. !eSU1;» U. 08110 C i.d ll1 s 1 n(l e we m v e noted . e i1m"Il:ar '1 __ ne wo ... t .. uta? 
,aA tinal d lscusa1 on ot emp1rloal aehot!ltltlarn toll",. the ,"op" 
~!a,laJl !l.1 sentence. Ct. n.. 69. The tact that the subsequent 
passase is ln.t rcdUoe4 by "~on ~tbJt 0Ms~.M·t fur ther jus tlf18 II the 
distinction "'ween emp1r1C1i'l'""i'iit ~ iJ'iii";fe:ntal schetnatlsm. Of. 
Ch. Ill. 
'14Paton, LIt Z7. 
76",U4z-.B 181 (183). 
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In interpret1ng th1s "PIIr1 d 1fti cul t passage it 1s nece.ss17 
far the most part to tollow Paton, who a1anda alone in attemptlns 
to analyze this sentence cr even dl$OUS8 it. Aco<rdlng to Paton 
F.ant l1llkes three points, the 1b1rd or which 1s subd1vlded 1nto 
another three. .FIrat the transcendental. schema has no correspond-
ing image. This 1~ a. :fact lant diaou saes throughalt the Wi ole 
sect10n on empirical achemat1sm. Only empirical concepts can mve 
imges corresponding to them or to their schemata. 76 
The second point causes more dif'1"1culty. I\ant seems to be 
equi vala t1ns; the transcendental. scheua to a synthesis. Paton ad-
mits that perhaps the best interpretatl al of Y..nnt's meaning In the 
words HS given 'Would be that the schema'lsa ru:\! at lrm{!.1mtlon 
as 1s the. anpir1eal schema. ae preters to think that it 1s a 
sp6cl1' ic kind of !! RF~ 51'.& oc.mbinati an »rodu cad by pure synthesi. 
of IJ.mgination and is in eOnformity ltith the rule conceived in th 
category. That f its well with paton'~ .. int arpretat10n ot the 
transcendental schema thus t~r, but 1t does not expla1n :Kant IS 
words. 77 If the transcendental scl1e~ is a synthesis in an act1" 
or opera ti ve sense, then we e.as i11 pereei ve the difficulty ea..toa 
seems to be trying to explA.1n away: hOlt can the schema be both 
an activity and its product? But ~Dth!!1a is an ambiguous word. 
It ca.n be also ta.ken in a pa.ssive sense, namely that which bas 
bGer~ synthesized. Such an 1nterpretat1 Qll EI volds the d iifle 1.l1ty 
• 
76Paton, II. 37. 
77 37-38. Kant says boldly it II §.. S 
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paton toresa .. a8 .. ell as reD:1ers the Kant1an text more oons1s tent 
and 1ntel11gible. The rest of the sen ten os bears out th 18 1nter-
pratat1on. For 1 t i. a synth. es1. ttpttlma.!I,d by a rule ot 'tilat 
unity, in. 8pcQra!!Bcl :!!.!a. concePts.,,78 Moreover, the vera- ambigu-
ity of the ward .DU.aI,il In 1b is sen tence points out once again 
tluat Kant 1\,IaS constantly kl:Jepl:ng in .mind boths1des of the cogni-
tional duality. He talk. abwt the product. tne schema, but aa 
something that baa been syn1h •• 1zed. 1t1s been determined and eon-
dltioned b1 the rule of the cate80l'1. 
this ambiguity seems to be barne wt in the third po1nt where 
after telling us again tha t the' transoendental schema 1. a prOduc" 
of the 1magtm t1 en he d •• er1 be. wbat seems to be more the charac-
terist1c8 of the condl'i tiling process at SCl1EUJJil tism. than its pro-
duet. He apeaks of the sche. a. OODOC' nins the determ1Ul tion ot 
tlme with respect to aU represeD:tations. This see_ 1;0 be cm17 a 
rehashing ot the synthes1s at the manlf'Ql,d in time so as tp con-
stitute experience ("in respect to all representatl <*lett). FUrther 
he SaY8 that these representations are oonnected a priori in one 
ooncept in conformity with the unity ot apperception. Does this 
not seem to be the schema'1sm pro08 •• '19 as unifying experience 1n 
accordance with the law. ot appercept10n (the categor1es), eaoh 
-
... 
faA. 142--B 181 (l~). Italios not In tr1g1nal. 
?gor, in the hypothesis ot this thesis, the transcendental 
activi ties ot the deductions. 
M 
produced aahemaSO corresponding to one or other or ttl. ca'.gcr1_ 
This 1s certainly a possl ble int erpl"etatl on and It tlt. in not 
only w1 th what w. bav. seen ot the pure schena '1 an prooes8 1ib.ue 
far but also gl. ve. U8 once agaIn evidenoe ot the ooDt'Uslng ambIgu-
ity which characterizes Kant's treatment. 
In the eighth para8l"8:ph .Karl't Bakes a trana1tion to a con-
aideratlon ot 'the tran scendeni4l schemata in partlcular. In the 
brief p81'9graphs nine to suteen lnclusl'VQ Kant descrlbes eaoh ot 
the transcenden tal s& emata It In the seventeenth p1 ra gra ph .Kant 
summarizes the trans cen den tal schaats, as we saw, as "transcenden 
tal determ1nat1ons ot tl_ in accordance wi th rules." All of this 
treats the objeotive side at tbe ache_ tism dual!t,. exclusively 
. 81 
and will therefore be d1scussed 1n the next chapter. 
t.rben in the beglnn1.ng of the eighteenth paragraph, Kant gives 
us a d8f'int t1 on ot scbema t1 am. of' the UDiers tanding based on wba t 
he haa sald abQlt the transcendental s~ernata as various ttme-de-
terminatlons. "It 1s endent, theretaL"8. tllat what the schematiam 
at UDderstan1iDg etreets by !leans of transcendental synthesis of 
imagination is s1mpl, the unity of all the manifold at intuition 
in inner seltse. and so ind1rectly the u.n! ty of appel"ceptlon which 
• 
8OW1tb Paton, these are the universal characteristics at ex-
perience, as we sl:f111 seo 1n the next chapter. 
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as a function corre.ponds to the receptivity ot ilU3er sense. nel 
This again is tellIng proof tbft'li the fUnction at the soh."-
tisru process 18 the same 8s the constitu t10n ot the phenomenal ob-
ject, or Uthe u1'l1ty of all the manifold c£ intuition." Kant tell. 
us that this is done in 1Illler sense 01' course, and says that 1n-
d1rectly this erreota the uni t1 of apperception. This ~galn 1s 
not only consol1flnt w1 th the transcendental deduct! on but an ecbo 
of 1t. We recall that especIally 1n the second edition deductlce 
Kant p01nted out that my having an object at knowledge demands ep-
perception and that in turn I could not have th1s unit,. ot eon-
sCiousness unleslI there was a n object conformed to 1t. 83 Further, 
the empIrical :slde or apperceptiVe cCllscloUSMS8 Y!8S the recepti.-
vity of inner sense.54 
lmmediatelyafter 'tal1s sen'tfmce }Cant spe&it$ again abwt the 
11mlta:tlon of the ca'\egorles whicil results trom transcendental. 
" . 
82. 145 ..... B 185 (165-186). Again Paton, interprets this I'll th 
rei'erence to its ult1nate result and not what it 18 in itselt or 
from. the poInt ot view or the proCHs whIch proCilc8s 1t (II, 73-
75). lie admits the passage is obscure but thinks that }~ant means 
different ldnds at un! ty or comb 1nat1 on of the tEDporal manU,'old 
corresponding to 'the categories. He claims that schematism in-
volves an obscure SUdgment. tThis product of transcendental syn-
thesis is an instance ~ which tho pure category app11es. t It is 
not explicit in ordirary eXp:1r1ence. He deniee. as we sh!9.11 see 
again. that It 1s preconsci cus: "I. .... still less a description 
of the sucoessive stages which precede experience_" 
83B 131-135 (152-155). 
64B 152-159 (165-169). 
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sehematism.85 These last sentence. ot this paragraph and the sig ... 
niticance ot the lill1 tat10n aspect at scnematism as a mole have 
their proper treatment on the objective side of schene. tlsm in t be 
following chapter. The final paragraph ot the dlapter. the 1;wen-
tleth,86 also treats explicitly the transcendental schemata, the 
objective side ot our dUa.lity, and will be ana17Sed later. There 
1s remaining only the one-sentence nineteen th paragraph t9 dls .... 
cuss, ,which "serves 8.S an apt s'tlmJlllry of the point ot this chap-
ter. 
"All our knowledge taUs w11t1in the boWlds ot possible ex-
perience, and just in this universal relation to possi ble experi-
ence consist. that transcendental truth mich pl"fIlced!1 all empiri-
cal truth and makel .11 P9!Sllb!*,,87 
In the midst of h18 treatment of the transcendental schemata 
Kant tells Us 'that 'laycmdent9i: i£Y'tP Rt:Scegel B;nsl !l2 kes Dosalbl t 
our knol'Jledge wh ioh f'alls only wi ttl 1.D ~he bounds ot possi b;l.e ex-
perience.sa In the metaphysical end transcendental deductions 
S5A l46--B 185 (l86). 
eGA l46-147.-B 185-167 (l86-187). 
87 J. 146 ....... ]3 185 (186). Italic. not in O1."lS1Dal. 
~ot. the similarity ot this paragraph to a' statement made 
by Rant 1n his treatment otsche. i18m 1n the Prole~omena to ~ 
l!&:!au:, !!~apm~e •• t1:ans. Pet er G. Lucas (ManChester. 1~5'!T.p;'T7: 
"The object contorm.1n6 to the schema 1. encountered only in ex-
perience {Sh1! HiJ!g ll:lt.. p£!:!dUO; at the Unders1~lJJl1ng out at the 
mater1als ot seiiIliIl1t71. ItaliCS not in original. The paren~ ... 
ais is ambiguous, but context seems more in favor of join1ng ale 
with the !;rtal:!fW making !xpe£lemt the product, not soh_. 
6'1 
Kant had told us tbat ~ere are certaIn!. priori Pl"1D.c1plea aDd 
synthetic activit1 •• whlcb make possible and cons1;1tu.1;e the phe-
ncmenal object ot our knowledge and ?hlch accoUJlt for the unIty 
and necesal ty of that knowledge. This source d Oll.'r knowledge 
wh1ch In the ra41cal Kantlan sense of' the W 01'4 1s tlans~en4ental 
truth 1s preconscIous in 1ts condItionIng activ1ty. Kant 1s tell 
ing us the same thing we 114'11' in the deducti ODs in the cha pter on 
schematIsm, where t we ahall see. he 18 deser1 blng tor us the lUli-
versal characterIstics 01' exPerience 1¥h1ch jUstify the conscious 
applIcation 01' the ootegor18. to tm t experience. 'lbe schemat1sm. 
process which prov1des and proouces these character1st1cs.1s 
noth1ng mere than the transcenden tal .,nth esia or the m.an1fold 1n 
general w1 th the unIfy1ng and leg! ala t~ng pr1nciple. 1nvol ved. in 
apparcepti on. Consequently. this 1. a preconsci ous aot1 v1:ty. The 
> 
po1nt of: the schena. tlsm e1l8p1;81' 1s that the categortes do provide 
the transcen dental sOh ema ta in tbe 11' a '0'1 1vi t 1es. 
, '. 
The tact tba1; the schemat1sm proce •• 113 subconscious or pre-
conse10ua has been repea1;edly emphas1zed throughout th 18 treat-
Dent. It may be objected tbat Kant neTer explicltly mentions this 
tae1; In etther the dedu.et! alB or the chapter on seb.ema1;1sm. Fa to 
sim1larly objects to the interpret .. "1on that 1tle S?neealed !.l1 8S-
peet or schemat1sm proves that schemat1sm 1s unconscious or eYen 
posstblI 'M refers back even to 0RJAAl,--but this would not es-
.enttal y-cnange the meaning. 
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nOWJ1fUlal.89 Yet from ~at we saw of thi$ 1ft ;)tII.lge sbove, ani troa 
J1l..arely tbe !!l$anlng of the li c.rd llIAl2H4fB Ul. this writer eann~ 
cancet V8 h~ su.ch ne_in tiea could pcs81b1y be consCious, at 
least exp11citly so. The :final determiDAtion or the meaning at 
the word .Ri2qPQAg~0».l must be the tol101linf. It 19 that mldl at ... 
fac'ts or baa some influ.ence en cOMo1018 kl1owle4ge, bu.t ot t1b.lch 
I am not explici ~11 a_re_ At beat. it 1s 1m.pUclt90 in con-
sciousness ot an object in such a -7 that 1: COM to beve };now-
ledge ot it anlJ at~r long anal,. ••• and reflection ooncernlng th 
consciousness. That seems to be wbl t .Kant ~a8 dolDg 1n all tbe 
transcendental actlvit1e. Q1tl1D!d in the deductions and implied 
11'1 the sellem.atiam chaptS'. Consequent1r. 1t 18 c.-talnly not 1n-
volved in the expliclt and direct content uf cr41nary lau:&'f ledge. 
It the achema.tlz1ng QC:'U vi tlea are the same 88 those out-
lined in the deduct! one, tb.en 1s the cha pte:' on s cbe mtltls~.'l super .... 
fluous' That 18 a question which can:~ Qnly be answered after eon-




89;patoll. II, 73-75. cr. p. 64. D. 82. It ahcu.14 be ncaecl 
that 1'8to1\ BUlk·e. mdl in this section of tho pOint. tbtlt tu:m.ettiltl 
111 not Wlcoasolcue. Yet be make. no a ttempt to pro,," thu. The 
final iSSUG Of the position or l\ik'ton's general 1rtterpretat1 CIl at 
scbemati_ 11111 be cons1dered lAter. 
90tant implies that we do 80;'18t1 •• be ve a_reM •• of 8l1oh 
activities when he says that we rare17 if over are aware CIt the 
echem t1z1ne actl 'Y1tJ. A 141-8 180-181 (10:3). 
0BA.PTl£R III 
THE SOLUTION. PARr II: THE OBJEClfIVlC 
SCHEMATA OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
"Phenomena are nothlng more tban the pure conc.pia 
sehemat1sed • • • and the world of ,cienes 1s 
a world ot schemata ••• "~ 
The task 01' th1s chapter 1s to demonstrate the objective slde 
01' the dIla11ty wh1ch Is the essence 01' this thesis. our conslder 
atlon must now turn to the products of the transcendental schema ... 
t1z1ng process. These are the characteristics.of our consciOUS 
experience whlch enable us to apply the categories to appearances. 
The accomp11shm.ent ot this 'task will be cons iderably less labor1-
ous than 1n the preceding chapter. because the 1nvestigat ion must 
concern 1tselt mcre with Kant's expl1.c1t and prima tacie state-
• 
ments concerning schemata. and it is ntit so necessary to delve ex-
tensively 1nto the transcendental implications of some of h1s ob-
scure defin1tions. 
In the first Mlt' of the solution 01' the problem. of schema-
tism Kantts statements were considered principall,. in the order 1 
which he presented them to us. This was, in a sense, necessary 
1,1'.J. weldon, e~:roduct10t1 to ~ .. !. Critigue .2.t FUre ReasOll 
( Oxford, 1945) t p. 
as 
'0 
lest by Juxtapositlon ot oertain unrelated texts a misinterpreta-
tion 01' the continuity ot his argument might result. But now 
since the general lines ot his argwment bave been outlined, the 
goal ot this Chapter w111 be much more clearly accomplishe4 by 
dividins the arS\l.lB.eit.ts and :Kant's texts under tive important head 
lngs. lll. ot Kant t • essential statements concerning the schenau 
will be treated acmewbere in 'lhose five sections. Those headings 
are: (1) the transoendental sohema in general a8 the solution to 
the proble.m. 01' heterogenelt7, (2) the transcendental schemata in 
partlcular, (3) the schemata as limitations 01' the categories, 
(") 1ihe function ot empirical schemata, and (5) the significanoe 
ot the tranacen4ental achemata In tbe Kantian system. 
Flrst, to the transoendental sche. as Kant's 801ution to the 
problem 01' heterogeneity. .Pure catego17 aDd aen •• appearanoe. are 
too completely dlverse in their respective natures to allow an un-
mediated application ot the tormer to~ ~~e J.a tter. Theretore }(an' 
O8lls upon fl tIEl!1l9!pdenta. »!M-de1!l!1ns:t1 gp a. a mediating tac-
tor, because time i. both !. PEion and thus hc:mogeneou8 wlth the 
pure ea tegary, and 'the torm of sense manitold and thus homogene-
ous with a ppetUtance •• 2 
In conerete consoious Judgments wbat doe8 th1s mean? t..ant 
haa proven 1n 'the M.e\8phys1oal and Transcendental Deducti one that 






make exper:1ence pos8:1ble and bring unlty, necesalty, and unlyeraa 
11 ty to our knowledge. How then, can I say empirioally. "Fire 
causes smoke."? How can Newtonts laws, so lmportant tor Kant, 
neoessary and universal as they are, be applied to the PUt'ely sen 
slble charac1erlst1cs ot experience? Or, philosophically, how oa 
I say that causa 11 tJ or sUbstance or un! ty a.re verifiable in the 
objects I know? 
All the above are e~mple. of "the subs~ptlon of intuitions 
under pure concepts, the 8PPA!oatlon of a category to appearan-
081h,,3 Kant answers 1n the sohematism chapter that we can apply 
the categories to senae exPerienoe in such judgments beca~se 1al 
transcesdental ,~lm~-4.et~n:mlna'19Y, 8.1 p1pdiati~ f!1ctors, ~~­
ve~sal char.at,eria'1, •. <#.~ ~own object whI1,~, Mable .2Bl. m1n,d 
consCiously.12 a:rm1Z ~ oatescr1es l..2. ;t!lese 9bJects !2. ~.!l.ru:-§cter-
1!!l1-
Jiow to the 'proof of Ulls statemen"* We sa.W in the preceding 
" 
chapter that the transcendental time-determination which media tea 
the subsumpti on of appearanoes under the ca tegory4 was first. "de-
termined by a rule of that unity ••• to ¥.h1ch the categtry giv •• 
expression. t't We saw tha t the transcendental SdlSlla was a tttrans-
cendental product ot the 1rD&g1.m t1 an, a product eich concerns the 
determlnation at inner sense in general • • • in respect of all 
representations •• _ ir.l. conformity with the unity of appercep. 
3A 138--B 177 (180). 
4A 139--D 178 (181.). 
'a 
tion. H5 secondly, we saw that "what the schema"ism at understand-
1ng eftects by meana 01' the transcendental synth.s1s at imaglDll-
tion is simply the unity or all the manitold or intuition in 1nner 
sense ••• tt6 
We saw both these texts previously trom the aspect 01' the a 
-
pr1ori, constltuti ve 0 onstructi en of the object at know ledge. Now 
we can see 1n the same texts an obJectlve produot wnich the cate-
gory as it rule IIRl'II!'. a determination 01' t 1me which conce1'118 
all reptesstat;1op,l- With Paton' these two texts must be inter-
preted as pointing out tbat the traDScendentalschemata are ob-
jective characterist1cs 01' objects, which, since produced by the 
imagination according to the categories as rules, allow these sam. 
categories to be applied to such Objects. 8 Fer the express10n 
whioh the oategory ettects 1s nat merelY a subjective product in 
the inn gina t1 on, but 1'a t:b.er the lmaglJJ':l t1 on produces t11 is schema 
ln the §lpthesi, £t lil p~ject1vt I!~t~. 
Furth9r, the categorles, Kant tells us in the context of 'the 
schemata. "serve only to subordinate appearances to universal rule 
ot synthesiS, and thus to tit them tor thoroughgoing conneetial 
SA 142--B 181 (183) and cf. this paper pp. 60-63. 
6A 145--B 185 (186-186) and cr. this paper pp. 63-64. 
'Paton, II, 37-39 and 74-70. 
SCt. alec as we saw preYiw81y (in Ch. I) naval's double 
aspect of the schelM as a concept determining, and the determ1ned, 
projected schema t pp_ 90--96. 
73 
in one experience." 9 And 81nce Kant has repeate4ly told us 
througb,Q1t the transcendental deducti c:m.s that one of the main 
tuncti ems at the categorIes is to objectity the manifold at sense 
th!s subordination 01' appearances I<..ant speaks ot must certalnl7 
an object1ve one. 
There 1s one more text w1thin the sdleaJatism chapter which 
espec1ally demonstrates that Kant meant by the transcendental 
schema an ob ject1 ve aspect of the known, even the universal char-
acteristics 01' experience. "But it is alao ev1dent that althwgh 
the schemata ot sens1b1l1ty first real1ze the categories, they at 
the same time 'restr1ct them, that ls. lim1t them to conditions 
which lie outs1de the understanding, and are due to sensibIlity. 
The schema Is, properly. only the phenomenOD. or sens1 ble concept 
01' an object 1n agreement wlth the category.tt10 
The llmitaticn aspect of th1s quotation w1ll, of course, be 
considered in the ttlir4 :pa.rt of this "-chapter 'a cons1derat1.ons. 
What attracts our interest here are Kantfs words: tttbe schema'. 
of sens1bi11 t,. t,l;rs,t rea1;' •• the eEl tegOl"les tt and ttThe schema ls, 
properly, only the Wlen~()1 or $en§lb1e concept .2t !ll .9bJe~1 !!. 
8&teemes .!.U.i. l!!! g&t,soU."ll Firat. the fact that the schema 
18 called an aspect ot sensibility objectIfies It, tor even though 
9A l46--B 185 (166). 
lOA 146--B 18& (lSe). 
U 1b1g• Its.l1c8 not in or Iginnl. 
" the torma ot appearances, space, aDd t1l1e. are !. priSE1 •• enal-
bill tl1s DOl'18thel •• 8 ob JEtctl ve ill so tar as 1 t 1. the only pas-
sive element 1n }{ant'. knowledge. Secondly. the tact tbat senalbiJ 
i t1 t1rst realize. or ma111t •• '8 the ca te,aryU a"me to objeot1t,-
the sohe_. Th11"417. the tact tna t the schema 14 called a pilAS-
ill9D 1n agreement wlth the category pol11ts out th1s objective 
character1stic l1kewl... Adm1ttedly, there 1s d1ttlculty ln call-
lng the transoendental aehema a concept. But Paton lIel1 pOints 
out that the schemallkeanyothersenslbleCbarac.eriat1c ls 
capable at being coneei .,e4.13 Further, aa we adv_ted to earli-
er14 and as will be especial11. aeen again 'below w1 th respect to 
empirical adJ.emata. J.ant otten, lD4 •• el, 18 almost neceasitate4 to 
glve a repreaentatloual nomenclature to his obJect.~ But ahartly 
the schema as a J:ePIoQ!AA~t,9!.\ aa well as a character1stic of the 
object wl11 prove to be not qulte 80 en1f9D8t1c. The point here is 
that Kant haa Etquivalated the transc~dental schema to the Eheno-
menoa. whlch. !ant e1s ... here tell. \lS", ia the aRR!!IIl'1ce i.h .!2 t!E. 
!.!. .u. !ilhought yg,r .at 9 1$1 .st ll!.l gatrUSSl\1,tE,.15 This is as 
objectl "e aa one can be in Kant'. sls'em. Clearly then. at th1a 
lIar. mare properly perhaps, the achematized category. s •• 
th. discusslon ot this 'erm below. 
13Paton, lIt p.69, n. 4. Paton also confirms the objectlve 
int.~reta'lon or th1s text. ct. also Ib1a., p- 62. 
14see above, p. 24, n. 10. 
15ft.A.pposranee., 80 tar aa they are tllwght .a objects accor4-
ing to the unity ot the categories, are called ph!enomena • ft 
A. 149 (265). ot. the distlnot1 an b.t .... n appearance (ifPsche,n!y) 
and l?henomengJ. which Smith haa broue'llt to light In his 
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point 1n our argument. the treu::ulcendental schemata are at least 
ODe aspect ot the obJeo.t, known lntelleewally through the Cla'.-
gor1ea. l t) 
Betore pass1ng formally to the "omraentators who subsoribe to 
the above 1nt.rpretation, one laat and perhaps moat important text 
may be considered. Betore the Bchematism chapter itself, in the 
introduction to the "Analytic of Principles. tt lant is diBella.ing 
the 41tterence agaln b.t .... n general and transcendental loglc. 
General logic, slnoe 1t considers only the torma 01' thought with-
out content. can supply no rules far subsumpt10l1 ill jUdgJlell't.17 
But transcendental logic oan give not only the rules ot Judsment. 
but ''It can also speo1ty !. R11ox:l th, in§f~nce !2 which th, IllY:!. 
!I. toO l?.!. 8.l1pl&,d.·t Further, he say8 tha t the transcendental 
soience "must tormulate 01 means 01' !alv!~sa~ ~u, !utricle;t mark! 
Inglish translation and 1n his QomDl!Q'arz. p. 83. Melkl.ejphn and 
Muller had mistranslated Er'scheiauns in' their translations as 
"phencmenon. " 
leer. Weldon, p. 94. who malnta1ns that 0JlCt ot the reasons 
tor the contusion 1n the interpretation ot the chapter on sohema-
t1sm 1. that; Kant 414 not make clear what is a real intent10n in 
his system, namely. the notion 01' Rhenomenon aa the objective or-
der ot things. Ue 18 also author of ilie opInion quoted at the 
head of th1s chapter and here quoted in tull--an apt summary 01' 
the polnt being made 1n the present argument: "Phenanana are 
nothing more tha.n the pure ooncept. echemat1zed by the transcendent 
tal raoul1iy ot 1me.g1 .. 'ioa, and the world 01' SCience is a world at 
schemata. senerated in a senae by our own activ1ty but none the 
less objeotiye in contrast to the t subjective play ot representa-
tions' whieh mskes up our unreflective consc1ousneS8.~ Ib1d.,p.95 
17et• Paton on general and transcendental logic. II. p. 21. 
'1& 
the condition under which objects can be g1 ven. tn blni'mon,. with 
the.e concepts ~e ca tagOr1es] • "lS It wauld seam tba t the aapee" 
of transcendental schemata as univeraal characteristics has its 
most explicit textual verification W!,lslt the tormal treatment at 
schematlsm. This tact should not be strange to a reader fami11ar 
wlth Kant. In this instance he 1s talking about the "Analytic 01' 
Principlestf a8 a whole, and we sball see there is an intimate con-
nectlpn between the schemata and the uPrinciples, tf or doctrine 01' 
judgment 11'1 particu.lar. 
A number at repUtable commentators ba ve pointed otlt this ob-
jective and universal Characteristics aspect 01' the transcendental 
schema. Jfol"emoat among them. 1S t at owr88 • .Paton. and this ia the 
most significant aspect 01' hi8 Intel"pretati on 01' sohematism. He 
sees this interpretatt on as the only Clear solution throughout the 
twisting detlnitions Kant gives in the schematlsm chapter. He 
drives his point home tb:rcughout 8111;h"e chapters in mieb he 
" 
tree. t8 .xplio i ill" or schelUl t1 sm. Far inata nee. as a SUmrlll ry at 
his post tion: ftThus tor Rant the transoendental schemata are uni-
versal characteristics which. he hopes to show later [in the "Prin 
c1ples~, must belong 'to all objects as O!2Jects .!B. ~im!. These 
universal characteristics belong to objects, not as given to sen-
sation, but as 5HpbiaeA by the transcendental s;ynthesis ot 1mag1-
:natlon 1n one time. What we have to do at present is to learn 
leA. 135 .... 136 ... -B 1'14-175 (179). Italics not in original. 
Ct. Paton, II, 21-23. 
'I' 
what these transcendental schemata are, and to see, 1t we can, 
whether each transcendental sahema falls under ita oorresnanding 
08. tegory. "lg 
There is one Qther 1nstance In Paton's t~eatment whlch we 
must cOBsider 11' we are to 40 jUstice to his interpretation and It 
will add 11ght to the ar~ments ot thls thea 1s. Speaking of the 
schematism process, aDd rete.rrlng to the use ot th18 term in other 
i 
ot Kant's writing., Paton oa11a transcendental schematism a k1nd 
ot eIBlb1tIog otthe Object to which the category app11ea. 20 It 
seem.s to this wrIter that this is Ii very apt sllrl'IMry of the relli-
tionot schemat1. to the transcendental schemata. The!. Pllor! 
constructlon at the object 1n conformIty with the category results 
in the ealbU1S>1 of that category 1n the envelopment 01' sense 
data. a ua1versal characteristlc ot that object, the transcenden-
t8 1 _cnema. 21 
In th1s tirst and m.ost important argument 01' thls chapter, 
" . 
19Paton. lIt 19-20. ItaliCS in original. See also pp.21-24, 
37. 39-41, and 73. 
20llU:.9.., 73. 
2113e81de8 Paton. 1)1ya1. Mal"'chal. and Weldon hold posit1ons 
which are s1Jn1lar to an "universal characteristics" 1nterpre'tatlO11 
In considering 'the transcendental schema an objective reality. 
For DElval product! va lmaglDat10n jOins the forms or unders1and1ng 
to that of intuition, incarnat1ng the tormer in the latter. 'me 
result ls the sehema. (pp. 92 .... 93). ~e schema i8 the concept 1"8:' 
turned and transmuted 1n experience and is synonomous w1th the 
phenomenon. (pp. 100 and 101) • For M8r'ehal the transcendental 
schema reveals the constsn" re1a tlon of the categories to experi-
ence ln the rec2ltetl. gem*11 ~ tor this application. (III. P* 184). a s an a ghniry near to Paton's. Yet the 
conflict of such a statement w1th Mar6chal's earller lntsrprete.-
'18 
1mere rema1ns only to c ona1der p:r,oj. 881y wha.t the oonec1ousmaa ot 
the transcendental schena lnvolves. We are cons1der1ng the ob-
ject1ve and oonscious a14e or the schematlam duality and before 
look1ng at !ant's descriptions ot the individUAl schemata, 1t will 
be ".11 to- perceive more clea.rlJ how the transcendental schemata 
enter into our jUdgmen1Hh 
We saw above €tampl •• of philoaophlcal Judgments in which 'She 
transcendental SCMma. "'0114 pr~ld. an intermediary representation 
as an answer 'to the prdllem of heterogeneity. Now we have seen 
that ~e schema ~8 objective and tbat speo1fically lt provides the 
universal- characteristics whieh allow the application of the cate-
gory. Let us look agal~ a t the three types ot jUdgments used as 
examples earlier. First, two empirical judgments 1n which the 
ea tegarlea are involved, the tlrst expliCitly, the second implic1t 
ly: nFirecauses smoke;- and ft'fba1; tree changes eolors. f1 The 
category ot causa.lity is evident in the first judgment and., that at 
'.' . 
substance is laten" in the seoond. The empirical concepts in-
vol ved --troe, t lre, smoke--have their Olm resps ct! ve empirical 
schemata but these will be cQlsidered bel(~h Both these empirical 
jUdgments involve analysis and abstract10n trom previously consti-
tuted experience, perhaps over a long success! on of' temporal mo-
ments. I have learned from that experience that it possesses 
tlon ot the 8chema 1n general w1ll be discussed again below. 
Weldon's expltu,1II 1f1 on 1s seen in hi s p Os 1t 1 on on the phenomenon. 
t=iee abave, p. 75, n. 16. 
'19 
oertain characteri.tios ot 1191''1£1 ISSSIIIlga22 which enable me 
to apply the category ot cause to 'thls 4a'tum ot experience. Thus 
! formula te the PI' opos 1 tion tba t am OMt is caused by, a nd follow. 
in neoe.aary succeasion from tIre. SIm.ilarly. my analpable ex-
perienoe haa shown me that tb.a t whieb. is the aubJe. of chanse 18 
aubsistent, because I have recognized the general ohtlracteristlc 
of UIMnSe in the changing • ts te of tb. tree. Thus I impllo1 t. 
11 apply the category of IU.bat6nce to the datum I 0811 "tree." 
True, there are other, indeed all. categories implicit in tho •• 
a.nd other Judgment.. That 1s c.r~a1nl)' .II.ant'. I11n4. 23 The polnt 
here 1s tbat the categories are involved even in empirical judg-
menta. and they are appl1ed beoause of tbe unlver8tll characteris-
tlc. which Rant gi vea US 1n the 11st at the transoendental schema t • 
This same polDt ia true of wba t Kant w wld eo.1el.r the s,.n-
thetic !.. PORE' judsmenta or Newtonian phys 1 ca. "In all • • • mo-
tion aot10n and reaction IIlUst alway •. obe equal. flt24 cause, sub-
• 
stance, actuallty. etc. are lmplicitly·involved 1n such a law and 
are applied to experience because of the un1veraal characteri.t10. 
whiCh are found imbedded in tbe object as known. 
But thIs i$ above all evident 1n the philosophioal or 8xpllei 
. transcendental JUdgments sudl a8, "herything whioh bappenahaa 
ita cauae,"ao or "Substances and cauaality lIre element. taund in 
• .. IU .. 
21See the transoendental sebea tor cauaalltl below, p. 83. 
83S •• Patm. II, 43-44-
&in 1'1 (64). 
25A 9--a 13 (50). 
II 
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hll.8JEin experience. It In theae the ca t8gorles are seen 1n the ob .. 
jects of experience because of \he universal character1stics of 
such experience, and thus we are able to apply the categorles '0 
those objects explicitly and tully. 
But here 1s the point whlch 1s of prlme 1n?partance: the 
transcendenta.lschema. as a PA2;.om.!DOP" is both the universal 
ehnracterlstlc 01" the object known, empowering the knower to applJ 
the category to thert ob jeC't, g .!!. also the vehicle .2! that est.-
.5.9IZ !.!. kpown. tn! phantaaa .!a. which the catesory; .!!. consciousll 
eX;Qresged w1tniD '.he kp.0Mr. The represents. tl onal note found so 
frequently in Kant's object no longer puzzle,S us. It is an es-
sential characteristic of Kant's crltical system and the preCise 
proof ot the poInt being made here. Thus. Vie see why tha trans-
cendental schema is the hinge, the meeting place, and the solder-
ing polnt t 26 between tile precollsc ious and synthetic constl tutlon 
of the object on the one hdnd, and tb.~ ,an'11yt10 and C CIlso1!ous ex-
presslon of that knowledge an the other. 
In this Identi'J between the characteristic of the object an~ 
the subjective carrierS" in which the category is :first known 
, 
("the schemata ••• first realize the oategaries,,28) we see one. 
26Marbcbal, III. 16Z. 
27Ct. ~oleeOm,na (Lucas, trans.)j p. 77 where Kant talks 
about the flO ject conforming to the schema" encountered in exper1. 
ence, and the schema as being 8ubst1tuted for the category in ita 
applicat1on, flor rather set it along side the category ••• " in 
the ft.Princ1ples" --A 181--a 224 (212). 
28A 146--B 180-186 (186). 
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agaIn the fence :r:ant is attenpting to straddle between pure sub-
Jectivism and phenomenal18~29 We are never certain 1n Kant ex-
actly where subJeotive knower ends and phenomenal object begins. 
The typ1cally Kant1an dual tendency to subjectiv1sm and phenomena 
ism shows us here Jllore t:tan elsewhere the essential Kalltian dual-
i 1;1 which this theai. proposes. It seerna too t the schema as knew 
and as an objective onaraoter1st10 is what Paton was getting at 
the distinction he postulates between transcendental schema and 
schematized catesorz. Kant never uses such a term. Paton main-
tains 1t is implicit in his doctrine and describes 1t as a concept 
of a synthesis of an object 1n time, where the category unaonema-
t1zed lIould be the pure synthes1s w1 thou t involving the time ele-
ment. 30 This writer d008 not see any neoessity far such a new 
element and it is d1fficult to see exaotl,. what Paton means by tile 
term. The use of the terminology "schema t ized cate60u" though, 
seems to be an excellent way of retel;Ti~ to t he schema (am the 
oa tegory) !.!. !BoSh or to the Cia tegory· . ae limited in t:ime; Fa ton 
seems to bave been torced to postula te such a new element to avoid 
the subJeotivism which is latent in Kant's system and thus put the 
critical thinker on a firm phenomenalist fOUndation. 31 
29cr. above, pp. 38-39. 
50See espeoially, Paton, II, 41-43. 
31with reeard to the !chemat1l!d caye~El mention wlould be 
made ot Patonts critioisms of wbat he . thin . are smith's identifi-
cation or the schemata with the categories. In referring to this 
mil tte:r, Paton seellls to include an at least seeming contradiction 
to his own critici .. ot Smith, in the interval between the first 
~e f1rst and most important ar~m.nt ot th1s chapter haa 
been demonstrated: 1t has been shown that. in general, the object 
ive side ot: the schema tiam. dU-al1 t1 calsis ts in the tran a eenden tal 
sohema involving tlle universal characteristics at the known objeot 
enabling the mind consciously to apply the categor1es to these ob-
jects in contorm11ty with 'Uleill. and that the schema, as a phenan.e .... 
non, i8 not only the exhibition at the 08 t880ry in tbe ob j..,ot f but 
the vehicle of its being known in the subject. The question im ... 
mediately tollows: what are these ua1versal characteristics in 
contarmi ty with the :respective ca tegories? 
The various schemata Kant 11st. are logical lmagina tlve con-
struction. 01' the respective oategories in the succesaive moments 
ot: tim~.t. The treatment this paper wl11 give to them will hardly 
be more than an abbrenated paraphrase of Kant's list. Tbe reason 
for this 18 sound. Kantts list of the individual schemata 1s ad-
mittedly art1:t:1oc1a11n the extreme, and its art1f1oiallt71-s that I' 
of the metaphysical deduction. Paton, lantts Most sympathetlc 
commentator. Impllcl tly adm1 ts this wben he attempts to recon-
struct ii.ant's dootr1ne or schemat!sm. The various transcendental 
scb.flDI8ta (and the categories) are based upon the judgments of forma 
logic as well as .1pon the nature or- time. '!'he forner seems to I' 
have tallen. What is important is that the categories ertect 
and second volume ot his wcrk. The vb ole issue is at 'best confu-
sing and dQ)s not seem to be of manent tor the purposes ot this 






sartain kiadl of oharacteristics ot objects to conform with 
them. 32 It the twelve eat.series S.nd their partIcular schemta 
are a bit artifioial, the general doctrine involving the unIfying 
principles of unders tanding stl11 r EIIla ins • Therefore the analyst 
of the veri GU8 schemata found here will be Bufri elent merely to 
show the general characteristics ot objects synthesized in t1me, 
8S contil'!Ifl.tl (Il ot the general doctrine of the liu!hem9 outlined 
above. 33 
The transcendental schema for the tbree categories ot quanti 
toy is nHJ!be.l.. the generation of succes.ive unity in tim.e. The 
schema of the tbree categorles of quall \1 1s the successive till· 
iag up and emptying of sensatim in an Object 1n tine. That or 
substance 18 the perm.anenee of an d:> jact through alecess1 ve 
cbanges in t1me, ot causality 1t is the .. oe8881"Y succession ac-
oording to rule, of canmun1t1 it 1s the coexistence according to 
a un1versal rule of the dete'rm1nat1ai .,9t different 8ubata1l.ces. 
The schema of poasibl11,ty 1s the agreement of the qnUlesia ot 
representation w1th the general conditions or t1me, ot actw11t1 
1t 18 existenoe in sane determinate t~e, of neoessity 1t is the 
existence ot an object at all times. 34 
JI.'ven so cursory a. s1J.llJ.1'Jlary reveals the artiticiality ot the 
32Ps ton , II. 15-78. 
33cr• Karner, p. 75 and ~ith, p_ 341. 
34A 142-146--8 181-184 (183-185). ct. Paton, II. 44-60. 
ind1 vldual schema'ta. K.ant seelllS to be forc1ng the temporal 8S-
pect. Thai quality t for example, should be bOUDd to successive 
moments of t1me for its objective verification 1s d1fficult to ac-
cept, even in Kant. Paton points out that quantity and quality aa 
described seem to have mere ot iynth!$l, abCllt them than unlversal 
characteristics of an object. But lr3 adds that Kant's Slmmary at 
the close ot Ule list C8 sChemata appears to retain the view that 
such schemata are objective producta. 35 
In that aummary of the list of 1be traDScen.4en'tal schemata 
lant 'tells us that the 8chema'ta ot quantIty relate the ordar ot 
t1,m£t"'serle'J of qualIty, time-eontet, or relatlon, tlme-£fder; 
and of malall t7 t the scope .2!: l!!!.!. !!! ream ct of aU pos81 ble ,S&.-
Jects.36 Sm1th pointa O1t that Kant gives only one schema. for the 
three categories of quallty and one tor the three ot quan'ti1;J, 
whIle he glves a dltterent schema tor each of' the three categorles 
, 
of relat10n and modaJ.itJ. He uses th~~ as an example to shOll that 
Kant 1s s11ent when his architectonic haa fai led, 81 thoutjl he 18 
37 
most voclferous when it corresponds. Paton orters somewhat Wl-
convincing argum.ents to just1!)" this. 38 Grant1t1g the artificia11-
ty of the 11st, the dispute does not bave lIAlch consequence. In 
35.Paton. II, 61 .... 62. Paton mus't m.ean synthesis in an a.ctive, 
constructive sense. Cf. abora, Pp. 61 .... 02. 
36A, l45-B 184 (185). 
5'1Sln11b • P. 341. 
38Paton, lIt 63-65. 
general, it would seem that the list ot individual sollenata 1s an 
antiCipation ot the "Principles" where Kant's purpose is to give 
the rules for the applicati an of the categor1es in judgment and 
the .! Rri 9£1 judgments tllemsel vas. 39 The purpose of the schema-
t1sru chapter is rather to ahow the oop41t&onfJ (the schem ta in 
general) fOl' such epplicati en and to demonstrate hem these univer 
sal character1stics result trom imagiBl tlon in conform1ty with the 
categories. 
The th1rd liB in point or our cons iderati on in this cbapter 18 
Kant's recurrent insistence that the transcendental sche~qta 11mi 
the categoriss to the renitold of sense a xper1ence. We saw in the 
preceding chapter how the categor.ies are l1mited to sensibility 
because the fcrmer"contain !. pr12£J: certain formal condi tiona of 
sensibility, namely, theee 01' imler sense." Then follows a defi-
nition 01' the sebem'ita as the conditions to which th.ecategory 18 
40 
restricted. Later l~t tells us ~at the transcendenta~ sche-
" . 
rna ta are the only condi t1 ons under vb iOO the eEl tagar ies obtain ob-
jective significance. TherefOre their employment is l1m.ited to 
the empirical.41 Hia most trench an t proof of this aspe ot of ttle 
39ct. A 135--B 174-175 (179) and A 148-'.8 187-188 (188). 
Smith concurs with Sloh an interpretati an of the indi vidUal sche· 
mats.. See Smith, p.341. 
40 ... 139-140--B 179 (182). "Th1s formal and pure condition of 
scms1b111t;y to which the emplo)'1l1elD.t of the concept at Wlders1and-
ing i8 restricted, we shall en title the schema of' the concept.,. (d:P1A.) Cf. above, pp. 44 ... 46 and Paton ii, 31-32_ 
41A 146--B 185 (186). "The schemata 01' the pure concepts of 






schemata aeeme to be the passage quoted ear11er where the schema 
119 equlvalated to the phenomenon: ttBut it is also ev1dent that 
although the schemata of sena1.bl11V :first realise the categories, 
they at the same tIme restrict them, 'that Is. limit 'them. to con.-
d1 t ions which lie outside the und ersla II11.ng. and are due to sene i 
bl1ity. The schema Is, properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible 
concept, of an object In agreement with the category.n4S 
The reasoning 1s not difticult to tOllow. Sdlematism eftect 
the el.-pressi on of the categor1es (pnenan.enon, realizat10n otthe 
categexy) in the sensible cblracter1sti os of the Cbject. This 
sensible expression Is the schema. But the aooellllta. as the solu-
t10n to the problem of heterogeneity are the cond1tions Which 
alane make the applicat10n of the categories to senslble object. 
possible. Therefore the only leg!. ti_ te object for such categor-
ies (or t KtUlt m.ight say. the represen ta t1 on of such an ob ject) are 
the sellsible objects so e oo.dI't ioned. ,.' 
From such limitation Kant draws some conclusIons sim.ilar to 
the ones expressed in the cha.pter on the phenomena and nwmena. 
Apart from. the conditions of the transcendental schemata, the 
categories apply to thinga !!. .lh.U.!!"!., mIle the schemata "repre-
43 
sent them only ~ lBll ap»Ia:." It would seem, therefore, that 
these concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess signif.i-
cance. In the end, therefore, the categories have no other possi-
ble employment th.an the empirical." 
42A 146--B 166-186 (166). 
4~A 146-147 --B l86 (186). ';~f}lin we see the transcendental 
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the pure categories give 8 much wider knowledge. Such 18 not 
rel1117 the oaae. For the meaning of such categories is merely 
10g1cal and thus haa no objective content. "The categories,there-
tore. without achemata. are merely functions of the understandIng 
tor concepts i and represent no object. This ob jecti ve meanillg the~ 
acquire from aen81bI1it1. which rea118es the understanding in the 
very process of restrictIng 11;. ,,44 
The fourth subject to be considered as pointing out the mean-
ing 01' the objective schemata of consciousness is a final settle-
ment of the problems of ~he empirica 1 schema ta. fhat Kant really 
intended auch a distinct10n trQm the transcendental schemata 1s 
clear frau the text and this will be pointed out during 'libe analJ-
sia 01' the Sixth aDd seventh paragraphs where Kantts doctrine an 
aueh schemata 1s contained. The real signifioance of such empiri-
cal achematlsm is br no means SO clear, as we saw in the precedlag 
chapter. The present treatment wl11 .~~ divided into two parts: 
what the empir1cal schema 18 1. it. own sign1fioance and the rela-
tion Of the empirioal sohema to the transcendental one. 
schema from a conscious or representat tonal aspect as well as an 
objective condition. 
44A l47--B 166-187 (~.6.187). ct. smith, p. 342. Cf. also 
the !!£~esomeM.. p. 7": tt ~Jhe senses only provide the pure oon-
cepts 0 the understanding !a ,consye jp•n This latter ambIguous 
phrase in context must mean the tS ng as thOUght, 1.e. the unknow-
able jing !!!~. John watson baa a very 100d explanation ot how 
the s~ta IliiIt the categories, 1n!!m! a~d !!!.!. English CritiC! 
(Glasgow; 1881), p. gl. 
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Fir ai, 1 t i8 clear ihs. t the snpir1cal scb.ell1& I along w1 th the 
transcendental .one, 1. a product ot the 1mg1m tion and 1s dis ... 
tinguished from the image •. If I lla ve t.1 va dota alongside ot one 
another, I have an WI! of the number five. But on the oUler 
hand, 1t I _,Ilk of the nWlber five or any other number, 88.1 a 
hundred .. I need aometb1ng mare than an 1ndividual Imge. Let us 
also take the example !\ant used a little later, ot the empirical 
concept of: a dog. It 1 have only an 1mage ot an ind1vidual dog, 
it is clear that I cannot think the em.pirical concept ot dog in 
genel'al with the aid ot sueh an image. In tn.. case of both the 
number and the dOS, there 1s no com.par1aOD between tbe indi v1dual 
dog or inage or the number ti ve and the universal concap is. Thus 
Ke.nt gives us his definition ot the empirical schema: it is "the 
representation ot a me1ihod whereby. a multiplicity, fur instance a 
thousand. l'Aa.J be repro se n ted in a n ina sa inc ant orm1 t Y wi th a car ... 
tain ooncept" or the "representation o.~ a universal procedure at 
lrraginat10n in providing an i.mage far a concept.,,45 
Kant must be using the wcrd 1mAi.. 1n two dIfferent senaas 1n 
this paragraph. First there 1s tho 1nd1 vIdual i1M ge trom wh iolL 
Kant distingl,ishes the schema and to which the empIrical concept 
1s nat adequate. Seoon11y, !ant used the vHrd baSI as the gener-
al structure at the SOhOOIS it selt in 1111 loh the imaginat10n repre-
sents its method. or proc.dure adequate to and in confo:nn1ty with a 
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certam ooncept. Th1s 1s evident trom the tollOlli:ag para.graph. 
f\8lli ahoold have distinsuished tbe 1Bdi!ldual &eS! (product or 
reproducti va imagtm 1;1on) from the I.ematt 0 .i~ B..! (product ot 
productive 1naglmtion). 
In the beginning of the seventh plragraph :Kant clarifIes tbe 
rele t1 em of the emp1rical sohema to the 1ndl vidual lmage and I a.-
individual ob ject. The disjunction ot th1s 14811 sentenoe is tn-
tended and must be esta.blished betere fU.r~er eons iderat1 on of Ule 
sohena IS relation to such an objectcr 1.r.mge. There was occasion 
to mentIon earlier. that at tinea :lant g1 ves a ;representsti ona~ 
note to 'the object. We saw this In the id.entification of the 
transcendental schema with the phjnOll¥'non and in even calling it 
"sensible concept" conformed to the category. We saw this also i 
the preceding chapter where Kant in setting up the problem. 01' 
heterogeneity says that non-transcendental sciences do not poss •• 
general concepts so heterop,eneous trO~.those "which represent it 
('the objee!J !a cppc;£etg. fl46 It 'Was rezmrked that. bec3use of 
Kant's denial of any knowledge of th logs a s they are-we know on! 
their appearanees ... ·xant 1s almost meessl tated to EUch a 
It is in the consideration of empirical schemata that this is evi 
dent more than elsewherE.., This p;3culiar Kant1an ambiguity 1s es-
tablished here between the 1maS of an individual object and the 
object itself. For :Kant tells us after stating the incongrulty 
., - ± 
I 
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between 8 geometrIc concept and It. 1m ga that tt [sl t111 leS8 i8 a 
.9bje" !?t.. ener1etlC! j£ ill 'maa ever adequate to the anpirieal 
c(Jlcept ... 47 Thls amb1gu1ty is confirmed by the best commenutors. 
Daval poInts out that the 1Dfi ge corresponding to epirlcal oon-
cepts Is really the eJi!!.pl, or ins tance of alch concep ta and sa,. 
the t th 1s 1s c cnf irmed 1n Kan t t S elji t 19:" .. ' qr Jl1ds!!!nt. 48 Pri cha rd 
oomments that Kant unquest1oJ'lably makes an i.ma ge out at what shrul 
have been an instance or Ind1v1dual of tnEt·,cancopt.49 Theretore 
when Kant is talking abQ1t an individual 1nng. in the context of 
the empirical sohemata he can be Just al well 1nter.prete4 8.S re-
ferring to the individual objeot. 
Returning now to the relet10n ot empIrical schema to indl vidu 
a 1 ina ge, we d 1s c over Kant telling us tila t "1 t is aChe_ ta. not 
images of objects whlab. UDderlie Our pure se1l8ible concepts. It He 
proves this by the example that no image could ever be adequate 1; 
the concept· at a triangle 1n general;50 For an 1n4i vidual. tri-
" . 
4' it. 141--B 180 (l~). ItaliCS not 1n or iglna1. 
4800va1 • pp. l02-l0~. 
49Priohard, pp. 261-252. Cf. Pa"ton on a s1mllar ambiguity, 
II, p.25, n. 1. 
50There is an app~~:rent difficulty in baving ma:.thematlcal con-
cepts among empirical ones. Is not quant1ty OM ot the categor-
ies? The answer, of cwrse, 1s that the category of quanti tty et-
feots the sohema or universal cba:racter~8tic of extension as a 
necessary characteristic of aU object s, while the empirical, 
mthemat1eal cancepiis are abstrac;ed. analyzed from the transcen-
dentally scheuatized experience. Daval mkes much of Kant's 
theorJ Of mathematiCS based on his descr1ptlons of the empirlcal 
schema ta. SeG pp. 105 ... 165. 
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angle coUld not expre •• the universality of 1b.e concept ot tri. 
angle which makes it valid and adequat. tor all 'nee of tri(Jngle 
whetner rlght ... ngled., obtuae .. ngled, or aout • ...e.ngled. Continuing 
the example, he tella us tna't lta 8Gbe .. can exiat nowhere but ill 
thw.gh't and that lt i8 a lJI6tSl.. .. lluP.1. ot 1_81Ilt1t1011. i'la"-
ther, aa regards pure empirical cone ep ta aa d 1& t lngu i.bed fr QI the 
_th~ma'1.1 one •• tl1 he descr1be. 'the a •• me. "as a ru.le for the 
determinat10n or our lntultlO11t in aoecrdanee with some 8]»cltle 
univer .. l concept." The he clt •• the example of the d~& show-
1118 how WI" lms1natl <m .at delineate .ome vague flt;ure of a tour 
footed animal in Ql.'der to think ot doe in contrast wltb. aome par-
t1cular des of expertence.52 
To the denn.! 'tiD Of the empirical schema lJint gave prev10us 
h. haa added the Dotion ot .1ll"thes1a accord1ng to rule, which 
glv •• m ..... e content to the .tsthCld" or "procedure ft of lmu glnation 
ot the previoUs deaor1ption. FUrther •. ~e taot that an lad1vldua 
" 
1s no't an adequa ie object tor a universal concept 1. oont1nua1l7 
emph ... ized by lUlnt, no doubt liS be1r.t.g the reauan tor the enatenc 
01' emplr10al schema. Thus 1t is 'that t.he empirioal schemata 
"under11e our c CIl.OOp'." 1n the a.u •• tha t ttle), are subjective 
1 .it 
51 .... s noted ear11er the term "8p1r1081 ooncept" haa bee 
u.ed. throughwt 1:h18 paper In the w i4. se •• ot' all non-transoen-
dental ooncept., *1d1 includes both. • tnernatioaJ. ooncepts and 
str10t empirical or what Kant someUmes calla "sensi bleH coneepta. 
At t1mes Kant al.o .Mma to us. the term emplr&oal COPS!2' In 1ta 
w1der significance. 
alA. 140-lU-B 180 (168-183). Italios nc.$ ill orls1nal. 
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instrument a in which .e can think and by which .. e oanapply em.-
pirical concepta. 
Kant in his tinal considers t1 on ot the em:pir1ca 1 sehe!1ti ta 
tells us tblt these schemata m9ke in1ages possible. The productiv 
imgimticm results in the schemata, the reproductive results in 
images, but only through the instrumentality or the corresponding 
schema. Kant tells us that the empirical IS chema ls a n.!p.onos+:llm. 0 
pure !. priori im gil'll tian.th l"OUSl which. and in accordance with 
which. ina ges themse1 ves first be oome possible •• 53 
A few interesting corollaries follow :f'rom 1ttis rinal descDlp 
tlon by Kant. First. Paton tells us54 that, traa 1be meanlng 
nlS!lmrp had in Kant's tlme, tbe empir1cal sche_ must be a sort 
ot wavering or schematio image. Secondly, the tact that theae 
schem.ata _ke images poasible and enable the connectlon ot con-
cepts wlth sue imag •• proves the dis1;inctlon between transcanden 
., 
tal and emplrical schemata. For the ~'egorle8t Kant has 'tOld us. 
have no correspond1ng lntui tlon 8. mong appearances. Th1s d1stlnc-
tion 1s contirmed b1 the wards 1mDk:ldiately follow1ng the tinal 
desert ption ot empirical s ebemata that we .ha vebeen cons IderiI@_ 
nOR ,b!! other hp~., the schema of a PYE' concept ot understanding 
S$Jl ~v!I n brol!Sbt into!.!!i[ !maSI whatl08vex:_tt65 The empirlcal 
schema 1s then, tinally, a product ot !. :en 0ri imagina tion which 
53A 141-142--B 181 (183). 
54Paton, lIt 35-36. 
55A 1/2 ..... B 161 (183). With exception of' tt~urelt italios not 
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cOllal.'. or a aohema ti. 8YD\h •• 18 01' _ thad of tbat 1DB 81m 'lOll 
.hereby 1 08ll thln~ emplrl 08 1 c one.pta and a pply them to 'he 1,r 1n 
d,lvltlual instance. C1I: 1nage. Tbe latter. produc'h ot reproduc-
tive 1rIla81m tJQn, are p08s1 ble only because of the general con-
a,.truotl"e model ot the 8chema.66 
Now tba t •• have speoified mere in detai 1 the exact nat\a"e of 
~e empirical achema in ltaelt and ha". seen In flek11 the nature 
ot the transcendental schema, tbe quest1 CI1 of the relation bet" .. 
~ea. two daalJlldaa aore preClae auwer "than ... e one tbat oould be 
Si'9. 1n the prece41ug eaptar. 
Flrat of aU, how do •• tranaoenden tal achemaan4 the .pl 
oal acnema 4Uts troll one another? The tranaoenden'Ml schema 1. 
8888nt181.11 a obaracrterlatlc of ~e pbenceenal pb~'S! wh11e the 
empirlcal aohema 18 a IMllJ&Ul'&l1 rule ot 1.magiMti on. It 1. true 
that the present allel1IJia bas e1l.phaalaed tbe tact that the trane-
eendenial aobe. 1. a.19 the V8b.lo1eO! the eat.gar,. as known, 8J1 
18 there tON 1n a "De. sub j eotl". aa well. If suoh a th 1118 1. 
e.,e posai bl., draw1JJg a clear lin. o.\_ .. n the subject kn<MiDg 
anet tbe known objet' ln Ken tIs sy$ tsa ls, at best, dlft1cult in 
the 8xtreme. Here, we eaw. 1. evldeeed prec1ael1 IAn t fa double 
56!:Unce tbe 1ndly1dual image and the Instance or object of 
empir1cal celloept bEtv. been equlvalated. and since the empirical 
ache. ake. 1m.ag •• po.slble. dee. the empirIcal sohemtl lake the 
obJeot of the concept possible? Yes. 1t one remembers tbat both 
emp1rioal s<:hema and object depen4 on transcendental achemat:!s. (as eQ.ui valent to the eonst1tutlon of knowledge) and there 18 onl,. 




tendency to subjectivism and phenomenalism. Nevertheless, despite 
the ambiguous character of the transcendental schema, greatest _ .. 
phs. 81s see1'n$ to be pla ced by Kant on its object! va characteristicl, 
the temporal aspects of what is intellec1ually known, and there-
fore, in this respect the transcendental schema is to be distin-
guished f"rom the emplri ca 1. 
The second point or difference between the two types or 
schema. ta 1s the poles between v.bich each is int ermedlary. The em-
pirical schema is intermedlarr between any universal concept 
("sonsi blett or matheJlll ti cal) obtained from the manifold of experi-
ence by analysis and abstraction, and an instance of' that concept 
or its image. The transcenden tal schenll. bas two palrs of." poles 
-
between ,Alieh it mediates. On the subjective or preconscious side 
in the mcment or the constitution of." the db ject of knowledGe, the 
schema is 1ntermediary between the pure category and 1be uncon-
d1tione:ld m.anifold ot sense appe3raree~... In this case, thE! trans-
candantal schema is time in general, in the very act of being de-
term1ned. On the c onsei rus s ide of." the dun11 ty, the transcenden-
t'3.1 schema mediates the category in its application in Judgnent to 
conditioned sense ~ippe<':trances. In this in3t~nee, the transcendan-
tal sche:na points two ways: to the object Imown in the p:lrticular 
t1m.e-deterrnin.a ti ons whicil are characteristi cs of the object, and 
to the knowtng subject as the ve~icle of the knowledge of that 
category. All this is a surtllll9ry of' Whi:lt we have seen about both 
types of scheM~ta. 
The transcendental and empirical schem.a share 1n beIng pro-
ducts of the imag1na t10n, as tEmporal, and as e leae nts of COI1-
scious exy.er1ence that mediate the apnl1catlc.!1 of some sort of in 
telligibl11ty to sense appearances. In a sanse It can be said 
tha tone lJ .. cb,ma~l!Q ef'focts both types 01" schenlil ta. In the pre-
ceding chapter we for all practical purposes 1dentit1ed transcen-
dental smemi;l't1sm with the transcenden tal actin ties which con-
8truot the object of knowledge. Since the same categories effect 
the phenomenon. no matter what the formal a spa ct at 1t known. 
whether it be empirioal or the categery, fl.ud since the categ01'ies 
are aU present 1mplici Uy In every object ot knowledge, even the 
most empirical. suoh a $Ynthesis seems to have clear validity.57 
'rhls unity in soheIlllt1sm despite the diversified sch.e.ma ta es .... 
sentially contains the answer to the dittiwlt1es some ot" the com-
mentators presented, as we 38'W earlier, in whtlt they thwght were 
the contrad1etiCllS betVJeell scheJ1atis~ ,In general and the transOEJn-
1 
" dental .schema ttl. Vi$ are nCM' in a better position to answer those 
dif:l'icul ties. Prichard, we recall, listed wurac teristi es or wba t 
he thought to be the schewa in general which did not square 'with 
the dEmands of til e tra:n.scendeIl tal schem~ita. .1?'ir at .. t!19 rule of 
i.raag1mtion la subjective, ~.a:lile the transcendw.tal scherlla.ta must 
rela te to objects known. 3ecomly, time seems to be subjeoti va ill 
the ftgener~ tt c onsideratl on, v..b 11e obje cti va for t.he transce:nde!l.ta 
57cr • ..Javal .. p_ 167 an the depe ndence or elllp11"ical s aha ira t1_ 
upon transcCldfBl1al SolUUB tism. 
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achema. 58 We s88 now that these descript10ns ot general schema-
t1am were re&l17 Character1st1cs at the anp1rical schema. and tbu 
subjective. as .e saw in the d1stinotions made above. 
There was no oontradiction w1th the transcendental schemata. be. 
cause such empirical character1atles had notbing to do with ~. 
transcendental scheat. Prichard's 'third objection resolves 1tsel 
into the familiar object1on to the schema as a "third thIng" &.n4 
will be anawered shortl,. 
S1m.1larly. Mar'ahal's ohange ot pos1t10n from. the subject1-
visl1e deSCription ot lhe schema 'in g •• raJ. to the rather objecti 
vist!c analysis of the transcend_tal schemata,59 and Paton's re-
marks that considerailems ot the schema 1n general t.hrow 11ttle 
light. on the transcendental schema, eo are both based on the inter 
pretation tilat ~e descr1ptions of the sdlerra as a rule or imagi-
nation, as a .olloer_. and. as a .'Ulodor presenting an image to 
a concept, .ere to be applied to treuis~~ndental. SCeDIlta aa .eU 
as to empirical one.. SUch an i:aterprelatlon is cer'talnly excuaa 
ble seeing thecontus1ng order ot Kant's treatment. 61 But the 
, I 
eSCf. PrIchard, pp. 252-254 and 1h1s paper, pp_ 11-12. 
59cr. Mar'chalt III, 178 ... 185 and this paper, pp_ 13 ... 14. 
SOct. Paton, II, 36. 
61Smith could also be listed among these men. He did not 
percelve the contradiotion between what the others thrught to be 
the schema in general and the transcendental sdlema, but he con-
ceived the rule or lmag1nat10n aspeot as pr1mrU,. desc:rip.tive ot 
the tranaoendentaJ. schema. He does, thwgll, consider that an,. 
treatment by !ant ot senalbleconcepts 1s wt ot place. ct. 
Smith, pp. 338-339. 
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position adopted here .eems to be tar l'8arer the truth: b..nt 
mixed in examples ot empirioal schemata and their def'1n1tious .. 1' 
considerations 01' transcendental sel'hlmati8Dl, first. beoause 01' the 
oonmon characteristics which .e saw sowe. and secondlr. beoause 
botn types 01' schemata result trom one unified act of knowledge 
transcendental apperception. But Kant also wanted to 
empirical schemata differed from the transcendental ones. With 
a 11 this in }{ant t s terse expression. amblgui', and cantua ion of' 
interpretation was certain to result. 
The above suttlce·. tis a Justification ot the position adopte 
here on the empirIcal schemata and their relation to transcenden-
tal schemata. 'the fitth and tinal portion of this chapter must 
give a general view ot the signifioance at the transcendental 
schema ta. in !\ant ta 9£;\ t19UJ- OUr purpose a t this momst 1s not t 
3iv8 the tinal ana178is 01' sclumatism-·that is the task of the 
., 
follOWing chapter-.but simply to shoW,:~hat the objective a1de or 
the dUB lit1 involved in schemat1sm is an integral. part of :Kant t8 
systenh 
Probably the most trencMnt objection to the significance or 
the transcendental schema 1athe posit1on of 3Jnith. Prichard, and 
cairo. t]:)a t no schema or "thir d th ing" was neoessary to media t9 
categor,v and appearances. Therefore the problem 1s talae and the 
answer unnecessary. The answer to such objections was implied 111 
the distinct10ns made above, but formal treatment of this 1mpart-
ant quest10n has been reserved t111 now. 
.. 
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We recall ~ha' Sm1 'h leveled '''0 ob Jeet1 CIl8 asa1nat the 
whole etruc1iUre at the schemai1em problem: (1) schel'ltl t1_ 18 n~ 
a process ot aubaump1iton, and (2) 1ihe sehem 1s no1i a "1ih1r4 
thing." Bath ot lhe.e Dl1atakea are tarced upon Ran' by his arch1 
tectonic. We also saw tba.t the first objection reduced itself to 
the secom. since !ant never says that schemat1e .!i. subsump-
t1on. 62 
To SmIth 'a second object! on we must reply: lant says that 
the transcendental schem. 1s a third thIng and he is correct. In 
deed, it is sum t as we saw above, in a dUal manner. On the 
transcenden tal and. preconsc1 QUa s 1de tlll'B roo d 1ates as a til trd 
thing between the pure category a nd the manifold ot sense data to 
be determined 1nto an aot of knowledge. This is eYldent tram the 
transcendental deduct10n alone and should be clear h'om the pre-
eedint:; chapter at this thesis. On the conse1 ws Side, in determi-
nate judgments, the transcendental sqbema is the third thing be-
~ 
tween the category and the now determ1'liate end condl tioned sense 
appearances. On this side of the dU'i lity the transcenden tal 
schema haa a double lite; it involves universal characteristlos ot 
the object and 1$ the vehiole ot the category a s known. This 
ambiguity he1gb1ums the point of the schema as a third thLng. As 
to the influence of Kant t II arch iteoto:o.ic upon his arg~nts, the 
flnal determination ot such an issue 1s being reserved tlll next 
chapter. 
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C81rd t s po.ltlon, 81ml141r to 8m1'th's, we recall, hold.1;hat 
the rela1J1on of perception and concept1on 1s such that no 14111'4 
thing is really needea. The act ot knowledge 1s so unifled. that 
acnemat1sm 1s no longer necessary to glve the categortes synthetio 
value. Thus. his ar~m.n' necessarIly leads to an alteration at 
the premIse ot the heterogeneIt7 problem. 63 PrIchard likewise. in 
the third d1screpauoJ he claims to exist between genera.l schema-
tiSlTl and the transcendental sehemata, says that aim. the process 
of sehematism actually subatmGs the manit old \Ulder the category, 
it perfOrms the very Impossibility 'for whlch the schematism was 
postulated in the tirst place.54 
The answer to Caird's and Prichardta objection. besldes the 
answer just gIven to smith, 11es truly in tbe whole duality that 
has been outlined thrOUf!')lout this paper. Kant stated his problem 
in terms of suosum.pt1on, i.e. judgment. and therefore in terms 
more of the conscious side of this duality. He answered it in 
terms tha t were sometimes eclloes of the trallscenden tal deduotion 
and thus in terms or the preconsciOUS, constitutIve side of 
knowledge. Yet in other parts at his chapter }Sant answered it 1n 
terms of objeotive characteristics of c onsel OUa knowledge in jUdg-
ment. A.t bast- hls argumelit was difficult to tollow. Consequentl,. 
the obJect1ons of the c anmantatcrs are understandable. 65 
.t, 
63Caird. It 402-406, 421. 433. Cf. above. p_ 10. 
64Pr lchard, pp. 254-255. Cf. above. pp. 11-12. 
65 A tinal resume 01' the significance ot all the standard com-
mentators will be tound 1n the final chapter belOW. 
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Neverthele •• , the schema'lsm chapter conta11UKl 8 ver"l e ••• tial 
11Dk in the cr1 'tleal arstem. Rant had praren 1n the 4.4uo'10118 
tilftt the oa:tesorl •• Hr8 tbe 8Q1Z'Ce and ultimate explanat10n of 
our intellectual experience. lie b_ tlltt tbe content of aueb. 
categories muat ulUmatel7 be. ud could otlly 18&1 tlm 'ell 'be, 
.ellS. lntuitlona,. But he bad IWt 18' &n_e.t:'e4 ,be problem at !sL 
the on. was '0 be o~cte4 to the oUler. The ref ON he 10oke4 to 
tbe tren8e.n4an~1 ao'lv1 tl •• and the eategories he bld outlined 
Ute deductions. lIe 88_ that in constitutlng tbe object of know-
ledge, the cat.sor1e. aDS 1maslnat1on must prodUce an ettect upca 
the object suoh tl:lIat thaa. _'e,or1 •• could be le~ timllteq &pp11 
to ". 1'b.ef _art. prodUce certain eh6ra"'.rist1 c. ln ,bat ob jeet, 
"third thlngs" bet ... en tbe pure 1n.tell1g1 billt,. ot the catesorr 
and the indetermlD11te ••• or appearane... Thea. uDlveraal cb.tl",o 
'eriatles are the transcends tal eoheDlta, .. whole greater than tb. 
two const! \,,'1ve parts. The subjeotive transcendental aoU vltl •• 
" , 
outllned in the deduotions, when looked at under the aspect of 
producins "uGh cbaractar1at1ca contcrmed to the oategories, .. ere 
oallod SElH9SstS~&. Uiu'lI»lih ill. products, :ll!aIPSa!p:telr 
._.M1I· 
At the conclu.J.on ot the la.st chapter \;e a.ked lt the sOh .. -
t1sm. chapter lOaa $UptSl'tluQUs. since the const1tutlon at the object 
of the tranacenden tal deduotion was the same aa tIle actl vi ties 1m 
p11ed in tbe 8000ustlsm chapter. It 1& olear DQ'I tbat the chapter 
on scheDr3t1am waa not superfluous. Kant needed the transcendental 
achemta to eel' the ar01mmta ot the deduct1 aus. 
CHAPTER IV 
EPILOGUE 
The wr1 ting ot the illustrious sage of Koenigsberg, 
The founder of the Crit1cal Ph1losophy, mere than an,. 
other work, at once inv1gorated and disciplined my 
understa.nding. The orig1na 1i tYl the d.epth, • II • the 
adamantine cha1n at' log1e, and I will venw.re to add 
(paradox as it will appear to those who blve taken 
their not1on ot Immanuel Rant from ReV! ewers and 
Frenchmen). the clearness and evidence of the Citi tlgue 
of Pure Res;Qn ••• took possession of me with a 
giant' 8 hand." 
.-001er1dge1 
The purpose ot this paper MS not been to instUl an opinion 
as vehem.entally favora.ble to Kant as the one Coleridge expresses 
here. But it 1s hoped that tals 'thes1s has shown that there 1s a 
logic and 1nner consistency in Kant's Cr1t19u~ wh1ch, 1f it were 
more widely recognized, would embarrass those cant11entators who 
~ 
" 
ala 1m to t ind sa much that 1s inconsistent and contradictory in 
Rant's thwght, especiall, in re€f:1rd to the problem of schemat:ism.. 
The initial pages or tllis peper pointed out a few 01.' those un .. 
favorable opinions concerning the sign1ficance and interpretation 
of Kant's chapter on schematism. This doctrine was supposedly 
formulated to anner the problem of the eanp.le te heterogeneity of 
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eategory an4 "nse 1ntuit10n. But far the objectors tbat hetero-
geneity does not even exlst; these two are rec1procally orienta-
ted and no intermediary Is needed. Scbematism Is postula ted slm-
ply to fill out the parallel with tbe arch1tectonic structure or 
tra.ditional logic and 18, consequently, artif1clal in the extreme_ 
Sehematism ia the answer to a non--existent problem. Or' if the 
problem haa any signiflcance, the answer 8S hant formulates it is 
so involved with contradiction and obscurity that the chapter is 
ultimately meaningless and or no value. 
This has been seen all too frequently, but it bears repeti-
tion here so that 8. summa.ry signif1cance of' schematlam. ean be per-
ceived til clear eonu-ast. On the oontrary, this paper has main-
tained that the cha:pter on scbemtism is an integral part of 
Kant's arauMent and the purpose of the C,itiQue. And the ke.r to 
the understaIll1ng of that s 19nit1canee 11e s in a du.:J.lst 1e outlook 
which 1s "the eenter ot Kant's crit1cal,.,sys"tem. Kant needSd the a 
-. 
R£1or1 categories to eave sci enoe :!'ran Rurnean soept1cism and Bens-
lam in general; he needed to limit the knowledge engendered 07 
these categories to the realm otsense eXl>erience to save the mind 
trom the metaphya1cal pitfalls of rationalism. But the dlscussioa 
of' such oaiegOt-ies dem.anded a. duality such as that pointed out in 
this paper. To prove conclusively the existence and necessity or 
!!. Brion concepts, Kant had to refer tothe content ot human mow-
ledge and show tha t the categories explain these taots ,ot know-
ledge. But _tnce the categories are !. P£ lor1,,. i.e. pri or to the 
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given ot experience, he lBd to delve deeply inw an explAII8:tion 
of "transcendental" activl'ties. syntheses, operatlons ot pure .anc1 
reprOductive lmginatlon, pure intuitions of space and time, aDd a 
dozen other elements which entered into and aided the oonstruction 
of our knowledge. even betore we were aware of it. 
It was shown how the duallty between the subjective constitu-
tion of the object ot knowledge and the cc.nscious awareness or 
this object is imp11ci t in a very poignant way in the meta.physlcal 
and transcendental dedueti ons of the Citegorles. It can be said 
that it was the precise purpose of both these deductions, especial 
17 the latter, to demonstrate the I. Pii.l, preconscious side of 
Kant's cognitional dua11ty_ It was 11kewise shown that the oft 
discussed double tendency ot Rant to subj activism and phenOIlenal-
iam. where knowledge is regarded merely a s the product C1Z modifi-
ca1;ion ot subJecti"e apprehension on the me hand, or where the 
., 
products of the transcendental actl"1~.1es take on some SOl't or ex-
istence ot their own on the other. signltlcan1;lr retlecta thts 
duality. 
only w1th it 1n mind could the schena t1 sn chapter be 1nteUl 
gibly and consistently in'terpreted. Time and its determlna tlons 
.. ere proposed by lant as the 'tj!ird th1pa which would mdtate cats 
gary and lntui tion. But tlme-determ1m t1 ons were seen to be am.-
blguOUlh As products of a synthesis they would later be seen as 
kiDds of temporal determinati ale, unlversal characteristiCS or 'tll 
object. As the form of inner sense and the formal OOM itl an of 
lO4 
a8nslbl1lt,.. 'theae t:lme-d.term.1.t1oaa implied an !. BASE' 8J!ltb.. 
sis omtormed to 8 rule. This mle oould only be the oategory. 
and the synthesis ot sohenatism was the synthesia 1Ibl<b _. U1e 
heart 0'£ the transcendental dedl.ll.ltion. The tact that the sohe1YJl-
t1zing process is a hidden art pointed to the preconscious and 
subjective side.of the duality and its relatla1 to the transcende 
tal syntheses. This was contirmed by Ktm t'a emphasis in the 
achematlsm chapter on the word JXIltllsai" itself' and ctl conform.it,. 
with or determination by a rule. The fact that seham tism effect 
"all representations" and the unity of' the manifold of intuition 
l1kewise impl1ed tlle .!. Rr;J.2l& consti'tution of t11$ object It Schema 
tism can be said to lim1t the category only because it must in-
volve some !. nrl9l,l construction in the object. Lastly, schema-
tism was seen to be connected with the "transcendental truth'tt 
which precedes empirIcal truth and makes exper1ence possible. 
If such 115 achemat1sm, wlla t of tnt transcendental scl\ema? 
". \ 
Schemat1sm was seen to have an eN'ect upon the ob.1!!t, upon all 
representat1on; this effect was an eXRl!§s!on of the category. 
This. the text calling the schema a phtlsmenoa. and espec1ally th 
statements before the scheu:l8tlsm chapter that it wculd deal with 
the "slane, and the ua1vssal Mrk,. sufficed to prove that the 
transcendental schema must involve universal characteristics of 
the object •. Only in this way could schenatism be sald to exeble 
us to apply the categories to that object. Kant 'a list of the· 
1ndividual schemata, artif1cial as they m1r-,ht be, confirmed that 
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~e eohemata were objective grounds tor 'the C4~.&ory·. applioation, 
But 1t tit. banaoen4elltal schemata were Obj ... 1"8, the proll-
lera of Kant's d •• oript1cm.e ot 'the sohemata ot empirical coneep'. 
a8 subJeotive 8rnthea,es accord1ng to .. ru.le. procedure. ot the 
~Slno.tlon 1n proV141aa an image to a concept, waa a Gordian lulot 
that had "0 be 'Wltlfi.. In as mucn aa too empirical schema 1. part 
or ObJec'1ve oonaclouanea •• it oan 1n Aunt be considered obJeoi1ve j 
but it was o ••• nt1ellJ a subJectlV. sohemat1z1ng process prov1ding 
a vehlcle tor the thinkin6 ot an abstract universal. emp1rical 
concept. It was, aa 1t were, Q OJ-product of the transcendental 
schema trQll which it _5 to be d1stingu tahed. '1'110 reason tor \h1e 
was th.ut the latter involved the un1vel'sal characteristics of .11 
Objects, prior to a~ abstraction. Sinee these characteristlos 
are implicitly known in 8rq object, no matter how emp12,-1cal. 1t 
must be involved ln the object! vet 1ntelligible cootent ot i;tl17 COD 
Ott!'t tha t 1$ 'll batra.t.ed by anal,si. ~om tha t ob jflct • 
. '
candentsl sohema. nevertheles., bad a 81gnlt1canoe all 1ta own 
a1nce it alone proY! .... 4 the o'b jeoti va rafereDce whlch aUowe4 the 
application 01' the categary to objects, closed the gap between pur. 
~tesory and ~ppe6ranoea. and fulfilled the anticipatiODs of the 
deductions. 
Having .<ten th.is summary 01' the argument. of thi8 theais. the 
necessary baokground 1. prav1.ded tor a tlnal anewer to the obJec-
tions 01' the c~ent6tor$. 
Norman Kemp Smith's objeotions, probably tbe m.ost perauaa1ve 
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ot all, merit first consideration. It Mil already been shown that 
the transcendental schema i~ a ,third th ing and tba t the relati'ou. 
of category to intuition does not preclude such a mediating factor 
Yet his objection 1s not a superficial cr1 t101m; it is based on a 
deep understandiIlg of :Kantts tihwgllt. Smith's insistence tbat 
category and intuition are related as form and matter t and are 
therefore mutually orientated toward each other, is precisely tbe 
subjective and !. PlLA9El side of tbe duality Emphasized'in this 
thesis. Even on thiS, side, t~e could, it was shown, be con-
sidered a third thing. But the far greater overs1~t on Sm1 ttl fS 
part was the tact tba t he failed to see that Kant must answer the 
problem ot heterogeneity on the objective, eonscious side as well. 
In the metaphysioal deduetion Kant had gone from the logical torms 
ot judgment to the categories which must be !. »rio[1 to experience 
In the transcendental deduction he went trom the necessary element 
01' conscious experience, both subJecti.:v.e aId objective, to these 
same !. l!ri,ori oa.tegories. Now, 1n the ttPrInc1ples, tt tant had to 
make the step back from the ~ prlorl and preconscious into the 
realm of ex:)llci tly conse! ous judgmn ta, to see preCis ely how 
these categories entered into knowl edge. Smi tb. failed to see that 
hantts purpose in the schemat1sm ch:)pter was to point out the ob-
ject1 va grounds which the subjective and tr.tmscendental pi';1enta-
tion ot category and intuition must construct, the products of 
these transcendental· scttvi ties. Wi tbout Slcn grounds, there 
would be no conceivable way or jU3tlfying the application of suoh' 
10' 
categories to objects in the judgments ot consciousness. 
The failure on smith's part to see the necessity of Kant re-
turning to judgment through scbematism 1s also partially the caus 
ot his repeated calling upon an artiticial architectonic aa the 
real basis ot Kant's ohapter on schematism. F'tn'thermare, it waul 
seem, as Paton maintains, Smith WtiS too greatly and ~s11y inf'lu-
ene ed by Ad lckes on 'ttl is point. 2 Fart:rom be lug an arb1 tra ry ac-
cretion to match the chapter on Judgment in tormal logic. the 
schem ta were a necessary complement. a s has been shown, to tbe 
deductions. Lastly, the view t18 t smi1b held that the transcen-
dental schema waa the rule or prooedure of imagination, a descrip 
tion which, as was seen, Kant used only fOr empirical schemata, 
led him to look. upon the schema as a purely subJecti ve 
ventlng hlm from seeing Kant's real Intention. 
Slmilarly. Edward Caird considered soh erna ti am unnecessary b 
cause he was so deeply engrossed In the subJective. consti'tutl ve 
side of the duality. It 1s Calrd's great merit to have perceived 
w1th deep penetration the dual1ty between construction and con-
sciousness, \\bieh he preferred to express in the Kantian terms of 
synthet 1e and analyt 1c lmwl edge. Mudl. more prof wIldly tha n smith 
he pereel ved the na tive rela t1 on ot category and perception and 
the synthetiC UpJ.tz between the two. Too much so, it seems, slne 
be looked upon a discusai CIl of Judgment and the schema ts merely 
... ,. 
ISee Paton, II, 66, n. 2. Cf'. also Ibl~.f 76. 
loa 
as a dialectical JrWllnel' of speaking about the .rn\h.tle unian 1D.-
VOlYN in l:;,antlan knowledge. so ,bat mee such cons1deratlon. baw 
been accanpl1alled, tbe premise (of heWZ'Oi,;enelt;y) whieb. 41'0\1 .. 4 
the discussion beco;llea u.xmecoaaary. Deapi to hi. penetrat1ng aDa 
.8. of the .Kant1an duall ty t Ca1r4 haa ral1ed 1n em. tundamental. 
polnt: he haa not perce1 ve4 tbe essen'tial a n4 J'8dlcal d 1tt.rent1 
III i1 on between senae an4 in telleet It be _een emplrlcal. lntul tlonal 
experience end \ul1fy1n& intelligence. It was this that Kant was 
trying to get at 1n the sehenatisll dlapter.. Ca1rd haSt 1n etfect. 
reduced the l;a nt lCtn 41 all i1 to a s.1 bJe ctt ve 1 den '1". It might be 
ventured tbat Ca1rd did this because he interpreted !<ant in \Gr_ 
ot Hesel "ho fol.lowed hint, and l1e too facilely .yain.sized the 
anti thesis Ji.ant had constructed between moyl edge aa active In-
telllgence and k.:tlOwledge as pasat ve IntuitIon. 
11.A. :rIcnaJ.'d 'a lea. protOWld but trenchan'C crlticisms have 
been deal' wlth tor tbe moat part tn: the cone lud1ng sect1Qn of \be 
previous chapter. Ue too, as _. pOinted out, SAW no mOGssl tJ 
tor acher&~ tlsm 1f the (l\ _gorlea actu$ll;y dId subsume intu1tional 
experience under them. L1ke3m1th, he fAilf'd to percelve that the 
synthesis of ct1tegory and 1ntuit ion mua t DIM1,~ in some ehartloter 
Ist10 of the obJect. or tbere ls no foundatl w tor applying the 
ea tegor y tot he 0 b je ct. 'lbe su.pposed 0 a:l tr&d 1e ti CIlS he 1'1 nd s be-
tween the "schemtll ln general ft aud the transoendental am ermta hev 
been dealt w1th sU1'flo1ently ln Chapter III. Mcreover. Paton 
pOints out that l'rldlard, like C81rd, was ill-advised ln ws1ng a 
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Kantian canmentary to expound his own philosoPhy.3 
/ The interpretation ot Joseph Mareahal, S • .r •• has the ~ea' 
merit or expound1ng "hat he believes to be the psycholog1cal gene 
sis ot the schema t truly a synthesis ot the chapter on schema t1an 
w1th the subjecti va transcenden tal dedlrtion ot the first edItion 
of the Cri tigu,!.. But like l?ri d:ulrd he implied tile t l<ant' s 
descriptions of the scmmats of empirical concepts, necessarily 
sub je ot! ve method 8 ot 1.ma g1 Ie ti va c wstrue th>n, are equally appli-
cable to the transcendental s chama ta. A.s wa s seen, th1s cannot be 
accepted. And even thou€,,h he ends up, somewhat contrary to his 
in1tial position, seemingly attempting to objectIfy the transcen-
dental schenllta by recognizing them as universal signs far the ap 
plication ot categories, they still seem to rem.ain 1n the end pure 
expressi oos of the cetegorie s in 1magim t10n llnd not an aspect of 
the ob je ct knom. 
, 
Nevertheless, iiarscb.a1's treatment is fraught 
with keen insights into the subjective,·em synthetiC aspe~ts of 
Kant's construction ot the pbenom~on. This writer is primarily 
I indeb ted to Marechsl' II tree too nt .. -despi te Its apparent defec ts--
tor the inGi~t 1nt 0 the subje cti va and preconscious side of the 
duality emphasized in this thesis. 
naval'S'1pproach to the problem ot schemat1:::m, it is recalled 
is erea tly similar to t he one proposed here. Clearly then, he was 
not an objector to the sicnificance of Beh anati 001 and he need not 
3see Paton, I, 17. 
uo 
be reckoned with here. He was, tor the most part, merely re-
terred to 8S e ontlming the basic insight proposed in these argu-
ments. As was menticned, he dces not take great efforts to prove 
his hypothesis, other than to SlOW haw schematlsm gives a. unified 
view not only ot Kant's first C£1tlgUShbut also at all h1s 
n1 t1ngs. 
The last man who msr1ta particular cons1deration here 1s 
H.I. Paton. His view ot the transcendental schemata more than 81 
others has been evidenced throughcut these pages. Th.e greatest 
contribution he otters to the schematism problem--besldes the int 
tisl willingness to see Kant 'a v1ew--ls the continued em.phaais he 
places upon the transcendental schemata 8S the universal charac-
teristics of experience. Rant h1mself did not emphasize this sut 
1'101ently and it took Paton's 1nsight Into the whole at Kant's 
critical v1.8w ot knowledge to bring 'to suft1e1E1lt lietlt this 1m-
por'tant aspect ot 'the scilemattsm chapter. In the view of"this 
wri ter, only 1n one th1ng has Paten tailed to do justice to the 
interpretation of schellBtiSl1! that is in overlooking the subject 
lve and c anst1tutlve side of schemat1am and in his denial that the 
'transcendental aotivities and the construction of tb! object ot 
knowledge is preconsel QUs. 4 All 111i8 ma y be an unintentional 
.:ffort on Paton's part to avoid a par1;icularly subject1v1stic 1n-
t .,rpretat1on of :Kant. This wr1 ter would roo inta1n that if Paton 
'Cf. Paton, II, 25 and 73-75. 
Ul 
had bad aa keen a penetra U on 1nto the au .. li ty lnvolved in the 
Kantian system as Caird had, his interpretation ot acb.ema'Uam 
would not differ essent1ally f'rcm that proposed ln thla tbe als. 
As lt is, if' ther$ is anything lack1ng in Paton's lnterprete:\iloD., 
it is mare by anission tban by oontradiction. Moreover, i.Xl aD1 
event, Paton's continued emphasiS upon the schem.ata aa universal 
characteris'tloshaa brought more l1ght to the dif'f'lcult chapter 
than seems to bave been had betore. The crov-n lng corollary ot 
such an interpretation is, as was demonstrated at the conclus1on 
of the last chapter and elsewhere. that it viv1dly po1nts out the 
consistency aDd 10glca11t.r of not only \he schsnat1sm chapter. but 
Kant t. whole purpose and acccmpllslulaent ln the tlrst halt or the 
9r&t&gu, !t ~e 8~aI2l. 
Theretore one oonclusion must necessarlly tOLlow trom the 
po1nt ot this thesis. Wlth Paton, the chapter on schenat1arn must 
., 
be c onsi dered to ba va ttmore tba n the . va,lue of throwing 11gb t Ol'l 
". 
Kant's er;'ors," and "is essent1al to an underst8m1ng of the 
Crit1cal Ph11oaoPhy.,,5 W1th Paton too. schematlsn m.uat be con-
s1dered to have 11ttle or no1bing attn. IBrversity attr1buted to 
it by h1s crit1cs. It ls tNe that the der1vatlQ11 of the cate-
gor1as--and consequently the spec1fic schemata-tran the ferms ot 
Judgment "is ••• a trifle ingenuous." But Kant's doctrine d088 
y. 
5,paton. II. 20. 
us 
not rest exclusively on such a deri vati on. 6 Besides the depend-
ence upon the tarms of judgraents;( whlch after all only gives the 
spe91t12, nature ot the various schemata} the categorical charao-
teristics ot objects are der1 ved from the tact that all objects 
are temporal; in this there 1s a good bit of truth. ItThe con-
naxion ot' the categories wlth the synthesls or 1mag1.na tion and the 
t'orm. ot time is the DlOst important, and the least artific1al part 
ot the Cr1t1cal Ph1losophy.M? 
This does not excuse Kant trom tb.e mistakes that are ev1dent 
in the chapter. The obscurity of h1s terminology. tbe brevity of 
1118 treaim.ent. and according to the interpretation of this thesis, 
the lack ot clar 1ty on Kant t s part in pointing out the signiti-
cance ot his descriptions ot sehenata of empirical concepts, all 
have contributed to the cantusion tbat he. s arisen in the 1nterprEt-
iat10n ot this .1m.portan't dlapter.8 'Besides th1s. the failure or 
Kant to _ke clear the essential dua11~y which 18 1mplicit'· in his 
system, between the !. .;r1W1 oonstitution of the object and the 
experience ot that object. has contributed 1n a moat s1gnificant 
way to the c wi\ls1Qn that haa surrounded sch \:;:matism. In this 
chapter Kant was building the bridge trom the transcendental and 
6ben so, Paton defends the plaus1bili ty at such a der1va-
tion. "To treat tke derivatim of the categories trom the forms 
ot Judgment as wJ"CIlg,.headed and inexcusable pedantry indicates, to 
my mind, only the failure of the oritic to think himself into . 
Kant's point ot view. n ~bid •• 76. 
7ill4. •• 76. Paton again pOints cut in this section th.e lack 






preconscious side of h is system to calacs. QUe experi enos in JUdg-
ment. from the categories to the universal character1stics of 
ex~rience which Justify the app11cation of the former. It" both 
sides of the critical d iv1de were not percel ved, naturally the 
bridge of schematism seemed insign1t"ieant. 
But, aa was po1nted out above, even the objections of the 
cr1 t1 os a.re not wi thout merit J since they serVe to point out one 
er other aspect of Kant's doetr1ne on schemat1sm. Smith's empha-
sis on the correlation ot category and intui tlon, Sa O'1Jl tter and 
farm, structure a nd content t serves to emphas1.2;e the preconsc1ous 
snd constitutive side of the duality. Caird clearly perceived the 
dua11ty, eYen if he reduced 1t to ~ sort of Hegeliam identity. 
Prichardts criticisms share some of Smith's merits and besides. 
point up the d1ff1 wlt ies arising from an erroneoUs interpretatlon 
,. 
of the empirical schemata. Marechsl ,M s pOinted unintentionally 
to both sides of the duality. .And Pate-n. of course, has itven US 
the clear picture of the objective side of schematism and its 
total 8i gn1ficanee. The very 41 versi ty of trJe commentators haa 
aided in pointing out the dU'Sllit y vm 1eh is the essence of the 
present interprets t1 on ot schelnat1sm' 
It haa been outside the predetermined limits 01' this thesis 
to criticize Kant's doctrines from the point 01' view of a realist, 
a Sdlolaatic, or a Thanist. The purpose here, after all, was to 
clarity a small but important point in the thrught of a great 
philosopher. and not to point out the errors in hls whole system. 
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Yet. granting all the possible er1 ticis£.lS ttmt have been leveled 
!i. t tHe eri tical syste:l, and tIlere .have been many--some that are 
penet1't1ting and (,ui te valid, others tl1:1t do l~ant a ereat injustice 
--there will still be much of vlJlue in Kant's thougbt. Like 
:-.l11 great thinkers, in his errors he veered very near the truth. 
It may be permitted therefore, tu point out a few comparisons be-
tween what has been seen in the in·terprctation of schernatism and 
elements Of a mere realistic and even Thomist philosophy. rrhis 
will not be done very extensively nor prul'oul1dl.y, hut as a. s()rt of 
9pi to..!. dle~ to thr()v~ an Interest1.l1g sidelight on the consistency 
vf Lant's th;;'iU€,ht. If his thought has parallels with more tradi-
t.ional philosophy. it cannot be sO utterly I'alae and inconsistent. 
A 1'a ther cbvious comparison may be the one between the empir-
ical schema. and the Scholastic phantasm. Both are general schem~3-
tic images which permit the th ou~;:h t uf ,Hi ulli versa.l concept and 
its predic:ltion of an instance vf th~t ccneept. 9 Similarly, as 
., 
the empirical schema presu.pposes the t~anscendental one, ::md since 
the eu tegorles are ell involved implicitly in every object of 
knoviledge as the s OUl~ce of wha t is intelligible, so the schema ta 
of these C':i. tetr,ories f tile universal characteristIcs of real! ty, can 
90r. 1.. 1:.-. It 84, 7c., ~ •. Thoma,e Aquinatis, Summa Theologiae 
::larlett i edit ion ('T'nurini, 1950): ttlmpossi'61ie est 1ntel1ectus 
nostru(!1 ••• aliquid intell1gere in actu, nisi convertendo ad 
ph(JntaStlltlta. tf The content of an smp1ricnl concept and thus its 
schema could be correlated with what st. Thomas calls ltcom.mon 
matter," i.e. the material or empirical notes which are corn.mon to 
1'111 the individuals ai' a species. Hac'lll Eantts example of the 
schema of tbe empir leol concept 01' a d () as the ilnt)gil'lil ti ve delin-
e, tioD of the figure of a four-t'ooted animal in sorne general man-
ner. Cf'. ':3. '1' •• I. 75. 4c. 
U& 
be equiva18ted to the vague pbantasma which au,'s imaginat1on. 
mus,t formulate to think such concepta aa cauae, 8,batance, etc. 
Only 1n Kant, because ot his inherent subJectivism, the medium 
In which the eatesory or intelligibility is known is Identltled 
wlth the characterist1cs ot the object itself, And as the 
schemata are determine. t1 ons in t 1me (8 prime characteristiC at 
sensib111ty even tor the Scholastic) and the schemata limit the 
categories to sensibllity, so ytJhatever 1s known intellectualJ.,. by 
a Thani.t. is known only in and by reter,fHlce to the sensi ble 
paa nta sm. 10 
In the Introduction to the "Principles" Kant tells us that 
skill in being able to tell the particular applications of the 
rules of Judgment 1s an lnborn talent ,11 This and Kant's insist-
ence that schanatism is a "concealed art" can be roughly corre-
lOcr. Mar~chal. V, "La Than1sme ,davant 18 Phllosophte Cri-
tique. It PP. 163 and 164 and n. The reason \:hy Vie know ooly by 
converting to a phantasm is seen fUrther in the sam.e artIcle at 
~.! •• I, 64, 7 c.: "Intellectu8 autem hUrttlni, qui est conJunctua 
carpori t ptopr1U1D obJecttg g81 9l!tfi1 tat :s1!,6 natura !! materil1 
corp,gra;l;1 6U!tens, at per u us m uraa vIslnlIlum. rerum. 
etiam in inTis 1bl11um rerum. a11qualam cogni tionem a.scend·it ••• 
sicut de ratione naturae lapidls est quod sit in hoc laplde ••• 
Unde natura lap1dia, vel cu1u~eumgue ~teria*l! l!!, ~ognos~~ nan 
fO~"t COlllPJ.~lil et D.U. JWI1 !$!9und~ S,!RSi £wosc1 tur in pilrt1eu 
"ori §2f .. LLtens. Itallcs not in ori na. mr~Cilial wellpoin s 
out that tnI. conversion to the phantasm. is true even of know-
ledge ot 1m.Dri terial things (Of. .§..I.. llU.!l.. and ad 3) and that 
l:ia nt • s failure to a4m t le g i tima te 1m. o'"WIid ge of any1h Ins bey ond 
the' sensible limits of experIence is baaed on his lack of accept-
a.nce of the SCbolastlc doctr1ne ot ~palogl' 
llA 133--B 172 (177-178). 
U6 
la ted to St .. Thomas t proof by the experi enee ot tbe use ot eam-
ples for the dependence of our inteUectual knowledge upon phan-
tssm. 18 Kant mentions that the use ot examples mal" be or great 
help to sharpen this skill in applying a universal rule, but the 
"correctness and precision at intellec1ual insight ••• they 
more usually s0m8wlll t impair.· j'or examples are theUgo-eart ot 
judgment· and cannot be dispensed with by thQlle lacking in 
natural talent.13 
It would seem that for Kant the talented can 4i spense w itb 
examples precisely beoause of the !. priori nature of the cat.gar 
ies. And it one may be permitted .to expand Kantts hypothesis t 
a moment, the more t81ented w wld be thos e whose HB1 t1 .2.t E1RP!£-
S8u~S&Qn (as the ooncomitant awareness of persoDal thrught) is 
mare deeply present throughout all the !. prior,' syntheses of 
knowledge.. Thus, because 01' the intimacy of this preconscious 
union, such men can mere readily percei va the correspondence be-
" . 
"ween the 1ntelligib111 ty they think (the categor1es sc.b.emat1zed) 
and the objeots in which their though1i 1s groumed (the schemata 
as the un1versal characteristics of obJects) • 
.... 
12·secundo, quia hoo qu1libet in seipao exper1rl poteat,quo 
qua ndo allquls cone. tur allqu1d intel11gere, format a11qua phan-
tasnata sibi per m.odum exemplorurn. in cpibl1s quasI inspiclat qu 
inte1l1gere studet. Et Inde est etiam quod quando allum volumua 
facers allquid In'elligere, proponlmua e1 exempla. ex quibUS slbl 
phantasma ta farmare poss1t ad Intell1gendum.· ..§.I.. It 84, 7 c. 
13A 134-B 173-174 (1'18). 
U7 
a1a, the dual nature of the transcendental. schema as both charac-
ter1st1cs at the phenomenal object and subjective veh1cle of the 
category as known takes on greater significance. First, the cate-
gories have been hldden, preconsci Qua elements in the subjectiye 
knower. Secondly, in the !. PEigr& synthesis with the manifold, 
the categories beceme, aa it were, imbedded in the objeot, as lts 
lmlVfu:'sal characteristics, the transcendental schemata. Thirdly, 
the subjeot lmow1rlg Eeo2Sll'l these characterist1 cs aa the 
grounds for the app11ca ti on ot the categories. . In this recogni-
tion the oategory 1s tirst consc1ously known (i.e. the achematlzec 
ga"gc;rl 1n the sehem) and as such, returns to the subjective 
knower. The appllcation of the category in judt7)D.ent tollows 
necessarily. The mavemant has been from. !. preior1, to synthesis Of 
the object, back to subjectlve recogn1tlon at the scheaat1zed 
category tar the latter's applicati on in judgment. In su.ch recog-
., 
nitlon and jUdgment the schema is the ,.conac!ws expression of the 
category. the m.iddle point between the he ter ogene OWl poles which 
have been also the ;term.ini of the ca tegory 's transformation ani 
PI' ogre ssl on. 14 
.All this may have seemed mere airy ape Qulatl on and a point-
14ww ld it be possible to correa te Kan t's doctrine ot schem-
ati8m and the "precIsion ot intellectual ins1-ght" which examples 
impair with the fundam.ental thesis at Fr. B. Lonergan's book. 
iMl.~? Fr. Lonergan even calls insight an .! prior! synthesis, 
which is indeed wha t schematism is. ct. Bernard 1 .• F. Lonergan, 
s. J' cr, IRtUSh9• !. 3tudx .2L Human Undftrlta pQ. A. (New York, 1957). 
p. 406. Yet this author repudiates schemata as grounds for judg-
ment in his own system, whlch they were tor Kant. Cf.,Ib1$i. ,p.340. 
us 
less digression, but it does help to underscore the partIcular 
point of this chapter, that l(ant's thwep.t, with all 1ts conrus1 
terminology and eXpression, and desplte Its manlfest errors, has 
deep ccnsisteney whicb. makes it applicable to and parallel w1 th 
much philosoph1cal truth. The clearness and evidence of the 
C£, t19g 9.t J.>url H!!IOI may not have taken possesslon of e1 ther 
the reader 01" this vi tel" with the giant's mnd wltb which'1t dId 
Coleridge. But 1t 1s hoped that 1t 1s at least a 11ttle better 
understood why Coler1dge and so many others have been so pro-
twIJdly impressed by the logic and ca:uJistency ot, tbe phllosophf 
at 11llID9 Duel !ant. 
" . 
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